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ABSTRACT
Performance Related Pay (PRP) explicitly links the level of pay an 
employee receives to that employee's performance. Intuitively, it would 
appear likely that employees would increase their work effort in order to 
maximise their earnings from PRP. However, there is now a substantial 
body of research evidence, which suggests that PRP is not particularly 
effective in increasing employee motivation in practice. Despite this 
research evidence, PRP continues to remain popular as a payment system 
amongst firms.
This Thesis uses a case study of Thames Water, a large utility company, 
to examine the paradox between the continuing popularity of PRP and its 
apparent ineffectiveness as a tool for increasing employee motivation. 
Evidence from an employee survey and interviews with key managers, 
together with information from internal company documentation, is 
brought together to explore five related questions:
• Why did Thames Water use PRP?
• How effective has PRP been in Thames Water as a motivator for 
employees?
• Why was PRP not more effective as a motivator for employees?
• How effective was PRP in delivering the other objectives it was 
originally intended to achieve?
• Why does Thames Water continue to use PRP?
The analytical approach adopted, using three theories of motivation as a 
framework against which to examine the motivational effectiveness of 
PRP, provides a new way of looking at the possible limitations on the 
motivational effect of PRP. This thesis touches on the question of 
whether and how PRP brings about cultural change; this in turn raises 
complex questions of causation, which call into question the effectiveness 
of PRP as a mechanism for bringing about cultural change.
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Chapter 1
The Puzzle of Performance Related Pav.
Introduction.
'Performance-related pay in the UK is a puzzle. There is 
overwhelming scepticism about its effects on performance, yet its 
progress seems unstoppable/
The Financial Times (3/11/93)
Performance Related Pay (PRP) continues to be something of a puzzle. 
On the face of it, relating pay to performance would seem to be an 
effective way of motivating workers to work harder. Intuitively it might 
be assumed that workers would increase their work effort in order to 
increase their pay. ACAS (2003) in their guidance on pay systems put it 
quite simply:
"... the prospect of higher pay for increased output/quality often 
provides an incentive and many (incentive pay) schemes are 
introduced in the clear expectation that performance will thereby 
be improved."
It is therefore natural that managers should introduce PRP with increased
employee motivation as a key objective (Kessler 1994, 2000 and
Thompson & Milsome 2001). From a theoretical perspective, expectancy
theory would seem to provide explicit support for PRP as a motivator, by
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predicting employees will work harder to achieve an additional 
performance payment in the right circumstances.
Research, however, has shown that PRP is often not particularly effective 
at motivating workers (Thompson 1993, Marsden & Richardson 1994 and 
Marsden & French 1997). Nevertheless, PRP continues to be a popular 
mechanism for rewarding employees (Choat 1997 and Thompson & 
Milsome 2001). So it would seem, paradoxically, that a system of reward 
that at face value appears to be principally concerned with motivating 
employees to work harder, often turns out to be fairly ineffective as a 
motivator, and yet still remains generally popular with employers.
This thesis uses a case study of PRP in Thames Water to examine the 
paradox of the continuing popularity in the face of the evidence that PRP 
is not a particularly good motivator, by exploring five questions:
• Why did Thames Water introduce PRP?
• How effective has PRP been in Thames Water as a 
motivator for employees?
• Why was PRP not more effective as a motivator for 
employees?
• How effective was PRP in delivering the other objectives it 
was originally intended to achieve?
• Why does Thames Water continue to use PRP?
Each of these questions raises further issues in relation to the use of PRP
both to motivate staff and achieve other objectives. These other issues 
can be summarised as follows.
Whv did Thames Water introduce PRP?
Using qualitative evidence from structured interviews with those involved 
with the decision to introduce PRP and contemporary documentation it is 
possible to put together the original rationale for the introduction of PRP 
by Thames Water. The literature on pay and PRP, in particular, has 
highlighted three questions that may help shed some further light on the 
introduction of PRP by Thames Water and help place it in a wider 
context. Did PRP form part of some overall pay strategy? Was PRP part 
of a Performance Management strategy? Finally, to what extent was PRP 
part of a strategy for bringing about cultural change within Thames 
Water?
There is a debate in the literature about pay as to whether or not there is 
a new approach to pay emerging, sometimes termed 'new pay'; this is 
not about the introduction of a new pay system, but is concerned with 
the way in which pay fits with business strategy and organisational 
change (Kessler 2000). This thesis looks at how far the introduction of 
PRP fitted into Thames Water's other strategic and organisational goals. 
Thames Water undoubtedly had a number of objectives that they hoped 
to realise through the introduction of PRP. The extent to which different
objectives were articulated when PRP was introduced and the consistency 
and degree to which those objectives fit together and support each other, 
as well as the wider business strategy, is also clearly important to 
understanding how far the introduction of PRP in Thames Water can be 
said to be part of a strategic approach to pay or 'new pay'.
Performance Management has also played a part in respect of both the 
introduction and continued use of PRP in Thames Water. Performance 
Management can be viewed as an attempt to align individual 
performance objectives with wider organisational objectives, although the 
concept still maintains a degree of ambiguity (Bach 2000). PRP is not 
essential to Performance Management. Hendry et al. (2000) have 
criticised the use of PRP in Performance Management, terming it the 
'dark side' of Performance Management, because it emphasises the 
controlling rather than the developmental aspects of Performance 
Management. Nevertheless, the ability to cascade organisational 
objectives and reward their achievement, through PRP, has in practice 
meant that PRP is widely associated with Performance Management.
Looked at from the perspective of PRP, it is Performance Management 
that ensures that PRP engages with the wider organisational issues 
necessary for PRP to bring about greater employee commitment and 
cultural change. In Thames Water PRP was intended to ensure 
managers and employees took responsibility for organisational
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performance by getting them to focus on issues of performance 
management through the performance appraisal system. The question 
then is was the use of PRP in Performance Management part of an overall 
strategy or simply just another justification for adopting PRP? It is 
hypothesised that PRP will have been an essential part of the move of 
Thames Water from the public sector, as a nationalised industry, into the 
more commercially focused private sector, as suggested by Kessler and 
Purcell (1992).
How effective has PRP in Thames Water as a motivator for employees?
PRP explicitly focuses on performance it therefore seems pertinent to ask 
how far PRP can be said to improve performance. The evidence, as 
already noted, is that while managers by and large think that PRP acts as 
a motivator for employees, when you ask employees, they report not 
being motivated by PRP. Indeed the apparent ineffectiveness of PRP as a 
motivator has often been used as a point of departure for a critical 
analysis of PRP (Bevan and Thompson 1991, Thompson 1993, Marsden 
and Richardson 1994, and Marsden and French 1997). Kessler (2000) 
has observed that much of the evidence about the motivational 
ineffectiveness of PRP comes from the public sector where there are 
constraints regarding the nature of the workforce and the nature of the 
organisation which make it less likely that PRP will be an effective 
motivator. It is perhaps worth noting that this study looks at the
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motivational effectiveness of PRP in a newly privatised company where 
many of the constraints that apply to the public sector do not apply. 
Irrespective of any constraints, the explicit link between pay and 
performance in PRP begs the question of whether that link has a causal 
effect on performance, or whether pay is simply being distributed 
contingent on levels of performance that would have been achieved 
irrespective of the use of performance payments.
It could be argued that if PRP is used to achieve a number of different 
organisational objectives it is not particularly important to know whether 
or not PRP increases employee motivation. Nevertheless, whether or not 
PRP is introduced with the objective, wholly or in part, of increasing 
employee motivation, the extent to which PRP is motivating employees is 
still an important issue in terms of the overall performance of the firm. If 
PRP is not motivating employees, then there is a danger that it may 
actually be de-motivating employees (Marsden and Richardson 1994). It 
is also argued in this thesis that PRP is more likely to be an effective 
mechanism for bringing about a positive change in organisational culture 
and as a tool for Performance Management, where it is successful in its 
own terms, that is to say where it motivates employees.
An attitude survey of the white-collar employees of Thames Water in 
receipt of PRP was conducted in 1995. On the face of it this survey 
provides the best evidence in a field setting of the additional effort
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employees are prepared to make in return for the prospect of obtaining a
performance payment. The problem with measuring actual performance
in order to gauge motivation in a field setting is that performance is
dependent on numerous other variables such as ability and
environmental factors. Equally the employer's assessment of individual
effort may be tainted by prior commitment (Brody, Frank & Kowalzyk
2001) or other considerations (Harris 2001). Therefore the simplest and
most direct way of assessing motivation is to ask those whose motivation
is being assessed. To put it another way:
'It is the fish who decide what is bait not the fisherman. We need 
to ask the fish what they would prefer to nibble on/
(Derek Robinson quoted at p. 55 in Hendry et al 2000)
The results of that survey have been used to assess the motivational 
effectiveness of the Thames Water PRP scheme and also to explore why 
the Thames Water PRP scheme was not more effective in motivating 
employees.
Why was PRP not more effective as a motivator for employees?
If much of the criticism of PRP relates to its lack of motivational
effectiveness, one has to ask why PRP fails to motivate employees to
work harder. Common sense would suggest that workers should improve
their performance if that will lead to an increase in their earnings.
Consequently, it is not immediately apparent why research has shown
that PRP is not always effective as a motivator. One view would be that
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it is simply a question of implementation and that if PRP were 
implemented in the correct way then it would be an effective motivator. 
Lawler (1981) says that for PRP to work the rewards must be important, 
capable of being varied in line with validly measured performance, where 
there are high levels of trust between employees and managers and 
employees accept the PRP scheme. Kessler (1994) has identified three 
elements in PRP which present problems of implementation; establishing 
performance criteria, assessing whether those criteria have been met or 
not, and the linkage between the criteria and the pay award.
However it may not simply be a case of changing the scheme to match 
the prescription for improvement. Marsden and Richardson (1994) found 
that there were deficiencies in the implementation of the Inland Revenue 
PRP scheme that tended to undermine its potential effectiveness. The 
Revenue changed the scheme in certain important respects following this 
research, but research by Marsden and French (1997) after the new 
scheme was implemented found that employees were still not motivated 
by PRP, the researchers suggested that the essential problem was the 
workers' lack of trust in both the scheme and the way that it was 
managed.
The revised Revenue PRP scheme built in a number of features, which 
reflected the principal theories of work motivation, namely expectancy 
theory, goal setting theory and equity theory (Marsden and French 1997).
This thesis is based on the general hypothesis that by applying theories 
of work motivation to a particular PRP scheme it should be possible to get 
a better understanding of why that PRP scheme is failing to act as a 
motivator for employees. This gives a framework within which to 
examine issues such as employee trust, which it is suggested is a critical 
element in PRP, both from the point of motivational effectiveness of PRP 
and also because PRP may actively undermine trust.
One of the first steps has been to identity those theories of motivation 
that seem most likely to explain the motivational effectiveness of PRP. 
Looking at the literature the three theories that have been identified as 
most relevant to PRP, are those Marsden and French (1997) refer to, 
namely expectancy theory, goal setting theory, and equity theory. Some 
commentators (Kanfer and Ackerman 1989, and Kanfer 1990) have 
attempted to build an overall theory of motivation, which encompasses all 
three theories. However that approach has been rejected, as it is argued 
in this thesis that goal setting theory and expectancy theory are 
essentially measuring different motivational drivers.
Looked at individually, each of the three theories of motivation highlights 
a different aspect of PRP. So that while goal setting theory and 
expectancy theory both emphasise the importance of the goal setting 
process, in goal setting theory the emphasis is on the specificity and 
difficulty of the goal, while in expectancy theory the emphasis is on the
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nature of the reward and the link between goal achievement and reward. 
Potentially, this distinction between goal setting and expectancy theory 
offers the intriguing prospect that it is the goal setting process that is 
motivating employees rather than ability to earn a performance payment. 
If the performance payment really makes no difference to the 
motivational effectiveness of PRP, then PRP really needs to be judged on 
its other supposed benefits.
Equity theory on the other hand is concerned with the impact of the 
wider group on motivation, and this highlights issues such as procedural 
and distributive fairness. Equity theory predicts that individuals will take 
action to balance any perceived imbalance in their effort reward ratio 
compared to the effort reward ratio of comparitor groups, but without 
specifying how the individual will bring about a re-balancing. Individuals 
may respond to perceived inequity through a range of reactions including 
increased or decreased motivation and cognitive dissonance. 
Consequently while equity theory may help to explain improved 
motivation in some cases, in others where employees feel hard done by 
and unfairly treated, it suggests that they may become disillusioned with 
the firm or even reduce their efforts at work. Thus by using these three 
theories of motivation as a framework of analysis against which to 
examine the motivational effectiveness of the Thames Water PRP scheme 
it is possible to highlight those areas of the scheme that are most 
important in relation to employee motivation.
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How effective was PRP in delivering the other objectives it was originally
intended to achieve?
PRP outcomes are assessed against the original rationale for introducing 
PRP and the rationale for its continued use. PRP is like any other 
business tool; its value depends on its cost ratio benefit. Consequently it 
is perfectly feasible that PRP can fail to motivate employees and yet at 
the same time present a real benefit to the business. Looking at Thames 
Water, if for instance PRP is intended to motivate employees and bring 
about a change in organisational culture, then Thames Water may still 
feel that it is a worthwhile investment even it fails to motivate most 
employees, provided it brings about the desired change in organisational 
culture. Nevertheless cost benefit may be difficult to measure without 
knowing precisely what value Thames Water puts on the benefits they 
derive from PRP. Even though Thames Water have used employee 
surveys to ask about employee views on PRP and have recently 
undertaken a review of their reward structure, the continued use of PRP 
has been taken as a given and there is no evidence of a complete review 
of its effectiveness. Most employers do not review the effectiveness of 
their PRP schemes (Cannell & Wood 1992).
Therefore it seems appropriate to ask not just about the benefits of PRP 
for Thames Water, but also to attempt to weigh those benefits against
those outcomes that can be seen as negative from the organisations 
point of view. Likewise the consistency of the original objectives and the 
extent to which those objectives are undermined by any unintended 
outcomes from PRP are important factors in weighing the success of PRP 
within Thames Water.
Whv does Thames Water continue to use PRP?
Finally why does Thames Water continue to use PRP? This question goes 
to the centre of the paradox about the continued use of PRP despite 
evidence that it is not particularly effective. The original reasons for the 
introduction of PRP may no longer be relevant or time may have proved 
them less compelling. How would Thames Water justify PRP some years 
after its original introduction? As already noted a current review of the 
Thames Water reward strategy contains no proposals to do away with 
PRP. What is the continuing attraction of PRP for Thames Water? Is PRP 
seen as the least bad option in terms of pay? Does it have iconic value, 
marking the company as a commercially focused organisation? Or does 
the payment of PRP to all employees help to justify larger much more 
substantial performance bonuses higher up the organisation? These 
issues have been explored through a structured interview with the 
current European Director of Human Resources.
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A case study approach.
Thames Water has been used as a case study partly because of Its size; it 
is the largest water company in the UK and has introduced PRP for a 
substantial part of its workforce. At the time it introduced PRP Thames 
Water was publicly quoted on the stock exchange (it was subsequently 
purchased by the German RWE Group), which meant that there was a 
substantial amount of information about the company in the public 
domain. Also as a Water and Sewerage Company, it had been in public 
ownership until 1989, when the then Conservative government led by 
Margaret Thatcher privatised it. Water and Sewerage Companies are 
concerned with maintaining a secure and safe water supply and 
sewerage system. Privatisation posed a new challenge for the 
Companies to become commercially focused, so that they could meet 
their obligations to their shareholders and raise money in the market at 
advantageous rates. Thames Water under the Chairmanship of Roy 
Watts was in the forefront of water privatisation, anticipating the new 
freedom of operating in the private sector by, for instance, being the first 
water company to withdraw from national pay bargaining. Consequently 
Thames Water seemed to be an interesting case study, not only because 
of its size and the availability of information, but also because it was 
undergoing a process of change not unlike that being experienced by a 
number of Nationalised Industries which were privatised by the Thatcher 
Government making a change in organisational culture arguably very
desirable (Kessler & Purcell 1992).
Ideally, qualitative research would have been conducted with Thames 
Water in order to identify the key issues before any quantitative research 
was undertaken. However, there were problems over access for research, 
which may well initially have been exacerbated because the author is a 
full time trade union official. A number of different companies were 
approached all of them in the private sector, because the original 
intention was to examine a private sector company that was free of the 
sort of political constraints that apply in the public sector. After all, if the 
reason for introducing PRP is simply political, and there are political 
pressures in the public sector to use PRP, any discussion about the 
motivational effectiveness or overall cost benefit becomes otiose or at 
best less pertinent. At least one of the private companies approached, 
London Electricity, specifically said that they would not want to give 
access to a trade union official. In the end, research access to Thames 
Water employees was gained with the assistance of UNISON at the 
beginning of 1995, Thames Water initially refused to cooperate with the 
research. This necessarily limited the qualitative research that it was 
possible to carry out, to a trade union view of why Thames Water had 
introduced PRP, and a few published documents. From the point of view 
of quantitative research a survey of UNISON white-collar worker 
members employed by Thames Water in its utility business was 
conducted in May 1995 and that survey forms part of the core research
\for this thesis. Subsequently, in 1999 Thames Water agreed to co­
operate with the research paradoxically after the author became the 
principal trade union negotiator for the trade unions in Thames Water. 
This allowed greater access to material about the PRP scheme and the 
reasons for its introduction. The author was able to conduct qualitative 
research with some of the key players from the company's side regarding 
the processes which the company went through in deciding to introduce 
PRP and reasons for its introduction. However, the problems over getting 
access for qualitative research have imposed limitations on the quality of 
the quantitative evidence that it has been possible to gather, most 
notably in terms of the ability to give appropriate weight to the various 
elements of the rationale given by Thames Water for the introduction of 
PRP. In particular, with the benefit of hindsight Performance 
Management and changing organisational culture should have been given 
more emphasis.
Structure.
The next chapter defines PRP, looks at its coverage, and explores some 
of the reasons put forward for the popularity of PRP and some of the 
criticisms of PRP by way of general context. The rest of the thesis breaks 
down into four parts. The following three chapters explain the theoretical 
framework used to explore the motivational effectiveness of Thames 
Water and its effectiveness as an engine of cultural change. Chapters 6
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and 7 describe the qualitative research evidence and describe the 
research instrument used to gather the quantitative data. The 
quantitative data is then reported and analysed in Chapters 8-10. Finally, 
Chapter 11 brings together the research evidence in an attempt to 
answer the five questions posed at the beginning of this Chapter.
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Chapter 2
Why do firms use PRP?
Introduction
In order to understand why Thames Water adopted and continues to use 
PRP it is important to look at the factors that may have influenced that 
decision including the approach that has been adopted by other firms. 
First of all it is important to be clear about what is meant by PRP and look 
at what distinguishes PRP from other performance based pay systems. It 
is also helpful to understand how far PRP has spread and why. There are 
a number of different surveys that give some idea of the extent to which 
the use of PRP by firms has grown. Firms have adopted PRP for a variety 
of reasons and a number of the benefits that firms commonly hope to 
achieve by using PRP can be identified from the literature and surveys. It 
is also important to consider the criticisms of PRP, that is to say the 
potentially negative factors that firms might take into account when 
deciding whether or not to adopt PRP. Finally there is the question of why 
PRP continues to be popular with employers? Taken together these 
different aspects of the extent and rationale for the use of PRP by firms in 
general give a background against which Thames Water's decision to 
introduce and continue to use PRP can be better understood.
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PRP Defined
PRP is one of a range of performance pay systems, that is payment 
arrangements where the amount being paid to employees depends upon 
specified outcomes being achieved (Performance Pay Trends in the UK, 
IPD Survey Report 1999). These outcomes can be in the form of inputs 
or outputs. In this context, inputs are how the employees perform their 
work or the level of competence or skill that they bring to their work. 
Outputs are a measure of the performance of employees, either 
individually or as a team or group, or of the workforce as a whole. The 
key feature of all such schemes is that pay is contingent on outcome.
Thompson and Milsome (p25, 2001) define PRP in the following terms:
'Individual performance-related pay links financial rewards for 
individual employees to the results achieved by that employee, 
usually through assessment of performance, summed up in an 
appraisal rating based on agreed objectives/
The IPD Survey in 1999 defined individual PRP as covering merit pay or 
bonuses determined by agreed individual objectives (Performance Pay 
Trends in the UK, IPD Survey Report 1999). Armstrong and Murlis (p262 
Reward Management 1994) define PRP as linking pay progression to a 
performance and or competence rating carried out at a performance 
review. They distinguish between schemes where the manager makes 
an assessment of the performance from those schemes where the 
performance is judged against predetermined targets and payment is in
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the form of a lump sum or bonus. For the IPD survey bonuses are 
included as PRP, yet Armstrong and Murlis say that bonuses are not part 
of PRP. There Is a lack of consistency in the definitions but for the 
purposes of this thesis the question of whether bonuses are included or 
not makes no real difference.
The key issues are captured by defining PRP as a payment scheme 
where:
•  The individual employee's pay is at least in part contingent on 
performance.
•  And the employee's manager assesses performance for the 
purposes of determining contingent pay against predetermined 
criteria.
The two points that are highlighted are that individual pay is linked to 
individual performance and that the manager assesses performance 
against predetermined criteria. A number of performance payment 
schemes are excluded by this definition. It does not cover group PRP 
schemes or payment by results (PBR) schemes or bonus schemes where 
the bonus is entirely discretionary, without any laid down criteria for 
payment.
This thesis is concerned with the paradox between the continuing 
general popularity of PRP and the evidence that it often turns out to be 
fairly ineffective as a motivator. This paradox is most evident in relation
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to individual PRP schemes. Individual PRP Schemes appear to focus on 
the issue of motivation more acutely than group schemes do. This is 
because the link between the individuals, their performance and their 
pay, in individual PRP schemes, more closely reflects the key elements in 
the three theories of motivation in individual PRP than it does in group 
PRP.
PRP and payment bv results
The growth of PRP can be contrasted with the use of Payment by Results 
(PBR), which it appears is either static (Mason and Terry 1990, and 
Millward et al. 1992) or may even be in decline (Cannell and Wood 1992). 
The essential difference between the two payment systems is that in a 
PBR system the level of payment is determined objectively by 
predetermined and measurable output, while in a PRP system the level of 
payment is determined by a subjective assessment of performance 
against predetermined measures, which may include both output and 
input. A further important distinction between the two systems is that in 
PBR schemes performance payments are not generally incorporated into 
salary for future years, while PRP schemes frequently consolidate pay 
increases earned through performance in one year into salary for future 
years (Heneman 1994). One of the attractions for employers of PRP over 
PBR appears to be the ability to use the subjective nature of the 
assessment system to focus rewards on the achievement of less readily
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quantifiable or tangible areas of performance, such as the quality of work 
done and customer service (Heneman 1994). Another reason why PRP is 
perhaps more attractive to employers than PBR is the well-established 
tendency of PBR systems to degenerate in their effectiveness as workers 
learn to play the system and regulate their own output (Roy 1952, 
Lupton 1963, Brown 1962, and Cannell & Wood 1992). It has been 
argued that PBR is particularly suited to large establishments with short 
tenure employees where essentially it is used as a substitute for 
supervision (Heywood, Siebert & Xiandong Wei 1997)
However, it is worth noting that much of the evidence on the 
motivational effectiveness of pay for performance schemes relates to PBR 
and bonus schemes, rather than PRP. Lawler and Jenkins (1990) 
reported that pay for performance schemes are producing productivity 
gains of between 1- 35%, but they found that PRP schemes were failing 
to establish a clear link between pay and performance and consequently 
failing to produce positive motivational results. Kahn and Sherer (1990) 
found in a longitudinal study of a company using both bonus pay and 
PRP, that, while the bonus scheme was motivating employees, the PRP 
scheme was not acting as an effective motivator for employees. Fernie 
and Metcalf's (1999) study of the performance effects of contingent pay 
over a fixed fee arrangement in horse racing is essentially measuring the 
motivational effectiveness of payment by results.
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The growth of Performance Related Pay.
"Reports of the death of IPRP [Individual Performance Related 
Pay] appear to have been greatly exaggerated"
(p. 280, Kessler 2000)
The evidence from surveys suggests that a large and increasing number 
of employers are using individual performance related pay (PRP), or merit 
pay as it is sometimes called, to pay workers. Annual statistics on pay, 
such as those in the New Earnings Survey, do not distinguish PRP from 
payment by results (PBR), consequently it is difficult to use annual 
statistics to gauge the use of PRP (Cannell and Wood 1992), although a 
recent attempt to use annual statistics to gauge the spread of PRP 
supported the notion that PRP is continuing to spread and suggested it 
may be forming a larger part of employees' salaries (Choat 1997). 
However, more precise evidence about the use of PRP comes from 
survey results. The 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) 
showed that 34% of all employees covered by the survey received PRP; 
Millward et al (1992) suggest that this figure under-reports the use of 
PRP. By 1998, WIRS figures had not changed to any significant extent 
and Millward et al (2000) were suggesting that there may even have 
been a slight reduction in the use of PRP. However three things were 
clear from the 1998 WIRS; there was more use of PRP in the private 
sector than in the public sector, PRP was more common in manufacturing 
than elsewhere, and PRP tended to be used in larger workplaces.
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Cannell and Wood (1992) found that 40% of the PRP schemes for non- 
manual employees reported in an IPM/NEDO survey had been Introduced 
in the preceding ten years, with 27% of the schemes being introduced in 
the preceding five years. The IPM/NEDO survey showed hardly any 
evidence of PRP schemes being withdrawn (1% of schemes for non- 
manual employees), while 11% of the schemes had been extended and 
20% had been revised in the preceding five years. The IPD surveyed 
some 5,000 firms in respect of performance pay trends in the UK 
(Performance Pay Trends in the UK, IPD Survey Report 1999) and got 
response rate of 23% covering some 1.5 million employees. They found 
that 40% of respondents had individual PRP, although it tended to be 
used more frequently for managers than non-management employees. 
Comparing the rate at which firms reported that they were abandoning 
PRP, with the rate at which firms were introducing PRP, the report 
concludes that the use of individual PRP is still increasing. Thompson 
and Milsome (2001) reviewing the survey evidence conclude that PRP is 
far from in its death throes, even though its advance is less rapid, and 
that it continues to be a prime and extending feature of the pay 
landscape for the majority of UK and US employees and it is increasingly 
in evidence in continental Europe. These survey findings support the view 
that the use of PRP is both widespread and may even still be growing.
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Reasons for the use of PRP.
There are a number of different reasons why firms have introduced PRP, 
and the reasons can be divided between those that produce immediate 
benefits, which will be termed 'hard', and those reasons that reflect a 
wider perspective in the firm's reward strategy, which will be termed 
'soft'. Increased employee motivation, improved recruitment and 
retention, and better wage cost control are the hard immediate benefits 
of PRP. While using PRP because of the message it sends, or as a 
strategic approach to pay, or as part of Performance Management, or to 
bring about cultural change are the soft benefits of PRP. Looking at 
employers' perceptions of the hard benefits of PRP first, the most obvious 
benefit is the link between performance and pay.
fl Motivation
There continues to be substantial support for the idea that incentive pay
schemes will improve performance amongst employees.
"the prospect of higher pay for increased output/quality often 
provides an incentive and many (incentive pay) schemes are 
introduced in the clear expectation that performance will thereby 
be improved."
ACAS 2003
One of the key objectives firms have in mind when introducing PRP is to 
enhance employee motivation and productivity (Kessler 1994). Intuitively, 
it would appear that the link between performance and pay should
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encourage employees to work harder and, indeed, expectancy theory
(Vroom 1965) would seem to support this conjecture, subject to certain
conditions being satisfied. Employers and commentators have long
believed that this link will motivate employees to work harder. F. W.
Taylor (1911) put it this way:
'it is impossible through any long period of time, to get 
workmen to work much harder than the average men 
around them unless they are assured a large and 
permanent increase in their pay/
The motivational effect of PRP is claimed as one of its principal benefits in
a number of the works on reward systems (Smith 1991, Armstrong 1993,
Heneman 1994, and Armstrong and Murlis 1994). From the firm's point
of view, increased employee motivation would, on the face of it, provide
a straightforward economic justification for using PRP, as increased
motivation should improve the employees' performance. Indeed it is the
motivational effectiveness of PRP, which has often been used as a point
of departure for a critical analysis of PRP (Bevan, Thompson & Hirsch
1991, Thompson 1993, Marsden and Richardson 1994, and Marsden and
French 1998). The motivational effectiveness of PRP is also one of the
central issues examined in this thesis.
ifl Recruitment and retention and downsizing and costs
PRP is also seen as a mechanism for retaining good employees and losing 
bad employees. Good employees, that is to say those who are assessed
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as performing well, will be better rewarded through PRP and thus 
encouraged to stay. Bad employees, that is to say those who are 
assessed to be performing badly, will either improve their performance or 
leave because they are receiving lesser rewards. Bodies like the Top Pay 
Research Group have argued (Top Pay Research Group 2003) that it is 
essential to pay those at the very top of organisations contingent pay in 
order to retain them. If the decision makers in organisations are being 
given rewards contingent on their performance, as a retention 
mechanism, they may well be attracted to the idea of cascading down 
similar mechanisms through the organisation.
Paying more to more productive employees and less to the less 
productive employees might also be thought to have the additional 
advantage of helping to control wage costs (Smith 1991). Increases in 
productivity help to fund the additional pay for the good performers, and 
poor performers no longer enjoy an automatic increase in pay through 
the incremental system or annual wage round.
Many firms have been downsizing since the 1980s by delayering, that is 
to say by getting rid of layers of management, which in turn reduces the 
promotion prospects for remaining employees. PRP may help to control 
wage costs and yet maintain employee morale amongst those employees 
who are judged to be better performers. It is argued that PRP became 
an attractive option for firms, as they sought to retain and motivate good
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employees, whose traditional promotion routes had disappeared, by 
offering them the opportunity to increase earnings through performance 
(Baker 1990). Meanwhile poor performers would leave as they became 
dissatisfied with the level of PRP that they received, or so it was said 
(Dreher 1987).
iifl PRP gives a message about the firm
Employers have also turned to PRP for longer term, more strategic, less
immediate reasons, which have been termed soft benefits. PRP is
sometimes said by employers to be a fairer system of rewarding
employees, than incremental systems, in which pay increases as a result
of length of service. PRP is said to be:
'A conscious move...to reflect a new perception of equity 
based on the developing view that it is fairer to reward in 
relation to personal contribution than for length of service in 
a job/ (page 18 Armstrong & Murlis 1994).
From the employer's point of view using what they perceive as a fairer 
system that relates reward to contribution, may be seen as sending some 
powerful messages about their organisational values.
In the 1980s PRP was promoted as part of the Thatcher revolution (ACAS 
1993, and Kessler & Purcell 1995), firms saw the adoption of PRP as a 
step on the road to an enterprise culture (Armstrong and Murlis 1994).
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PRP was officially promoted for the public sector in the Citizen's Charter
(1991), which stated:
'Pay systems in the public sector need to make a regular 
and direct link between a person's contribution to the 
standards of the service provided and his or her reward/
The plans for the public sector under the Labour Government continue to
emphasise performance and the use of PRP as a mechanism for achieving
improved performance, with a strong emphasis on benchmarking
performance and the linking of teachers' pay progression to appraisal
(Treasury 1998). The logic seems to be that if firms want to compete
then they have to be performance driven and one way this can be
demonstrated is by adopting a payment system that links the level of pay
to the employee's performance. This became apparent in the newly
privatised former nationalised industries (Kessler and Purcell 1992).
Across both the public and private sectors in Britain PRP was also
promoted, as part of the Thatcher agenda, as a move away from the
collective to a more individualistic approach to the employment
relationship (Kessler and Purcell 1995).
The use of PRP in the public sector in Britain reflected a wider move to 
use PRP in the public sector across many countries in the OECD, which 
Wood (1993) attributes to the cross-fertilisation of 'new managerialism' 
from the private to the public sector, as public sector agencies have 
moved away from simply using budgetary control, as their principal 
measure of effectiveness, to using more output measures to monitor
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their effectiveness. The argument here seems to be that as controls 
become more output-orientated performance becomes more critical, 
which in turn makes a pay system that links pay to performance more 
attractive.
State promotion of PRP continues in Britain and the United States, and 
has spread to the rest of Europe (Milkovich 1991, Elliot & Bender 1997, 
and Marsden et al. 2000), despite research evidence that PRP has not 
been particularly effective at motivating employees in the public sector 
(Marsden & Richardson 1994, Marsden & Frenchl997, and Kellough & 
Nigro 2002). Indeed, Kessler (2000) has commented that much of the 
criticism of PRP is based on evidence from the public sector where as he 
says the character of the workforce and the financial and political 
constraints were always likely to make PRP more difficult to implement 
successfully.
iv) Pav strategy
The introduction of PRP may also be a response to arguments about the 
best type of reward structure for the organisation, in other words a 
strategic approach to pay, what has been termed 'new pay' (Kessler 
2000). Some authors (Lawler and Jenkins 1990, and Armstrong and 
Murlis 1994) argue that the correct payment system for an organisation is 
contingent on a number of other factors, such as business strategy,
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history, people, human resource strategy, culture, market and regulatory 
environment (Armstrong and Murlis 1994). What matters in order to get 
the best from the payment system is that there is fit between the pay 
system and organisation. Lawler and Jenkins (1990) comment that there 
is little or no evidence to support this assertion, but that it has face 
validity. However, firms may introduce PRP because they feel that PRP 
fits with other parts of their business strategy, so for example Cannell 
and Wood (1992) found that some firms in their survey felt that PRP 
helped to emphasise that they were results driven or performance 
orientated organisations.
The development of human resources management (HRM) has focused 
attention on the reward strategies used by employers (Tichy, Forbrun 
and Devenna 1982). Adopting a HRM approach includes ensuring that 
the reward system reflects the organisation's goals and engages line 
management in the reward process (Kessler 2000). PRP emphasises 
performance, which is a key organisational goal for many employers, and 
engages line managers in the reward system through the appraisal 
process, so that it is a natural choice as part of HRM.
v) Performance Management
Performance Management is perhaps one particular approach to pay 
strategy, but it warrants separate mention, both because of its popularity
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and because it is sometimes seen by employers as linking pay into 
employee commitment and cultural change (Bach 2000). 'Performance 
Management has become massively popular in recent years' (at p. 52 
Hendry et al 2000), yet there is a degree of ambiguity about what is 
meant by Performance Management. In essence Performance 
Management is about ensuring that the individuals' objectives at work are 
aligned with those of the organisation, in a measured and managed way. 
Performance appraisal is clearly a key part of Performance Management, 
but PRP is not an essential ingredient of Performance Management, and 
Hendry et al (2000) argue that PRP takes away from the developmental 
side of Performance Management and focuses too much on the 'dark 
side' or controlling element. While Performance Management clearly owes 
some of its growing popularity to an interest in the structured approach it 
offers to employee development as exemplified by Investors in People 
award scheme, PRP also fits into Performance Management by directly 
linking individual performance into overall organisational objectives. 
Indeed the growth in the use of Performance Management may help to 
explain some of the continuing popularity of PRP.
The use of PRP for Performance Management can be viewed on two 
levels. At one level PRP can simply be seen as a way of ensuring that 
performance appraisals get done, as Cannell and Wood (1992) found in 
their survey. At a less prosaic level, PRP reinforces the organisational 
objectives for individuals by tying the objectives into financial rewards;
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this reinforcement may be particularly important if Performance 
Management is being used to increase employee commitment or bring 
about cultural change within the organisation (Bach 2000).
vO Changing Organizational Culture
PRP can also be used, not because it fits the organisation, but because it 
fits the type of organisation that the firm would like to become. In other 
words PRP becomes a mechanism for achieving change in the 
organisational culture. Some employers have used PRP as a mechanism 
for achieving cultural change within their organisation (Kessler & Purcell
1992). It is not clear precisely how PRP acts as a mechanism for 
achieving cultural change in an organisation. Lawler and Jenkins (1990) 
assert that all pay systems influence organisational culture, but argue 
that PRP does this more dramatically than other pay systems, because it 
communicates norms of performance in the organisation. PRP can also 
be used to communicate organisational goals by cascading the goals 
down through the organisation, as those goals are translated into 
individual targets for each level within the organisation. However, while 
changing the pay system may be an important reinforcer of cultural 
change, the process of cultural change within an organisation is far more 
complex (Schein 1992).
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Whether PRP is used because of the message it sends, or because it 
reflects the type of organisation the firm is, or wants to become, it is 
being used for longer term, perhaps less tangible benefits, which have 
been termed soft benefits. It will be argued in this thesis that these soft 
benefits are perhaps even more important to some firms than the hard 
benefits.
Criticism of PRP
Criticism of PRP can be divided between general criticism of its impact on 
organisational effectiveness and specific criticism of its failure to motivate 
employees in practice.
fl Conservatism
Critics of the impact of PRP on organisational effectiveness argue that 
PRP is inherently conservative in its effect on the organisation. Demming 
(1982) says:
'Merit Pay rewards people that do well in the system. It 
does not reward attempts to improve the system'
Kanter (1989) also describes the system as conservative. The problem,
for both Demming and Kanter, is that they see PRP as suppressing
initiative and risk taking, by rewarding the achievement of predetermined
targets. The setting of objectives, which have to be achieved in order to
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get a performance payment, creates what has been called a pseudo 
contract (Pearce 1987) in the employment relationship. Lacking the 
advantages of a fully contracted out relationship, the pseudo contract 
nevertheless inhibits the organisation's ability to gain all the flexibility 
from employees that should flow from an employment relationship. 
Essentially the argument is that the employee focuses on achieving those 
targets or behaviours that have been identified as the targets or 
behaviours against which their performance will be assessed in order to 
determine the level of performance payment that they receive, at the 
expense of flexibility. For instance, a longitudinal study of PRP for U.S. 
Federal employees by Pearce and Perry (1983) found what they called 
'gaming', whereby broader organisational goals were displaced as 
employees became narrowly focussed on achieving their PRP targets.
Potentially the flexibility of many PRP schemes allows employers to 
specify quite general criteria against which employee performance will be 
judged, so that for instance the Thames Water PRP scheme includes 
performance traits amongst the criteria against which employee 
performance is judged. On the face of it this should allow employers to 
specify performance for PRP purposes in such away as to avoid any 
undue rigidity. There is however a danger that the level of flexibility in 
the scheme depends upon the way in which individual managers operate 
PRP as well as the nature of the scheme itself. The evidence from the
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Thames Water PRP scheme is that the quality of management of the 
scheme was highly variable.
ifl Adverse impact on internal relationships
Much of the criticism of PRP has focussed on the effect PRP has on the
internal relationships within an organisation. Firstly, it is suggested that
instead of being an aid to good management, PRP becomes a substitute
for management. Rather than managers managing employees'
performance, so that employees work hard at their jobs, it is said that
managers rely on PRP to ensure adequate levels of performance from
employees. Smith (1991) asserts that in many organisations PRP is the
only effective control for the management of human resources and Kohn
(1993) says that:
'In many workplaces, incentive plans are used as a 
substitute for management: pay is contingent on 
performance and everything else is left to take care of 
itself.'
At least some support can be found for this contention in the report of 
the IPM/NEDO survey (Cannell and Wood 1992), which found that 
paradoxically one of the reasons given by employers for using PRP was to 
ensure that assessments get done. In other words, some employers 
were saying that without PRP managers would not discuss performance 
with those employees that they managed. The criticism is that if 
managers are only discussing performance because of need to set
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performance targets and assess performance, then they are abrogating 
their responsibility to manage the employees' performance, and relying 
instead on PRP.
The difficulty with this argument is that it reduces management to a 
question of managing employee performance. While this is no doubt an 
important part of the managers' role, it is only one part of a complex role. 
In any event, managing employee performance is not simply a question 
of talking to employees about their performance. Leadership and role 
modelling may be just as important in getting the best performance out 
of employees. On the other hand it may be that PRP is a very useful 
trigger for ensuring that managers take responsibility for managing 
employee performance. After all, if PRP is a trigger for good 
management rather than a substitute for it, PRP is fulfilling a useful 
function. However, the evidence from Thames Water is that the 
management of PRP is very variable in quality. It may be that good 
managers find PRP a helpful tool, and poor managers fail to use it 
effectively.
Secondly, it is argued (Kanter 1989, Kohnl993 and Pfeffer 1998) that the 
assessor role may undermine the relationship of trust which a manager 
needs with those employees they have to manage; as manager and 
employee focus on the assessment of prescribed tasks and targets, rather 
than identifying problems and solving them. Some PRP schemes, such as
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the Thames Water PRP scheme, work on the basis that the appraisal will 
be an opportunity for the manager and employee to discuss problems. 
The Thames Water PRP scheme specifically provides for more than one 
appraisal a year to take account of changing circumstances and provide 
an opportunity to discuss problems.
The relationship between the manager and the employee may also be 
tainted by the financial element of PRP. If the employee's earnings are 
going to be determined by the employer's assessment of their 
performance, then the employee might quite rationally want to be seen 
as a very competent performer. The employee may be less likely to 
admit to any shortcomings if they believe that this may adversely affect 
their earnings. Put another way, an employee, who has customer care as 
a PRP target, seems less likely to admit to problems over delivering 
customer care, than an employee for whom such an admission would 
have no impact on their earnings. Effectively PRP may damage the trust 
between the employee and manager. Some commentators have said 
that trust between the employee and manager is a precondition to the 
effective operation of PRP (Lawler 1981, Siegall & Worth 2001). If trust 
is a precondition to the effective operation of PRP then PRP may have an 
inherent tendency to undermine its own effectiveness. As the PRP 
process erodes trust between the employee and manager so PRP 
becomes less and less effective. From a theoretical perspective trust may
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well be important to the motivational effectiveness of PRP, both from the 
point of view of expectancy and equity.
A further widespread criticism (Demming 1982, Kanter 1989, and Kohn 
1993, Pfeffer 1998) is that PRP damages teamwork between employees 
as they focus on their individual PRP targets at the expense of co­
operative teamwork. The argument here being that if individuals are 
focussed on achieving their own individual performance targets, which 
carry a potential financial benefit, they will put the achievement of those 
targets before co-operation with other members of the workforce, which 
has no financial benefit for them. A number of PRP schemes try to tackle 
this last point by including team working as a PRP target, so that 
individual employees will know that their performance assessment will 
include an element to reflect the extent to which they have worked as 
part of a team.
Finally it is said that PRP schemes can demotivate employees who receive 
a poor appraisal or performance payment (Demming 1982, Kanter 1989, 
and Kohn 1993). Marsden and Richardson (1994) concluded from a 
survey of Revenue staff that the PRP may on balance have been 
demotivating employees. Clearly, if some employees are demotivated, 
then there is a danger that the demotivating effect of the PRP may 
outweigh its benefits as a motivator for other employees. Support for the 
idea that PRP might demotivate some employees comes from equity
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theory (Adams 1965), which says that individuals will compare their ratio 
of inputs to outcomes with others and adjust their level of input to match 
what they perceive to be appropriate comparitor ratios. This means that 
someone who thinks they are underpaid for the work they do compared 
to others may simply work less hard or leave, although poor performers 
leaving may be what the employer wants. Clearly the employer is left 
with a problem if the poor performers respond to low levels of 
performance payment by reducing their level of performance further. 
Some employers specify that consistently poor performers will be dealt 
with under the capability procedure and may have their employment 
terminated.
M  Fails to motivate
There is a considerable body of survey evidence that PRP is not effective
as a motivator for individual employees. Heneman (1994) examined U.S.
survey results and concluded:
The results to date on the relationship between merit pay 
and subsequent motivation and performance are not 
encouraging/
Armstrong and Murlis (1994) examined the survey evidence from Britain, 
including large-scale surveys by Bevan, Thompson & Hirsch (1991) and 
Thompson (1993), and found that none of the surveys showed that PRP 
works as a motivator for employees. Indeed, according to Cannell and 
Wood (1992) personnel managers, in the firms using PRP that they
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surveyed, were themselves unclear about whether PRP had any 
motivational effect. Harris (2001) also found scepticism about the 
motivational effects of PRP in a survey of middle managers. More 
recently the Industrial Society found that fewer than half the personnel 
and human resources managers in a survey believed that their own PRP 
schemes were rewarding performance (Hague 1996). Kessler (2000) has 
said that much of the survey evidence regarding PRP's lack of 
motivational effectiveness comes from the public sector where the nature 
of the workforce, as well as the distinctive financial and political features 
of the sector are more likely to make PRP problematic.
The Inland Revenue perhaps best illustrates the problems over the 
motivational effectiveness of PRP. Marsden and Richardson (1994) 
surveyed Inland Revenue employees who were in receipt of PRP and 
concluded that, instead of improving employee motivation, the scheme 
might actually on balance have been demotivating employees. 
Subsequently, the Inland Revenue revised their PRP scheme. A further 
study of Inland Revenue employees was conducted by Marsden and 
French (1998), three years after the introduction of the new scheme; the 
survey found that there was little change in the motivational 
effectiveness of PRP in the Inland Revenue, despite the introduction of a 
new PRP scheme.
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Evidence that PRP has any motivational effect is much more limited. An 
OECD study (Wood 1993) on the use of PRP in the public sector 
concluded that there was limited evidence to support the use of PRP. A 
number of other studies, which on the face of it show that PRP may have 
some motivational effect, have looked at incentive pay generally rather 
than just PRP (Guzzo and Katzell 1987, and Fernie and Metcalf 1995, 
1996). However, as noted above, there are important differences 
between PRP and other forms of incentive pay, such as PBR, and there is 
evidence that PRP schemes are less effective than other incentive 
payment schemes (Lawler and Jenkins 1990, and Khan and Sherer 1990). 
Consequently the results of these studies, although concerned with 
incentive or, as they are sometimes termed, contingent pay schemes 
cannot simply be applied to PRP, which needs to be treated as a separate 
and distinct form of incentive pay.
Whv does PRP retain its popularity?
At first glance it seems somewhat paradoxical that a pay scheme which 
attracts so much criticism should be so popular with employers. There 
may be a number of explanations for this. Employers may not believe 
that the criticism of PRP is entirely valid, perhaps because it does not fit 
in with the employer's view of the world or it may be at odds with their 
own experience. It may be that the employer believes that the perceived 
benefits of PRP outweigh the potential disadvantages. Or it may be that
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the employer sees PRP as the least bad alternative compared to other 
pay schemes. Each of these scenarios raises the question of how far the 
employer's assessment Is based on an analysis of PRP and in particular of 
their own PRP scheme.
The survey evidence (Cannell & Wood 1992) suggests that any 
assessment of the effectiveness of PRP within individual firms seems to 
rely, more often than not, on the subjective views of managers and 
anecdotal evidence. Cannell and Wood (1992) found that many of the 
managers who had been surveyed were unsure about how a proper 
evaluation could be done. Without a proper evaluation, it is not difficult 
to imagine managers concluding from their own informal assessment that 
their PRP scheme is working satisfactorily or at least not wanting to rock 
the boat by suggesting that there may be problems.
Employers may also be sceptical, about the criticisms of PRP as a 
motivator for employees, because a number of texts suggest that PRP 
schemes will work as a motivator provided they comply with specific 
prescriptive rules. In other words, the suggestion is that the problem 
over motivation does not lie with PRP per se, but rather with the design 
and implementation of the PRP scheme. Armstrong and Murlis (1994), 
for example, say that there are five basic rules that have to be observed, 
if a PRP scheme is going to be an effective motivator for employees:
i) There must be clear targets
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ii) Employees must receive feedback
iii) Employees must be able to influence their own performance
iv) Employees need to be clear about the rewards for improved 
performance
v) Rewards must be meaningful and positively communicated
For the rewards to be meaningful, Arstrong and Murlis say that the 
amount of salary increase needs to be at least 3% of salary, and that 
arguably 10-15% is needed for a significant increase in motivation. 
Heneman (1994) on the other hand, says that the critical component for 
the success of PRP is the adequacy of the performance measures, the 
criteria must have:
i) Content validity - they must be relevant to the job
ii) Convergent and discriminant validity - they must measure 
different constructs
iii) Reliability - they must be consistent
iv) Accuracy
v) Correction for rating error - that is they must recognise 
problems like the halo effect
vi) Relevance - they must be relevant to the goals of the 
organisation
For Heneman (1994) the amount of the performance payment is 
determined by the 'just noticeable difference', that is the minimum 
amount necessary to improve the employees performance, which he says 
will depend upon the individual employee and the circumstances. No one
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element of PRP is identified as being the critical determinant of the
motivational effectiveness of PRP:
'While the goal is to be able to pinpoint which 
characteristics of merit pay plans are associated with which 
desirable behavioural or attitudinal outcomes, it is not 
possible to do so at this stage/ (Heneman 1994)
It is perhaps not surprising that both Armstrong and Murlis (1994) and 
Heneman (1994) highlight different aspects of PRP schemes as being 
critical to the success of PRP as a motivator for employees, as neither 
approach is explicitly grounded in any theoretical framework or based on 
any substantial research evidence. Lawler and Kessler on the other hand 
take an approach implicitly more grounded in expectancy theory. Lawler 
(1981) says that for PRP to work the rewards must be important, capable 
of being varied in line with validly measured performance, and that there 
must be high levels of trust between employees and managers, and 
employees accept the PRP scheme. Kessler (1994) has identified three 
elements in PRP which present problems of implementation; establishing 
performance criteria, assessing whether those criteria have been met or 
not, and the linkage between the criteria and the pay award.
However, for some employers the perceived benefits of PRP may be more 
diffuse and less specific than simply increasing employee motivation. 
Kessler (1994) has argued that employers are often principally concerned 
with the use of PRP as a mechanism for strategic and cultural change 
than with its motivational effectiveness. Some employers have focused
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on the Performance Management aspects of PRP, as a way of ensuring 
organisational and strategic fit between pay and organisational 
objectives. Although there is a degree of ambiguity about Performance 
Management, essentially it links individual appraisal in with organisational 
objectives and strategy in a measured and systematic way (Bach 2000, 
Hendry et al. 2000). For employers who are concerned with strategic 
and cultural change, the link between PRP and a more motivated 
workforce may be more indirect than that suggested by the motivational 
theories such as expectancy, equity and goal setting theory.
The decision of so many firms to stick with PRP may also be a matter of 
choosing what is perceived to be the least bad pay system. While PRP 
has been criticised, the choice of PRP has to be set by the employer 
against the available alternatives. The rate for the job or an incremental 
progression system, both pay a set rate for the job done irrespective of 
the employee's ability or commitment or effort. Payment by results pay 
systems are only really appropriate for those employees whose outputs 
can be readily and non-controversially measured and, in any event, 
payment by results systems are subject to manipulation and may soon 
become degraded as employees learn to 'play the system' (Roy 1952, 
Lupton 1963, and Brown 1962). The problem with profit related pay is 
that the employee may have little or no influence over whether the firm 
makes a profit or the size of that profit, so that the employee may be 
rewarded irrespective of their ability, effort or commitment. Skill based
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pay systems are expensive to introduce and maintain and it is far from 
clear whether the benefits outweigh this additional cost (Armstrong
1993). Employers will also be aware that any differentiation in pay 
between employees doing the same work or work rated of equal value 
has to be objectively justifiable, otherwise such differences may be illegal 
(Danfoss EC3 1989). Consequently PRP may appear to some employers 
as on the face of it the least bad pay system available to them.
Despite the explicit linkage between performance and pay, which is made 
by PRP schemes, the literature reviewed above suggests that 
organisations use PRP to obtain a range of objectives. Increased 
employee motivation is only one of the benefits employers identify. 
Kessler (1994) has argued that political and cultural drivers are likely to 
be more important considerations than increased employee motivation, 
especially for a company, which has been recently privatised. If Kessler's 
analysis is correct it would help to explain the growth in PRP at a time 
when there is increasing evidence to suggest it does not increase 
employee motivation (Bevan, Thompson & Hirsch 1991, Thompson 1993, 
and Marsden and Richardson 1994). Similarly, it is argued that the 
growth in Performance Management (Hendry et ai 2000) may have also 
fostered the growth in PRP, as firms use PRP to ensure employees take 
on wider organisational objectives. The research for this thesis was done 
with Thames Water a privatised utility; this provided an opportunity to 
explore Kessler's argument about the reasons for the introduction of PRP.
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The competing arguments in the literature about the reasons why firms 
use PRP have been tested using qualitative analysis to test the following 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1.
' Thames Water introduced PRP in order to achieve a number of 
objectives, but principally in order to achieve a change in 
corporate culture following privatisation.'
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Chapter 3
Three theories of motivation.
Introduction
This thesis draws on three theories of motivation to produce a theoretical 
framework, which can be used to explore how PRP motivates or fails to 
motivate employees. The rationale for focusing on three particular 
theories in order to explain the motivational effects of PRP is explained 
below. The three theories are put into the broader context of theories of 
motivation in general, firstly by putting the theories into a broader context 
and then by examining an 'integrationist's' approach (Kanfer & Ackerman 
1989, and Kanfer 1990). Finally, expectancy theory is then examined and 
a model of expectancy theory, together with an elaboration on that 
model, are identified as the first part of the theoretical framework.
The fit between expectancy, goal setting and equity theories and PRP.
Expectancy theory (Vroom 1964) is frequently quoted as providing a 
possible theoretical justification for the use of PRP (Pearce & Perry 1983)
and consequently Is sometimes used as a point of departure for critical 
analysis of PRP (Kahn & Sherer 1990). As noted in the last chapter there 
is a natural congruence between a payment system that links additional 
payment to performance and a theory that predicts that individuals will 
be motivated to work harder to achieve goals that produce a valued 
outcome for the worker. Similarly some commentators have noted that 
the essential elements for goal setting theory are also present in PRP, in 
so far as the individual worker is set specific targets to achieve in order to 
get a performance payment (Cannell & Wood 1992).
The third theory that is considered in this hypothesis is equity theory 
(Adams 1965). Expectancy and goal setting theories are concerned with 
the mechanisms that affect individual worker's motivation to achieve the 
targets that have been set. One weakness with this approach is that it 
ignores the wider social context, in particular the perceptions that 
individuals have about the way in which they have been treated 
compared to other workers. Yet one of the fundamental claims made for 
PRP is that it is a fairer system of rewarding employees (Armstrong and 
Murlis 1994). Fairness is a question of how the individual is treated in 
both absolute and comparative terms, that is to say it engages both 
individual feelings of fairness and the wider social context. Equity theory 
has often been used in the literature in order to capture the wider social 
aspects of PRP (Brown 2001, Brown & Benson 2003, Isaac 2001, and 
Kahn & Sherer 1990).
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Taken together expectancy theory, goal setting theory and equity theory 
provide a framework against which the motivational effectiveness of PRP 
can be examined (Richardson 1999 and Arrowsmith et al 2001). The 
three theories highlight different aspects of the PRP process. Some 
commentators have tried to develop an overarching theory of motivation 
that attempts to bring together the theories of motivation. The problem 
with this approach is that it assumes that the various theories of 
motivation can be reconciled, so that they fit together to form a coherent 
whole. However, it is far from clear how at least two of the theories, 
which are tested in this thesis, can be reconciled. Indeed it is argued 
that Goal Setting theory and Expectancy theory are counterposed, 
because each of them assumes that motivation is a function of different 
variables. On the one hand, Goal Setting theory predicts effort will be 
related to the difficulty of achieving the goal. While on the other hand, 
Expectancy theory predicts that effort will be related to the expectancy of 
a valent outcome. As expectancy and goal difficulty are not necessarily 
correlated, it is difficult to see how the two theories can be reconciled in 
one overarching theory of motivation. This issue is considered in more 
detail in a subsequent chapter.
However, although it is argued that the two theories cannot be readily 
merged in one overarching theory of motivation, that does not mean that 
the two theories are seen as being mutually exclusive. Indeed one of the
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central hypotheses of this thesis is that each of the three theories, which 
have been used to examine PRP, can give an insight into different 
aspects of the motivational effectiveness of PRP. It is hypothesised that 
each theory might shed some light on a particular aspect of the scheme, 
because each of the theories looks at a particular aspect of PRP. It is 
helpful in this context to look at the place each of the theories has in the 
broader context of motivational theories.
The theories of motivation in context.
Two different approaches to a categorical framework for theories of 
motivation are helpful. Deci (1992) has suggested a framework for the 
theories of work motivation based on the development of the concepts 
underlying those theories. Ruth Kanfer (1990), on the other hand, has 
suggested an analytical approach focusing on the key structural 
differences between the theories of motivation as step towards 
reconciling the various theories of motivation in a unified approach. Both 
approaches produce a similar broad distinction between the theories of 
work motivation, and it is that distinction which illustrates why 
expectancy theory and goal setting theory in particular seem apposite for 
an analysis of PRP.
Deci (1992) suggests that the theories of work motivation can be put into 
one of five clusters built around organising concepts of; responses,
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physiological needs, psychological needs, goals, and social forces. The 
first three of these organising concepts are concerned with what it is 
individuals are motivated to do by various stimuli. Thus response 
theories, such as operant theory, are concerned with behaviour 
modification through the use of behavioural reinforcement. Operant 
theory predicts that behaviour can be directed through positive 
reinforcement. Theories clustered around physiological needs focus on 
the various physiological drives, such as the need to reproduce, that are 
said to explain behaviour. Similarly, theories based on psychological 
needs suggest that individuals experience pull which directs their 
behaviour to meet certain psychological needs, like self-esteem and self 
actualisation. It has been argued that physiological and psychological 
needs form a hierarchy of needs, and that when lower order needs were 
satisfied individuals will be motivated by the need to fulfil higher order 
needs. These three clusters of theories are concerned with identifying 
what will motivate individuals by describing what will be of value.
PRP schemes implicitly assume that workers will increase effort in order 
to achieve greater financial reward, in the form of a performance 
payment, and what distinguishes different PRP schemes is the 
mechanism for achieving that financial reward. The underlying 
assumption in PRP, about the attraction of a financial reward for workers, 
matches the prediction in the three clusters of theories about stimuli, that 
individuals are hedonistic and will respond to positive stimuli. What is
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less clear is to what extent any particular individual will perceive a 
performance payment to be a positive stimuli. Maslow's hierarchy of 
needs suggests that once basic physiological needs are met, individuals 
will be stimulated by psychological pulls such as the desire for self- 
actualisation. On the face of it, this suggests, applying just these first 
three clusters of theories identified by Deci, that not every one will be 
motivated by PRP, because not all individuals will find performance 
payments attractive, and all PRP schemes are predicated on a monetary 
reward for better performance. However, in order to understand why 
one PRP scheme is better at motivating employees than another PRP 
scheme, it is necessary to consider not what motivates individuals but 
how they are motivated. In other words in order to compare the 
effectiveness of different PRP schemes it is necessary to accept the basic 
premise of all PRP schemes that a performance payment is a valued 
outcome for employees.
Deci distinguishes those theories about what will be of value from goal 
theories, which are concerned with cognitive processes, that is to say 
how motivation is directed, rather than what motivation is directed to 
achieving. There is a logical connection and fit between goal theories, 
which describe motivation in terms of the establishment of goals, and 
PRP where the emphasis is on relating pay to the achievement of goals. 
Two goal theories, goal setting theory and expectancy theory, are 
particularly relevant to PRP and appear to have an inherent congruence
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with the goal setting processes used in PRP systems. According to goal 
setting theory (Locke and Latham 1984), motivation will increase with 
goal difficulty, when individuals are committed to achieving specific 
achievable goals. While expectancy theory (Vroom 1964) states that 
motivation is a function of the individual's expectancy that achieving a 
particular goal will be instrumental in producing a valent, that is to say 
valued, outcome for them. Both theories are concerned with goals and 
how an individual's motivation to achieve those goals can be increased.
Deci says there is a fifth cluster of theories around the concept of social 
and group influences. These theories are concerned with the way in 
which individuals adapt to their social environment by adopting the 
norms of the social group or informal organisation in the workplace in an 
effort to achieve social approval. Another aspect of this cluster is the 
concept that individuals will seek balance or consonance in their 
perceptions of how they are being treated. According to equity theory 
(Adams 1965) this means that individuals will adjust their behaviour in 
order to ensure that they feel their ratio of inputs to outcomes at work is 
comparable to the ratio of inputs to outcomes for others, who they see as 
comparators. One of the arguments advanced for PRP is that it is a more 
equitable system of pay, because it looks at individual inputs and outputs 
rather than simply paying people the rate for the job (Armstrong and 
Murlis 1994). Potentially workers in receipt of PRP might work harder on 
the basis that it is only by increasing their inputs that they can justify
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their pay levels. However, equity theory works on the individual's 
perceptions and there is a danger that individual workers will simply 
adjust their perceptions of their own contribution, rather than increase 
their inputs. Equity theory seems likely to be a better predictor of 
demotivation, where the individual feels that they are being treated 
unfairly. A number of commentators (Demming 1982, Kanter 1989, Kohn 
1993, Marsden & Richardson 1994 and Brown & Benson 2003) have 
suggested that PRP may have a demotivating effect on those employees 
who receive a poor performance appraisal or performance payment. 
Consequently equity theory has been used in this thesis both because it 
looks at the social aspects of PRP as a payment system, and because it 
predicts both the motivating and demotivating effects of PRP.
Ruth Kanfer (1990) adopts a different approach to the categorisation of 
the various theories of work motivation, but comes to a similar distinction 
between the various theories. Kanfer describes three streams of 
research that she says can be brought together in a 'unified perspective 
of motivation'. Firstly she identifies need-motive-value research which 
focuses on person based determinants of behaviour. The theories which 
have developed from this research are concerned with the activation of 
intrinsic motives, that is to say determinants of action that are based on 
that individual's own innate value system, such as equity theory, or the 
arousal of needs, as for instance in the case of Maslow's hierarchy of 
needs. The second stream of research, cognitive choice research, is
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concerned with how choices about goals are made. The dominant 
framework for this paradigm is expectancy theory (Vroom 1964). Thus, if 
need-motive-value research tells us what is valuable or valent for an 
individual, cognitive choice research seeks to explain the basis on which 
the individual chooses the goal that leads to that valent outcome. The 
third stream of research is contained in the self-regulation metacognition 
theories, these theories are concerned with the self-regulation of the 
mechanisms that transform motivational force into behaviour and 
performance.
According to Kanfer the first two streams of research are concerned with 
distal theories of motivation, that is to say they set the stage for task 
engagement, by determining goal choice and the level of intended effort. 
Self-regulation and metacognition theories and to a lesser extent 
cognitive choice research, on the other hand, are proximal theories of 
motivation explaining the mechanisms that control task engagement. 
PRP assumes that money, which is the distal motivator according to 
Kanfer's framework, will be a motivator and consequently it is the 
proximal theories, goal setting and expectancy, which should explain the 
effectiveness of different PRP schemes.
In this thesis each of the three theories of motivation used in the 
framework has been used to highlight particular aspects of the PRP 
process. Each of the theories makes a prediction about motivation based
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on the operation of specific psychological mechanisms. By examining the 
way in which PRP engages each of those psychological mechanisms it is 
hypothesised that the weaknesses in PRP or at least in the Thames Water 
PRP scheme can be identified. Consequently the approach adopted has 
not been to try and integrate the three theories of motivation in the 
framework, but to use each of them to highlight different aspects of PRP.
Expectancy theory
Vroom's Expectancy theory (1964) or valence-instrumentality-expectancy 
theory, as it is sometimes called, assumes that individuals makes choices 
between alternative courses of action in order to maximise the benefit to 
themselves. Vroom posits that there are three key elements in this 
process. Valence is the individual's perception of affective value of a 
particular outcome. Valence can be positive or negative, depending on 
whether the outcome is perceived by the individual as being of benefit or 
disbenefit. Vroom distinguishes between first order and second order 
outcomes. So effort may lead to a first order outcome of performance. 
Performance may be a positively valent first order outcome, because it in 
turn leads to a valent second order outcome, such as a performance 
payment. The outcome does not have to be financial in order to be 
valent, but PRP offers the potentially valent outcome of a performance 
payment. Whether a performance payment was positively valent for any 
particular individual would depend upon their perceptions about its
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affective value to them, and the valence of any other outcomes from the 
PRP scheme.
The individual's choice of behaviour will be determined by the 
instrumentality of a first order outcome leading to a second order 
outcome. Thus for the individual, the first order outcome of performance 
is only likely to be valent if it in turn is believed to lead to a valent second 
order outcome, and this causal link is described as instrumentality. 
Vroom expresses instrumentality in terms of probability, that is to say on 
a range from 1, where the individual believes one outcome will 
necessarily follow from the other, to 0, where there is no likely 
relationship between the outcomes, and -1, where the individual believes 
that the second order outcome will only happen without the first order 
outcome. In PRP terms, this means that performance payment can only 
be a valent outcome where performance is believed to be instrumental in 
obtaining a performance payment.
The third element of the theory is the individual's belief that a particular 
outcome is achievable; this is termed expectancy. Expectancy is a 
measure, expressed as a probability between 0-1, of the individual's 
expectation that a particular outcome will be achieved through a 
behaviour or action. Thus if performance at a particular level is the first 
order outcome that an individual needs to achieve, to get a valent second 
order outcome, then expectancy is a measure of their belief that they can
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perform at that level. That belief will be determined by a number of 
different factors including the individual's skill and confidence, as well as 
their perception about intervening factors that may help or hinder them 
in performing to that level.
According to Vroom the strength of an individual's intention to act in a
certain way is determined by the valence, instrumentality, and
expectancy which would result from that action. Vroom stated:
'the force on a person to perform an act is a monotonically 
increasing function of the algebraic sum of the products of 
the valences of all outcomes and the strength of his 
expectancies that the act will be followed by the attainment 
of these outcomes/
This theory is expressed as the formula:
F, = f  X(EyFj )  and Vj = f  £ l j t V k
,w |_j=1
Where F/ = the psychological force to perform an act /
Ey= the expectancy that the act will be followed by the first 
level outcome j
Vj = the valence of the individual first level outcome j  
Ijk = the instrumentality of the outcome for attaining the 
second level outcome k 
Vk = the valence of the second level outcome k
Vroom's model has been elaborated on by a number of commentators
but the basic multiplicative model, where effort is seen as the product of
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expectancy and valence still lies at the heart of expectancy based 
cognitive choice theories. Although there has been some suggestion that 
the effects of expectancy and valence on motivation may be additive 
rather than multiplicative (Kanfer 1990), it is still possible to view 
expectancy theory in a simple diagrammatic form, as shown in figure 3 a.
Porter and Lawler (1968) have elaborated on the basic model by arguing 
that both valence, or the value of the rewards, and expectancy, or the 
perceived effort/reward probability, comprise a number of distinct 
elements. The value of the reward will be determined by the anticipated 
level of satisfaction, which results from the combination of the extrinsic 
and intrinsic rewards and their perceived equity. The perceived effort 
/reward probability is determined by perceptions about performance, 
which will in turn be determined by effort, abilities and traits, and clarity 
of role. Both the value of the reward and the perceived effort/reward 
probability are informed by a feedback loop from previous organisational 
experience. Porter and Lawler's model is shown in figure 3 b.
Deci (1972) has challenged the assumption in Porter and Lawler's model 
that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is cumulative, arguing instead on 
the basis of laboratory experiments that contingent rewards reduce 
intrinsic motivation. This raises the question of whether firms that use 
PRP may in fact be reducing intrinsic motivation amongst employees.
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In this thesis Vroom's basic expectancy model has been used in the first 
instance to test the hypothesis that expectancy theory helps to explain 
the motivational effects of PRP for two reasons. Vroom's model has the
advantage, over other models such as Porter and Lawler's model, that it 
is parsimonious. This makes it easier to specify the constructs necessary 
to operationalise the theory. It is then possible to elaborate on the basic 
model by adding in elements suggested by Porter and Lawler's model. 
However, some of those elements provide conceptual and practical 
difficulties in a field setting.
According to Porter and Lawler's model performance is said to be a 
function of effort, ability and traits, and role clarity. In practice there are 
likely to be a number of other variables that affect performance. 
Organisationally an individual's performance may be interdependent with 
the performance of others, indeed in larger more complex organisations, 
it would be unusual for an individual's performance to be completely 
independent from other members of the organisation. Equally 
environmental factors, such as the market in which the organisation 
operates, are likely to have an impact on performance. It is therefore 
difficult to specify ability and traits in an organisational field setting.
Perceptions about the outcome are fed back in a loop to inform current 
expectations about the value of the reward and the effort /reward 
probability or expectancy, in Porter and Lawler's model. Feelings about 
the outcome are the product of both extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, 
together with equity considerations. The focus of this thesis is on the 
motivational effectiveness of expectancy theory in the context of PRP and
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not the wider issue of the validity or otherwise of expectancy theory. 
Consequently the basic assumption has been made that it is the 
performance payment which is the valent outcome from the employee's 
point of view, and consideration of the intrinsic rewards of the PRP 
system have been put to one side. However, Porter and Lawler's model 
highlights both the equity considerations surrounding PRP and previous 
satisfaction. This suggests that employees are more likely to be 
motivated if they perceive the PRP system to be operating fairly, and if 
their approach to performance is enhanced by positive feelings about 
their previous experience. The issues of fairness and satisfaction have 
therefore been looked at as part of the elaboration on Vroom's basic 
expectancy model.
Some of the most cogent criticism of expectancy theory suggests that it 
is over-simplistic, and implies that a more rounded approach is needed to 
understand motivation. Expectancy theory has been criticised on the 
basis that it is essentially concerned with straightforward choice, while 
human behaviour is determined in situations where simple choices play 
little part in determining individual motivation. Benkhoff (1996) 
characterises expectancy theory as a calculative approach to individual 
decision making. Benkhoff argues that every day work behaviour often 
comprises impulsive or habitual behaviour that is not susceptible to a 
calculative approach. Similarly it has been argued that expectancy theory 
provides an episodic model of behaviour which does not provide a good
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explanation of changes in repetitive behaviour where the variables 
remain constant (Kanfer 1990). These criticisms suggest that expectancy 
theory may not paint the complete picture, when it comes to 
understanding motivational processes. Hence the appeal of a more 
integrative approach to motivation. Expectancy models such as Porter 
and Lawler's go some way to addressing this problem by proposing a 
more complex model of behavioural determinants.
However, in order to understand to what extent and how a particular 
motivational technique, such as PRP, is working it is important to be able 
to distinguish the motivational effects of the various elements of the 
scheme. It is possible to look at the various elements of a PRP scheme 
by using each of the relevant theories individually, in a way that is not 
possible using an integrative approach. Expectancy theory focuses on 
the reward element of PRP, goal setting focuses on the performance 
targeting, and equity theory looks at the questions of fairness. Using 
each of these theories in turn allows each of the issues associated with 
the particular theory to be examined separately.
Hypotheses
In this Chapter it has been argued that expectancy theory provides at 
least part of the explanation for the motivational effect of PRP. From this 
general hypothesis about expectancy theory it is possible to identify a
70
number of specific hypotheses that address the different models of 
expectancy theory described in this chapter. Adopting the simplified 
approach to expectancy theory described above and set out in figure 3 a 
above it is hypothesised that:
Hypothesis 2(a)(1)
'Individual employee motivation will tend to increase as a resuit of 
PRP, where the employee has an expectancy that improved 
performance will be instrumental in leading to a valent outcome."
This hypothesis can be further elaborated, in line with Porter and Lawler's 
model, by hypothesising:
Hypothesis 2(aYifl.
'The explanatory powers of expectancy theory in respect of the 
motivational effectiveness of PRP will be improved by factoring in 
Equity considerations'
And
Hypothesis 2(aViiO
' The explanatory powers of expectancy theory in respect of the 
motivational effectiveness of PRP will be improved by factoring in 
feedback.'
Each of these three hypotheses is tested in a later Chapter using 
regression analysis to see how far the key elements of expectancy theory 
identified in the hypotheses go to explain the motivational effectiveness 
of the Thames Water PRP scheme.
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Chapter 4
Goals and Rewards,
Introduction
The approach adopted in this thesis has been to distinguish between goal 
setting and expectancy theory. The importance of the distinction between 
the key elements of goal setting and expectancy theory from a practical 
viewpoint is explained in this section. Then the various elements of goal 
setting are described and the goal setting model, which is used to test the 
motivational effects of PRP in this research, is identified. Finally, the various 
attempts to reconcile expectancy theory and goal setting theory are 
considered.
Goal setting is a theory that comes from the USA, and Locke and Latham 
(1990) did much of the formative work on it. The author is aware of only 
one goal setting study done in the UK, (Early 1986), although there have 
been a number of studies in Israel (Erez 1986). There is however a 
considerable body of research to support the motivational effectiveness of 
goal setting theory. Guzzo and Katzell ( 1987) used a meta analysis to 
compare the effect size from various studies of employee incentive schemes; 
they found that the variance in effect size for employee incentive schemes 
was so large as not to be statistically significant; but the same meta analysis
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found that goal setting had a strong and significant effect size. Potentially 
this has important practical implications for PRP. If it is goal setting, rather 
than the financial incentive, which explains the motivational effects of PRP, 
then it may be possible for an employer to get the same motivational effects 
without the need for a financial incentive. In other words, if it is the 
appraisal system in the PRP scheme and specifically the target setting part of 
the appraisal system, which affects motivation, then the performance 
payment may be unnecessary.
Consequently the distinction between goal setting theory and expectancy 
theory is vital to an understanding of the importance of two key elements of 
PRP, namely the target setting process and the financial incentive. Cognitive 
theories of motivation, such as expectancy and goal setting theory, describe 
the thought processes that affect an individual's effort to achieve a particular 
outcome. Expectancy theory focuses on the effect that the individual's 
perceptions about the value of second level outcomes has on that 
individual's effort to achieve a first level outcome. In contrast, goal setting 
theory focuses on the process by which an individual determines to achieve 
a specific achievable outcome or goal, and describes a correlation between 
the individual's effort and goal difficulty.
Goal setting provides an explanation for individual performance which is 
related to the individual's intention to achieve a particular goal, and is based 
on the hypothesis that if goals regulate performance then more difficult
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goals will lead to a higher level of performance than easy goals (Locke 
1968). As goal setting is concerned with intentional behaviour, it also 
follows that goal difficulty will only improve performance where the 
individual has formed the intention to achieve the goal, that is to say where 
the individual has accepted the goal. The relationship between goal difficulty 
and performance distinguishes goal setting from other cognitive theories, 
such as expectancy theory (Vroom 1964), in which performance is related to 
the expectation of a beneficial outcome.
The first part of this chapter examines two key elements of goal setting, 
namely goal difficulty and goal acceptance, and the relationship of those two 
key elements to performance, and identifies feedback as mediating both the 
relationship between goal difficulty and performance, and goal acceptance 
and performance. The relationship between goal setting and expectancy 
theory is then examined in more detail, including specifically the attempts to 
integrate the two theories.
The approach taken in the literature to goal setting has changed; initially
goal setting was portrayed as a technique, as Edwin Locke (1978) put it:
The concept of goal is not the most fundamental motivational 
concept, it does not provide an ultimate explanation of human 
action. The concepts of need and value are the more 
fundamental concepts and are, along with the individual's 
knowledge and premises, what determines goals. Goal setting 
is simply the most directly useful motivational approach in a 
managerial context1
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Goal setting was said to be 'a motivational technique that works!' Evidence 
to support this contention came from interventions in the American logging 
industry by Locke and Latham, who proposed goal setting as an inexpensive 
technique to improve employee motivation and productivity amongst loggers 
and truck drivers (Locke and Latham 1984). There was a focus in the 
literature on those facets of goal setting which had a resonance in 
organisational theory and practice, such as participation (Latham, Mitchell & 
Dossett 1978, and Dossett et al. 1979), feedback (Hall & Foster 
1977,Matsui, Okada 8i Kakuyama 1982, Locke & Latham 1984, and Pritchard 
et al. 1988) and the supervisory relationship ( Oldham 1975, Locke 1978, 
and Earley 1986), and the way in which those facets mediated goal difficulty 
and particularly goal acceptance and goal commitment.
The work on the different aspects of goal setting, such as goal difficulty 
(Erez & Zidon 1984), highlighted the importance of goal commitment, and 
the emphasis in the literature shifted from examining goal setting purely as a 
technique to a more theoretically based examination of the determinants of 
goal commitment (Hollenbeck & Klein 1978, and Locke, Latham & Erez 
1988). The introduction of control theory concepts into the debate on goal 
setting (Garland 1985, and Hollenbeck & Williams 1987) has in turn led to a 
move, away from the concentration on goal commitment as the key variable, 
to the hypothesis that self-efficacy and goal importance are the key variables 
in the relationship between goal difficulty and performance (Garland 1985, 
Hollenbeck & Williams 1987, Eden 1988, and Locke & Latham 1990). The
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treatment of goal setting In the literature has changed from viewing goal 
setting purely as a technique or motivational approach to a view of goal 
setting as a theory of motivation. A number of differing theories of goal 
setting are explained and compared in the second part of this review. Finally 
goal setting is contrasted with valence-instrumentality-expectancy theory 
(expectancy theory) and the attempts to both integrate and distinguish the 
two theories are reviewed.
l.The Kev Elements of Goal Setting.
a^  Goal specification and difficulty.
The relationship between goal difficulty and performance is central to goal 
setting theory, as it provides a mechanism whereby increased effort can be 
obtained through external stimuli, namely the setting of specific difficult 
goals. Locke (1968) found that there is a positive linear relationship 
between goal difficulty and performance in respect of achievable goals and 
that specific hard goals produced a higher level of performance than the 'do 
your best' type of goals; similar results have been found in numerous other 
studies. For example Dossett, Latham, and Mitchell (1979) found in a field 
study of clerical workers that there was a significant correlation between 
goal difficulty and performance (r = .53, p>.001). Tubbs (1986) in a meta­
analysis of previous studies of goal setting concluded that the evidence from 
previous studies of goal difficulty and specificity was generally so consistently 
positive that there appeared to be little need to conduct further studies
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which looked solely at the issues of goal specificity or goal difficulty. 
However, there is some evidence that the nature of the goal, in particular 
the complexity of the goal, may moderate the effect of goal specificity and 
goal difficulty. Where the goal is simple the effort-performance relationship 
may be clear; but where the goal is more complex, perhaps involving 
qualitative targets, a multiplicity of paths to the goal may be presented 
which will in turn necessitate the selection of a strategy for choosing the 
correct path, so that the link between effort and performance is mediated by 
strategy selection. It has been argued by Terborg and Miller (1978) that the 
majority of the evidence about the effectiveness of goal setting relates to the 
setting of simple quantitative goals, and that the relationship between goal 
specificity, goal difficulty, and motivation may not be the same for more 
complex goals as it is for simple quantitative goals.
Earley, Connolly, and Ekegren (1989) hypothesised that in the case of more 
complex problems, which required strategy selection, specific difficult goals 
would impede strategy selection and consequently prove dysfunctional. The 
hypothesis was tested in a laboratory experiment in which students (n=34) 
were asked to predict the performance of fictitious companies from 
information provided to them, their predictions were then assessed against 
performance levels which were generated using a formula. Some of the 
students were given specific and difficult goals, others were simply asked to 
do their best. The results showed that those students who had been asked 
to do their best tried fewer strategies and did better overall at predicting
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results, than those students with specific difficult goals. The authors 
concluded that being given specific difficult goals had resulted in subjects 
testing more of the possible strategies for predicting the results of the 
fictitious companies, but that this was dysfunctional because the search for a 
single best strategy was likely to prove futile, as there were an infinite 
number of possible strategies. Therefore, they argue that specific and 
difficult goals will improve performance where either the goal is simple and 
requires no strategy selection, or where there are a limited number of 
strategies which can be used to perform the task, so that selection of the 
correct strategy improves performance, but that in those cases where there 
are an indefinite number of strategies to choose from specific and difficult 
goals impede performance. However, given the small number of subjects 
used in the experiment and the laboratory conditions, these results ought to 
be treated cautiously. In particular, the time constraint imposed in the 
laboratory experiment is likely to have limited the time that could usefully 
have been spent searching for the appropriate strategy far more rigidly than 
might have been the case in a work environment, so that whilst the search 
for a strategy may prove dysfunctional against a tight laboratory time limit, it 
does not necessarily follow that the same would be true in a work 
environment. In any event there is clearly scope for further examination of 
the extent to which the nature of the goal moderates the effect of goal 
specificity and goal difficulty on motivation.
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b) Feedback.
Feedback appears to moderate both the relationship between goal difficulty 
and performance, and the relationship between goal commitment and 
performance. There is evidence that feedback leads to Improved 
performance through three distinct mechanisms, the first of these relates 
directly to goal difficulty. Locke and Latham's early work on goal setting 
(1984) suggested that goal setting would be more effective if subjects were 
given feedback on their performance. Indeed logically it would appear to be 
a necessary precondition for goal setting to be effective that the individual 
for whom the goal had been set should have some means of assessing their 
performance against that goal. Individuals may of course have their own 
perception of how their performance matches up to a particular goal or they 
may depend upon informal sources of feedback. Tubbs' (1986) meta­
analysis of the evidence from previous studies of goal setting found that 
feedback did increase the effectiveness of goal setting as a motivational 
technique, and that goal difficulty was less effective in increasing the 
motivational effects of goal setting in those cases where there was no 
feedback.
Secondly, where there is positive feedback, commitment to achieving future 
goals may be increased by the individual's perceptions of their own ability, 
that is to say by increased self-efficacy. Hall and Foster (1977) used path 
analysis on the work of students (n = 66) on an 'introduction to business 
course' to test their hypothesis that there is a psychological success cycle in
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which performance leads to psychological success, self esteem, and 
involvement, thus increasing goal commitment. Student attitudes and 
performance were measured at two different stages in the course and the 
results were cross-lagged. Hall and Foster found that their suggested 
psychological cycle of success was not fully supported by the results, which 
showed no significant link between effort and performance. However, by 
using cross lagged correlations Hall and Foster were able to show that good 
performance leads to increased involvement. These findings support the 
proposition that positive feedback can affect future goal commitment.
The third way in which it has been shown that feedback can lead to 
improved performance is where individuals with high achievement needs set 
higher goals after they receive feedback. Matsui, Okada, and Kakuyama 
(1982) conducted a laboratory experiment (n = 91) where subjects were 
first assessed for achievement need, and then asked to carry out a simple 
perceptual task for which they had been asked to set a goal, the task was 
then interrupted halfway through the allotted time and the subjects were 
given feedback and allowed to revise their original goal. Those subjects with 
a higher achievement need performed better after the feedback than those 
subjects with a lower achievement need, even though there had been no 
significant difference before the feedback was given. Matsui, Okada and 
Kakuyama found that the difference in performance was accounted for by 
the higher goals which were set by the subjects with high achievement 
needs after they received feedback.
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It is not clear how important feedback is in goal setting. Pritchard et al. 
(1988) found that feedback increased productivity by 50% in a field study 
they conducted with units of the United States Air Force. The field study 
started by establishing a baseline performance and then used first feedback, 
then goal setting, and then incentives, to see how far these interventions 
increased productivity. The results showed that productivity increased to 
50% over the baseline assessment when feedback was introduced, then 
75% when goal setting was introduced, and finally 76% when incentives 
were introduced. However, productivity was measured using subjective 
assessments and feedback was given through computer generated reports, 
which included information about the effectiveness of performance against 
what had been achieved in the past and what was being achieved by other 
units. The authors point out that this may mean that the feedback system 
was itself operating as an informal goal setting process, because the 
information contained in the feedback report in effect gave targets which 
might be used as goals. Consequently the 50% increase in productivity 
needs to be treated with caution both because of the way in which 
productivity has been measured, and because there is a danger that the 
results are conflating the effect of goal setting with the effect of feedback. 
Nevertheless, what evidence there is suggests that feedback plays an 
important role in goal setting and works in a number of different ways.
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cl Goal acceptance and commitment.
Goal setting depends upon the individual's acceptance of and commitment to 
a goal, it has been argued that commitment to a goal includes acceptance of 
that goal and that it may be better simply to refer to goal commitment 
(Locke, Latham, & Erez 1988). On the other hand, there is evidence that 
goal acceptance is a boundary condition for goal setting, that is to say a 
dichotomous variable, and it is therefore possible to distinguish the effect of 
goal acceptance from the effect of goal commitment, which is said to be a 
continuous variable (Hollenbeck 81 Klein 1978, and Locke, Latham, and Erez 
1988). Erez and Zidon (1984) found in a laboratory test of technicians and 
engineers (n = 120), who were asked to carry out a perceptual speed test, 
that the level of goal acceptance decreased with goal difficulty, but that 
provided the goal was accepted, the decrease in the level of acceptance did 
not affect performance which continued to increase with goal difficulty. 
However in those cases where the goal was rejected the relationship 
changed to a negative linear relationship between goal difficulty and 
performance, so that performance decreased as goal difficulty increased. 
The results obtained by Erez and Zidon suggest that goal acceptance is a 
boundary condition for goal setting, and that it is of critical importance that 
the goal is accepted, both to ensure that goal setting improves performance 
and to ensure that increasing goal difficulty does not become dysfunctional.
A goal may be accepted because it is the individual's own, or because the 
individual has participated in the setting of that goal, or because it is an
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assigned goal, which the individual has accepted. There have been debates 
both about whether the conditions under which an assigned goal is given 
affects performance, and about whether participative goal setting improves 
performance. Goal assignment may influence performance, firstly by 
increasing the likelihood of a goal being accepted, secondly by creating an 
environment in which harder goals are set, and finally through increased 
goal commitment. The nature of the relationship between the person who 
assigns the goal and the person to whom the goal is assigned may be 
important; Locke (1978) suggests that the employment relationship may 
facilitate the assignment of goals, because the employee's mental set will be 
'what do you want me to do?', so that the ease with which an assigned goal 
will be accepted will depend on the perceived legitimacy, fairness and 
difficulty of the goal and the level of trust with which the employee views the 
manager. If Locke is right then the nature of the employment relationship 
may increase performance by facilitating goal acceptance. In a laboratory 
experiment (n = 48) to test the importance of supervisory characteristics in 
determining the effectiveness of goal setting, Greg Oldham (1975) found 
that the individuals' perception of the legitimacy of the assignment of the 
goal and the trust with which the supervisor is viewed affected reported goal 
commitment, but not the performance. However, Earley (1986) found in a 
field study of workers (n = 120) in the United States and England that 
workers in England who received goal related information from their shop 
steward showed a higher level of goal acceptance and performance, than 
those English workers who only received goal related information from their
supervisor, Earley attributed this to the greater level of trust the workers had 
in their shop stewards. The findings from Earley's field study suggest that 
the level of trust may effect performance and can be contrasted with 
Oldham's findings (1975); it seems likely that the field study results are more 
reflective of real life than the experiment, particularly in relation to the effect 
of trust. However, it is unclear from Earley's results whether the greater 
level of trust workers had for shop stewards led to improved performance 
because there was a higher rate of goal acceptance or because the level of 
goal commitment was increased.
Participative management systems are said to improve organisational 
performance by increasing commitment (McGregor 1957,Lawler 1986), 
participative goal setting might therefore be thought to result in higher goal 
commitment, which would in turn lead to improved performance. However it 
turns out that the bulk of the evidence suggests that participative goal 
setting leads to improved performance because harder goals are set through 
participation in the goal setting process, and not because participation 
increases goal commitment. In a longitudinal field study of engineers and 
scientists working for a research and development department in a large 
international corporation, Latham, Mitchell and Dossett (1978) found that 
participative goal setting tended to result in harder goals being set than 
those that were assigned. There was a positive linear relationship between 
goal difficulty and performance (r=.79, pc.001), consequently those 
subjects with participatively set goals performed significantly (p< .01) better
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than either those subjects who had been urged to do their best or the 
control group, while those subjects with assigned goals did not perform 
significantly better than the control group or subjects who had been urged to 
do their best. These results were equivocal on the question of the 
importance of participation, because it was not clear how far goal difficulty, 
which was greater for those with participatively set goals than for those with 
assigned goals, had influenced the results. The same authors conducted a 
further longitudinal field study (Dossett, Latham & Mitchell 1979) this time 
using female clerical staff comparing the effects of participative goal setting 
to assigned goals. When goal difficulty was held constant, there was no 
significant difference in performance between subjects with assigned goals 
and those subjects whose goals were set participatively. These results lend 
support to the authors' contention that the differential results obtained in the 
field study of engineers and scientists may well have reflected the harder 
goals set through participative goal setting, further support for this 
proposition can be found in a meta-analysis of previous goal setting studies 
undertaken by Mark Tubbs (1986), although there were only six previous 
studies in which goal difficulty had been held constant.
Erez and Arad (1986) argue that the results from studies of participative goal 
setting are inconsistent and that participation in the goal setting process can 
increase the motivational effects of goal setting in certain circumstances. 
They point out that the results obtained by Latham and his colleagues from 
Washington University are based on a dyadic process of participation, which
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may not capture some of the effects of group participation particularly the 
information sharing associated with group participation. Erez and Arad 
argue that the improved information available to individuals through group 
participation differentially affects quality and quantity of performance. Their 
hypothesis that group participation would lead to improved performance was 
tested using a laboratory experiment where goal difficulty was held constant, 
and performance was analysed in terms of quantity and quality, the results 
showed a significant main effect for group participation both in terms of 
quantity and quality of performance and that quantity and quality of 
performance was significantly correlated (r=.23,p<.05) for subjects whose 
goals were set participatively. It is interesting to contrast these results with 
those obtained in the other studies, a distinction can be drawn between the 
previous work which has focused on goals being participatively set in a one 
to one environment and this study which has looked at goals being set in a 
group environment.
2. Goal Setting Theories.
Theories of goal commitment.
A number of these elements of goal commitment have been brought 
together in a theory of goal setting by Locke, Latham & Erez (1988), who 
argue that performance is the product of two independent variables, goal 
content and goal commitment, and that goal commitment is the result of 
both external, interactive and internal factors. In this model of goal
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commitment, the external factors which determine goal commitment are the 
authority of the person assigning the goal, peer group pressure, and the 
promise of rewards and incentives; the interactive factors which determine 
commitment are participation and competition; the internal factors which 
determine commitment are self-efficacy and self-administered rewards such 
as self-generated feedback. The authors argue that participation does 
increase commitment, and that previous studies have tended to 
underestimate the effect of participation, both where the procedures used 
have limited the range of goal commitment amongst the experimental 
groups and where the assigned goals have been 'sold' to participants.
Locke, Latham, and Erez's model draws on existing material on goal setting 
and the authors do not provide any further evidence to support their model. 
A somewhat different approach has been adopted by Hollenbeck and Klein 
(1978) who argue that commitment is a key variable, which moderates the 
relationship between goal difficulty and performance, and is the product of 
the attractiveness of goal attainment and the expectancy of goal attainment, 
where both the attractiveness of goal attainment and the expectancy of goal 
attainment are determined by both personal and situational factors. This 
expectancy theory model of the goal commitment process was not tested by 
Hollenbeck and Klein, although they speculated that it could be used to 
reinterpret inconsistencies in previous goal setting studies. Klein (1991) has 
subsequently carried out further work on integrating expectancy and goal 
setting theories using students (n=252) in a classroom setting, and the
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results from that study show that expectancy and attractiveness are inter­
correlated with goal commitment, although only attractiveness accounted for 
a significant increment of variance in goal commitment. These results 
provide only limited support for the expectancy model suggested by 
Hollenbeck and Klein (1987).
Goal importance and personal goals.
The use of control theory concepts in goal setting, and greater emphasis on 
self-efficacy and personal goals are evident in some of the more recent 
theories of goal setting. These theoretical models are based on the premise 
that goal setting improves performance in a number of ways (Earley & 
Lituchy 1991). First of all goal setting gives a sense of purpose and direction 
to performance, in addition the process of goal setting conveys a normative 
expectation of what can be achieved. Secondly the gap, between what the 
individual does and that individual's goal, acts as an incentive as the 
individual seeks to reconcile the two in order to avoid feelings of self­
dissatisfaction. The improved performance resulting from the goal setting 
process will further enhance the individual's feelings of self-efficacy, which 
will in turn mediate the goal setting process. Central to this understanding 
of goal setting is a move away from goal commitment as the key variable in 
the goal setting model, to personal goals and self-efficacy.
Hollenbeck and Williams (1987) argue that not all goals will be given the 
same importance and that performance is determined by goal level, self­
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focus and perceived goal importance. In their model of goal setting, the 
individual is motivated through a negative feedback loop to seek to reduce 
the discrepancy between the goal that has been set and actual performance, 
and this motivation will be stronger the more important the goal is perceived 
to be and the more self-focused the individual is. Goal importance is the 
level of importance the individual attaches to a particular goal relative to that 
individual's other goals and self-focus is the measure of how far an individual 
is focused on self rather than the external environment. In a longitudinal 
field study of sales staff employed by a department store, conducted by 
Hollenbeck and Williams (1987), the interaction between goal level, goal 
importance, and self-focus was found to be statistically significant (p<.05) 
and together with the main effect of goal level explained 17% of the 
variance in sales level. Goal levels in this study were set by the sales staff 
themselves and the selection of goal level turned out to be a function of the 
individual's perceptions of past performance, self-focus, and perceived goal 
importance, so that goal importance and self-focus also improved 
performance because they led to more difficult goals being set.
Earley and Lituchy (1991) have tested three models of goal setting which 
use self-efficacy and personal goals to mediate the relationship between 
assigned goals and performance. In the first model, proposed by Locke and 
Latham (1990), self-efficacy and personal goals fully mediate the relationship 
between goals and ability, and performance. In the second model Garland
(1985) suggests that self-efficacy and performance valence fully mediate the
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relationship between personal goals and performance. Performance valence 
is the anticipated satisfaction with performance and Garland argues 
performance valence will decrease the more difficult the goal, so that there 
is a negative relationship between performance and performance valence. 
The third model, suggested by Eden (1988), hypothesises that it is assigned 
goals and trait efficacy, rather than ability, which are mediated by self- 
efficacy and personal goals. Trait efficacy refers to the more generalised 
feelings that an individual has about their ability, than the specific 
expectancy about performance that is described by self-efficacy. Earley and 
Lituchy (1991) subjected each of the three models to two laboratory 
experiments, using tasks of varying complexity, and a field study in a 
classroom environment. The data from the tests was analysed using 
hierarchical regression, path analysis, and three tests of fit; namely chi- 
square, goodness of fit, and parsimonious goodness of fit. The results show 
that Locke and Latham's model and Eden's model were better predictors of 
performance than Garland's model in each of the tests, and that Locke and 
Latham's model was the most parsimonious of the three models. The 
studies also consistently found that performance valence added no 
significant variance to the prediction of task performance. On the other 
hand, while trait efficacy was not supported by the results of regression 
analysis, it was supported by path analysis, from which Earley and Lituchy 
concluded that trait efficacy may be playing some more subtle role in 
predicting performance level. Overall the comparison appears to lend most 
support to Locke and Latham's model of goal setting, which explained 78%,
35% and 21% respectively of the variance in performance for the first, 
second and third studies, as compared to Eden's model which explained 
65%, 22%, and 27%, and Garland's model which explained 62%, 34%, and 
9%.
Hypothesis
It is not practical to investigate all of the intricacies of goal setting in a 
survey based, cross-sectional study of PRP, consequently a simplified model 
has been adopted. The key question so far as PRP is concerned is does goal 
setting theory provide an explanation of the motivational effects of PRP, and 
if that is the case is Performance Management without the financial element 
of PRP a more robust motivational system than PRP? For the purpose of this 
research the key elements of goal setting theory have been reduced to the 
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (fr)
7/7 so far as goal setting theory explains the motivational 
effectiveness of a PRP scheme, individual employee motivation will be 
directly and positively related to goal difficulty for specific goals to 
which the employee is committed.'
Unless there is a relationship between goal difficulty and motivation, goal 
setting theory can not help to explain the motivational effectiveness of that 
particular PRP scheme. That is not to say that the particular PRP scheme 
could not be improved by applying the principles of goal setting. However it
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does mean that in so far as the scheme is effective at motivating employees 
it is other elements of the scheme rather than goal setting, which will explain 
this.
It can be seen from the preceding chapter that goal setting is not simply 
about goal difficulty, a number of other points have emerged which may 
have a bearing on the effectiveness of the PRP scheme from a goal setting 
perspective. Employees clearly need to be committed to achieving the goals 
that are set for them, but there is some suggestion that participatively set 
goals may be more effective than assigned goals (Erez & Arad 1986). The 
number of goals set may also mediate the effects of goal setting, with fewer 
goals allowing for easier strategy selection, which in turn appears to make 
goal setting more effective (Earley, Connolly & Ekergren 1989). Finally, 
feedback appears to be another key element in the goal setting process, 
giving cues about appropriate levels of performance and enabling employees 
to focus on goal achievement. Each of these three issues regarding goal 
setting will be examined in addition to the goal-setting hypothesis.
Goal setting and expectancy theory.
Intuitively, there appears to be a fundamental difference between goal 
setting and expectancy theory. Goal setting theory postulates that effort will 
increase in direct relation to the increase in goal difficulty for specific 
achievable goals. Consequently it is goal difficulty that is the driver which
increases motivation. In contrast, expectancy theory states that motivation 
is a product of valence and expectancy. So that for expectancy theory it is 
the perceptions about the effortyreward relationship and the value of the 
reward which drive motivation. This in turn means that goal setting theory 
focuses on issues around the goal setting process, such as goal commitment 
and goal specification. Whereas, expectancy theory is concerned with the 
effortyreward relationship and specifically the instrumentality of that 
relationship, that is to say the link between increased effort and reward. 
Sometimes it is suggested that goal choice and goal commitment are 
affected by valence instrumentality and expectancy. Whether this is true or 
not, does not affect the fundamental distinction between goal setting and 
expectancy theories, both theories still depend upon different drivers and 
focus on different aspects of the task setting process.
There have been several of attempts to reconcile the expectancy and goal 
setting theories, which fall into two camps. Some commentators have tried 
to reconcile the conflicting evidence about the explanatory power of the two 
theories. Other commentators have tried to reconcile the two theories as 
part of a wider search for an overall theory of work motivation. Looking first 
of all at attempts to reconcile the evidence about the explanatory effects of 
the two theories, it is apparent that the arguments concern methodological 
issues rather than the fundamental differences in the two theories. Locke 
and Latham (1990) argue that there are two ways of reconciling the 
evidence about goal setting theory and expectancy theory. First of all, they
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show that the positive correlation between goal difficulty and performance, 
and the negative correlation between expectancy and performance, is the 
result of the flawed methodology used in a number of studies. The difficulty 
with these studies is that they conflate group and within group results for 
both expectancy and goal setting. Subjects are allocated different goals and 
then they are asked to rate their expectancy of goal attainment. Locke and 
Latham (1990) argue that the problem arises because the data analysis does 
not distinguish between the groups which have been allocated different 
levels of goal difficulty. They say that this between group level of analysis 
captures the effects of goal setting, because the level of goal difficulty 
distinguishes the groups. But it fails to give a true picture of the effect of 
expectancy, as the expectancy data is distorted, because comparisons are 
being made between individuals who have been assigned different levels of 
goal difficulty. They show that for subjects with the same level of goal 
difficulty, expectancy is correlated to performance. Effectively Locke and 
Latham are able to show that it is possible to get a positive correlation 
between both goal difficulty and performance and expectancy and 
performance from studies which had previously shown a negative 
relationship between performance and expectancy, by using within group 
studies for groups that have been assigned the same level of goal difficulty.
The second approach adopted by Locke and Latham is to substitute self- 
efficacy for expectancy in the studies. The essential difference is that this 
effectively allows subject's assessments of their likely performance to cover a
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range of different levels of goal difficulty. This methodological change also 
creates a positive relationship between performance and both goal difficulty 
and expectancy. However, this second approach also involves a conceptual 
change from expectancy to self-efficacy, a concept developed by Bandura
(1986), that does not resolve the fundamental theoretical differences 
between expectancy and goal setting. So that while Locke and Latham's 
attempts to reconcile goal setting and expectancy theories raise some 
interesting methodological issues in respect of studies which attempt to 
compare both theories, they do not provide any satisfactory reconciliation of 
the underlying concepts in the two theories.
On the other hand, attempts to integrate goal setting and expectancy 
theories into one overall theory of work motivation have been concerned 
more with the structural and theoretical issues, than problems over 
methodology. One approach to integrating the various work motivation 
theories has been to simply combine the theories together, in what Kanfer 
(1990) describes as the amalgamation approach. Potentially amalgamation 
improves the predictive ability of the theories and should allow for the 
identification of redundant constructs. Amalgamating goal setting and 
expectancy theory does not reconcile the fundamental differences between 
the theories. Other attempts to produce an integrated model of work 
motivation theory have involved the construction of new models, which draw 
on established theories of work motivation. Kanfer (19..) describes this as 
the new paradigm approach. Kanfer and Ackerman (1989) suggest a model
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which includes both expectancy and goal setting elements. These two 
elements of the model help determine the resources the individual allocates 
to task performance at different stages in the motivational process. Thus 
expectancy which Kanfer and Ackerman divide into effort-utility and 
performance-utility, is both a distal and proximal process. Goal setting on 
the other hand is a proximal process determining the immediate allocation of 
resources to the task, in their model. The distinction between proximal and 
distal affects of the constructs from the two theories shows that it is possible 
to build a model utilising concepts from goal setting and expectancy at 
different stages in the model; it does not reconcile the fundamental 
difference between the two theories.
Notwithstanding the arguments advanced to unify expectancy and goal 
setting theories, it is difficult to see how they can be reconciled, given the 
fundamental difference between the focus on the outcome of goal 
achievement and the difficulty of achieving the goal. Indeed the findings 
from a study by Lee, Locke and Phan (1997) suggest that PRP type 
incentives may reduce the effectiveness of goal setting. The extent to which 
goal setting and expectancy theory can be reconciled has been examined in 
this thesis using the data from the research into the Thames Water PRP 
scheme. The data has been analysed to see how far goal setting and 
expectancy theories have a cumulative explanatory effect. If the two 
theories are, as Locke and Latham suggest part of the same process, with 
expectancy explaining goal choice and commitment in what is essentially a
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goal setting model of motivation, then they should have a cumulative 
explanatory effect. The cumulative effect will arise because one theory, 
expectancy, explains goal choice and commitment, and the other uses goal 
difficulty to explain the additional effort utilised to achieve goals to which the 
individual is committed. Likewise, if goal setting and expectancy theories are 
proximal and distal parts of amalgamation theory, their explanatory powers 
should also be cumulative. In this thesis it is argued that there is no 
cumulative effect because these are distinct theories of motivation which 
focus on different drivers.
Hypothesis 2
'Goal setting and expectancy theory will not be cumulative in the 
extent to which they explain the motivational effectiveness of the 
Thames Water PRP scheme.'
This research attempts to utilise the fundamental differences, between goal 
setting and expectancy theories, to see whether it is possible to identify 
which elements of a particular PRP scheme are most effective in motivating 
employees. From a practical point of view by highlighting those elements of 
the process that are motivating, for at least some employees, it should be 
possible to suggest areas where the PRP scheme might be improved. 
Expectancy and goal setting focus on the financial rewards and task setting 
process. The next chapter looks at broader issues of fairness and 
organisational change.
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Chapter 5
The impact of the wider work group.
Introduction
The theories of motivation that have been considered so far focus on the 
individual and their approach to goals and rewards, the next step is to 
consider the impact of the wider group on motivation at work. This starts 
with an examination of equity theory and then goes on to describe other 
aspects of group motivation such as corporate culture. A model for cultural 
motivation is suggested.
The two work motivation theories which have been described in detail so far, 
goal setting and expectancy theory, are both concerned with the individual's 
relationship with task and outcome. Goal setting theory predicts an 
association between goal difficulty and individual effort. Expectancy theory 
is based on the relationship between an individual's effort and that 
individual's perceptions about the value of the reward for task performance. 
It has been evident from some of the earliest studies of work motivation1 
that there may, however, be wider social influences on the level of effort 
individuals commit to a particular task.
^.g. the Hawthorne studies show how group norms can regulate 
productivity (Roethlisberger & Dixon 1939).
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In the workplace PRP has clear social implications, firstly because it 
purposefully differentiates the reward given to employees doing the same 
job, where it is judged that there is a difference in their contribution. This 
differentiation is intended by the employer to provide a clear message about 
the value that the employer places on the employee's contribution. 
Employees are likely to compare the level of reward they receive, for their 
effort, to the level of reward received by others, whom they feel are in a 
comparable position. If the employee believes that the relative performance 
assessments are fair, then that might have an incentive effect, either 
because employees try to do better than other work colleagues, or because 
the performance of other work colleagues inspires them to work harder. 
However, employee perceptions about the relative merits of the 
contributions made by them and their colleagues may not be the same as 
those of the employers, or they may believe that the system is in some way 
unfairly fixed. In either case there is a danger that the PRP scheme might 
have unintended consequences in terms of work motivation because it is 
believed to be unfair.
Equity theory provides an explanation of how an individual's perceptions 
about the fairness of a reward system might affect motivation. In addition, 
any doubts an individual has about the fairness of the system are also likely 
to affect the individual's belief in the effort reward relationship and, 
consequently, the motivational effectiveness of the reward.
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Secondly, PRP is frequently used as part of a programme of cultural change 
(Kessler 2000). It is not clear precisely how PRP can change corporate 
culture, or indeed whether it is effective in doing so. But the underlying 
assumption appears to be that by aligning the cultural norms within the 
organisation to the achievement of organisational goals individuals will 
improve their performance in order to achieve those organisational goals. 
The issues surrounding this process are considered in more detail later in 
this chapter and a model for cultural change is suggested. But first of all 
equity theory is considered in more detail.
Equity theory
Equity theory (Adams 1965) is essentially an exchange theory (Brown 1986). 
It is based on the premise that people expect that the outcome from a 
particular input will be comparable to the outcomes enjoyed by social 
comparitors from similar inputs, but unlike many economic exchange 
theories, it recognises that the individual's judgement may be based on 
imperfect knowledge. Thus it is individual perceptions about the inputs and 
outcomes for themselves and others that determine the judgement that 
individuals then make about the comparative value of the inputyoutcome 
ratio for themselves and others.
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Equity theory focuses on the comparison of the ratio between inputs and 
outcome. It is not concerned with the objective assessment of the value of 
outcomes against inputs. Adams expressed the theory by postulating that 
there was equity when:
Where: 0=outcome and I=input
According to equity theory the individual will act to remedy inequitable 
comparison with a referent group in one of a number of different ways. 
Individuals may seek to vary the inputs or outcomes, or cognitively distort 
the inputs or outcomes, or they may quit, or act in relation to referents. 
Choices about which course to take are made depending on the strength of 
the perceptions about injustice, situational and individual constraints on 
action, and individuals' perceptions about the choices open to them. Clearly 
motivation comes into play when individuals seek to alter their inputs. 
However, the individual is not restricted to simply varying inputs in response 
to inequity, and they may make cognitive changes to the comparative ratio 
of inputs to outcomes, which do not affect motivation.
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The two principal difficulties in applying equity theory are, firstly determining 
who constitutes the relevant referent group for any individual, and secondly 
predicting what counterbalancing action an individual will take to remedy an 
inequitable situation. Individuals may have quite different perceptions about 
who they ought to compare themselves with for reward purposes. One 
person may feel that the relevant group is their colleagues at work, while for 
someone else it may be a circle of friends from school or college. Intuitively 
it might be assumed that the principal reference group for most employees is 
likely to be colleagues working for the same firm and doing similar work. 
However, Dornstein (1988) found, in a study of blue and white collar 
employees in Israel, that the most important referant group tended to be 
others in similar occupational categories working for other firms.
Nevertheless, in relation to PRP and any assessment of the motivational 
effectiveness of PRP, it is reasonable to use other work colleagues as the 
relevant comparitor. PRP purposefully differentiates pay for individuals, 
doing the same work, where those individuals' performance is judged to be 
different. Some researchers have suggested that PRP may in fact 
demotivate employees, presumably because the employer's assessment of 
performance is felt to be unfair in some way (Marsden and Richardson 1994, 
Isaac 2001, Kellough & Nigro 2002, and Brown & Benson 2003). Equity 
theory provides an explanation of how differences in pay might demotivate 
employees. It also provides a mechanism for testing the impact of pay
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differentiation, based on performance assessment, on individuals, 
particularly where their judgement about the relative merits of their 
performance, compared to that of other work colleagues, is different from 
their employer's. It is clearly relevant to have regard to individual 
perceptions about the input to outcome ratio of work colleagues when 
looking at PRP because that distinction is a direct and intended consequence 
of PRP.
The problem over what counterbalancing steps an individual might take to 
remedy a perceived inequity is somewhat more difficult to resolve. If the 
perceived inequity is responded to by varying inputs this has a clear 
motivational effect. But if, on the other hand, a perceived inequity leads to 
cognitive distortion, the individual's own performance may not be affected, 
that is to say there may be no impact on motivation. This makes it difficult 
to predict the response that an individual will make to a perceived inequity. 
Indeed one of the criticisms of equity theory is that the theory can be 
interpreted flexibly to fit whatever research results are produced (Locke & 
Henne 1986) because it does not provide a clear cut prediction about the 
individual's response to inequity. In addition, the research evidence 
suggests that individuals do respond to what they consider to be 
underpayment (Berkowitz et al. 1987), but they are less likely to respond to 
overpayment (Mowday 1991). In other words the research shows that 
employees who think they are being underpaid are likely to work less hard,
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but that employees who thinks they are overpaid are less likely to increase 
their work effort.
Two assumptions have been made in order to generate a workable 
hypothesis about the impact of an individual's perception concerning the 
distributive equity of a particular PRP scheme on motivation. The first one is 
that the employee will use as a comparator group other employees 
employed by the same employer who are in receipt of PRP. This assumption 
reflects the fit between equity theory and pay differentiation in PRP. The 
second assumption is that employees will change the level of input they are 
making in response to any perceived inequity. Essentially the thesis is 
concerned with the motivational effectiveness of PRP. If the employee 
responds to inequity in the pay system by cognitive distortion or other action 
in respect of the referent group, that does not affect their motivation. On 
the other hand, if the inequity in pay is reconciled through a variation in the 
level of input, then that means that it is having a direct impact on 
motivation. The effects of employee perceptions about distributive equity on 
motivation can be hypothesised as:
Hypothesis 2 (d)(i).
Where employees believe that other employees of the same 
firm are being paid comparatively more for their effort, they 
will be demotivated.'
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Procedural Equity
Adam's equity theory is concerned with individuals' perceptions about the 
level of benefit of the input outcome ratio to them, or what is termed 
distributive equity. Greenberg (1987) has argued that in addition to 
distributive equity individuals are also concerned about procedural equity, 
that is to say the fairness of the procedure, which is used to determine 
what outcome is going to be. Indeed it has been suggested that 
procedural fairness may be as important as distributive fairness 
(Cropanzo and Folger 1991). The evidence from Greenberg suggests 
that where the individual is receiving a medium to high level of reward, 
compared to others procedural equity will not be particularly important: 
where however the rewards are comparatively poor procedural equity 
becomes much more important in determining the individual's 
perceptions of inequity. In other words, employees who are well paid are 
less likely to be concerned about the fairness of the payment system than 
those who are not well paid. On face value the approach of highly paid 
corporate executives and city traders to pay does not seem to support 
this proposition. These highly paid individuals appear to be very sensitive 
to pay comparisons.
Procedural fairness is an important issue in PRP systems, because PRP
depends upon a subjective assessment of the individual's performance
and the reward that performance should attract. The obvious danger is
that the assessment will be tainted by considerations other than the
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individual's work performance. PRP could, for instance, foster a 'blue 
eyed boy syndrome1 or halo effect, where an employee who is viewed 
favourably for some other reason, perhaps because of their readiness to 
agree with their manager, is unfairly assumed to perform well without 
any objective justification. Many PRP schemes include specific rules 
about the criteria which should be used in assessing an individual's 
performance, and indeed it is common for assessments to be subject to 
review or ratification by another manager within the organisation; this 
manager is sometimes termed the 'grandfather'.
Once an individual's performance is assessed, the other danger is that 
the level of payment might be influenced by external considerations. 
One of the fears expressed by revenue staff about PRP (Marsden and 
French 1998) was that their assessments were being overridden by more 
senior managers in order to comply with an imposed quota for the 
number of employees who should receive additional payments. In fact, 
some schemes specifically impose a quota distribution on the number of 
staff who can be assessed as falling into each category (eg London 
Docklands Development Corporation had such a scheme). From the 
employer's point of view a quota system helps to control wage costs and 
acts as a check on managers, who might otherwise tend to be too 
extreme, one way or the other, in their assessment of their employees' 
performance.
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These procedural equity issues also impact on the employee's expectancy 
that an improved performance will lead to an increase in pay. The 
research evidence suggests that procedural equity affects employee 
perceptions about the PRP outcomes (St-Onge 2000, and Siegall & Worth 
2001). From a theoretical perspective this may be the result of direct 
equity consideration and also the perceived instrumentality of the PRP 
process. If the assessment is thought to be influenced by factors other 
than the individual's performance, or if the payment is determined by a 
quota system, then that breaks the expectancy link between performance 
and pay. Consequently there is a twofold impact on motivation where 
there is procedural inequity. Firstly, according to expectancy theory the 
motivational effects of the performance payment will be nullified. 
Secondly, procedural inequity will itself demotivate employees or cause 
other adverse effects amongst employees (Brown & Benson 2003).
It is therefore hypothesised that:
Hypothesis 2 (dViO.
Where employees perceive that there is procedural inequity 
in the PRP scheme they will be less motivated.'
PRP and Cultural Change
There is a view that if a firm gets its corporate culture right, that will
improve the firm's performance. It is unclear whether or, indeed, how
firms can improve their performance by changing their corporate culture.
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Nevertheless numerous organisations have introduced cultural change 
programmes in order to improve their performance. PRP is often 
introduced as part of a cultural change programme (Kessler 1994). In 
order to understand how PRP could act as a catalyst for cultural change, 
a number of issues need to be addressed. Firstly, what is meant by 
corporate culture? How can having the right or appropriate corporate 
culture improve an organisation's performance? How can culture be 
changed and what part can the introduction of PRP play in changing 
culture? And finally how can these processes be measured?
Corporate culture is a complex issue and there is a considerable body of 
literature on this subject. In a thesis primarily concerned with PRP and 
motivation, it is not practical to do justice to the extensive research on 
this subject. Instead the focus in this thesis is on producing a model 
explaining how the issue of corporate culture and performance interact.
Defining corporate culture
Schein (1992) sees corporate culture as a set of psychological 
predispositions, which are evidenced by multiple layers within the 
organisation. At the top layer there are the artefacts, that is the visible 
signs of organisational culture; under that there are the organisation's 
perspectives, that is socially shared rules for dealing with common 
problems. The bottom two layers of organisational culture comprise
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shared values and the assumptions employees make about themselves 
and others within the organisation, as well as the organisation itself. 
Looked at in this way culture appears to be a complex web running 
through the organisation. Schein says that one of the key factors in 
determining corporate culture is top management.
Some commentators have focused even more closely on culture as the 
product of management activity. Denison (1990) for instance defines 
corporate culture as: 'the underlying values, beliefs and principles that 
serve as a foundation for an organisation's management system as well 
as the set of management practices and behaviours that both exemplify 
and reinforce those principles/
The emphasis in this definition is on management and management 
systems. Yet culture can be seen from a number of different 
perspectives, so that a shopfloor perspective on culture may be different 
from a management perspective. The differences in approach have been 
characterised (Martin 1992) as integration, differentiation and 
fragmentation. Integration is concerned with a single cohesive corporate 
culture. Differentiation argues for a number of different cultures in one 
organisation to accommodate the sub-cultures, whether they are rooted 
in different parts of the organisation or different levels of hierarchy. 
Fragmentation is a reflection of a lack of consensus and complexity in 
organisational culture. In looking at culture and pay systems it is logical
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to adopt an integrationist approach on the basis that pay as a mechanism 
for cultural change is part of a top down or management approach to 
cultural change.
Improving organisational effectiveness
Some management writers like Peters and Waterman (1982) have 
suggested that firms simply need to copy successful organisations in 
order to succeed. The assumption seems to be that successful firms all 
have the same culture. The difficulty with this inductive approach to the 
question of cultural effectiveness is that it has proved notoriously difficult 
to identify firms that will succeed in the long term. Some of the firms 
identified by Peters and Waterman as successful, subsequently proved to 
be less successful; IBM was one example. The selective basis on which 
firms have been chosen has also been criticised. By focusing on only 
some successful firms, Peters and Waterman omitted other firms, which 
have been successful with a different approach to organisational culture. 
More importantly, as Brown (1995) points out it is possible to identify 
successful firms that have a very weak culture and firms that face serious 
problems despite having a very strong culture.
Denison (1990), on the other hand, adopts a deductive approach to 
cultural effectiveness and hypothesizes that the effectiveness of an 
organisation will be determined by the extent to which the organisation's
110
policies, practices, beliefs and values mesh together and fit the business
environment. As Denison puts it:
'Effectiveness is a function of the interrelation of core values 
and beliefs into policies and practices, and the business 
environment of the organisation/
Denison argues that there are four mechanisms or hypotheses that an
organisation needs to utilise in its cultural strategy in order to succeed.
The first hypothesis is that employees need to be involved, that is to say
committed to the organisation that they work for. Involvement leads to
consensus about core values, which in turn lowers transaction costs as
employee action is intuitively guided by core values, thus minimising the
need for rules and regulations. This leads on to the consistency
hypothesis, which predicts that an organisation will benefit from better
co-ordination and communication of shared values, provided those
shared values are congruent with the business environment. These first
two hypotheses are characterised as internal, that is to say they are
concerned with how the organisation deals with internal cultural issues.
One, involvement, is about how change is brought about, and the other,
consistency, is about how stability and direction are achieved.
Effectively, Denison's internal hypotheses are concerned with creating 
and maintaining organisational commitment. Commitment is a complex 
concept which can be seen from a number of different perspectives 
(Swailes 2002) however for the purposes of this thesis Kanter^ definition 
has been adopted:
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'the willingness of social actors to give their energy and 
loyalty to social systems, the attachment of personality 
systems to social relations which are seen as self 
expressive/ (Kanter 1968, p499)
If employees believe in the same values as their employer, and those
values are co-ordinated and communicated through the organisation, as
Denison suggests, employees will believe in that organisation, because it
shares the same values as them, and that means that they will be
committed to that organisation. Employees, who are committed to their
employer and the employer's values are not only going to reduce
transactional costs of internal communication, but may also be
intrinsically motivated to work harder for the employer (Brown 1995, and
Gallie, Felstead & Green 2001). Commitment not only means that the
organisation needs fewer rules because employees intuitively understand
what the organisation wants them to do, it should also mean that
employees will be motivated to work harder because they identify more
closely with the employer and the employer's objectives.
Denison's other two hypotheses are concerned with how the organisation
deals with the external environment. Change and flexibility are
maintained by adapting to the changing business environment by
responding to both internal and external customers. According to
Denison it is important to be able both to restructure and re-
institutionalise. In other words whilst the ability to adapt to change is
important, it is also important to avoid the so called balkanisation of an
organisation. This seems to be somewhat akin to Schein's (1978) idea of
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cultural change being a process of unfreezing and refreezing the 
organisation's culture. Finally, Denison argues that stability and direction 
are given to the organisation by its mission, that is some statement of 
what the organisation is about and where it intends to go.
Brown (1995) argues that an organisation with a strong culture will not 
necessarily be a successful organisation. Organisational effectiveness 
depends on cultural fit, that is to say the fit between the organisation's 
culture and its business environment. This is similar to Lawrence and 
Lorsch's (1967) hypothesis about the contingent nature of successful 
corporate strategy. There is no one right culture; culture should be 
appropriate to the nature of the organisation and the business 
environment that it is operating in. Brown says that culture can affect 
organisational effectiveness by increasing employee commitment, 
because employees are more likely to work harder for a firm they identify 
with.
Each of the three approaches to organisational effectiveness identified 
above is concerned with increasing the organisation's performance. 
Peters and Waterman leave the precise mechanism by which this is 
achieved is opaque; their approach is simple, copy the best. Denison and 
Brown both suggest a theoretical framework to explain how corporate 
culture can improve effectiveness. In effect both focus on commitment 
to explain how organisational culture can improve performance internally,
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that is to say through the contribution made by employees. Commitment 
cuts down on the costs of communicating within the organisation, 
minimising the need for bureaucratic rules. At the same time, employees 
working for an organisation which reflects views that they subscribe to 
will be more intrinsically motivated to work for that organisation.
Cultural change
Schein (1992) suggests that cultural change is a process of unfreezing
corporate culture, learning a new culture and refreezing. Some
commentators have suggested that cultural change comes about as a
result of some organisational crisis, which throws the existing order into
doubt. The problem it is argued is that the existing culture has a certain
amount of inertia that makes it difficult to displace. Generally cultural
change is seen as a top down process, sometimes starting with a change
in leadership at the very top of the organisation. The actual mechanisms
used to achieve cultural change often draw heavily on the various levers
of change generally associated with HRM. Brown (1995) emphasises the
need for consistent cues, as with HRM the focus is not on one particular
policy, but on an overall strategy. The difficulty is in predicting the
precise outcome of a particular strategy. As Brown (1995) puts it:
'if you want to create a culture of, for example, highly 
competitive entrepreneurs, then make sure your reward 
system rewards competitive and entrepreneurial 
behaviour... while this strategy may sound simple and 
obvious it is in fact neither. In the first place it is extremely
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difficult for organisations to correctly analyse the full 
implications of, for example, a reward system'
PRP as a mechanism for achieving cultural change in an organisation
Pay is widely recognised as an important tool in bringing about change in 
organisational culture (Drennan 1992, Kessler 1994, and Brown 1995). 
PRP sends a particularly strong message to employees about the 
importance that the employer places on performance because it 
specifically relates pay to performance. As Kessler and Purcell (1992) 
observe, PRP has been widely used amongst newly privatised companies 
in order to create a more market orientated culture. However, the 
precise effects of PRP and its effectiveness as a means of achieving 
cultural change are less clear. As Kessler (at p.490, 1994) puts it,
'It is notoriously difficult to isolate and assess the impact of any pay 
system'. An effective PRP scheme might logically be assumed to send a 
clear message about the importance that the employer attaches to 
performance. Furthermore, if the PRP scheme cascades the firm's key 
objectives down through the organisation, as key targets which need to 
be achieved in order to earn a performance payment, then that should 
reinforce those objectives for employees.
On the other hand, a PRP scheme that failed to motivate employees 
might have a different effect. If employees see no benefit in working 
harder to achieve the performance targets that they are set, it seems
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unlikely that they will attach much importance to the messages that are 
associated with those performance targets. Consequently it can be 
hypothesised that a PRP scheme that failed to motivate employees might 
have unintended and unattractive consequences in terms of cultural 
change. Given that so much of the UK evidence is that PRP schemes are 
not particularly effective at motivating employees this is an important 
point.
Measuring cultural change and its effectiveness
Much of the work done on organisational culture has been qualitative in 
nature comprising detailed case studies. Denison (1990) uses 
quantitative methods to test his hypothesis, but the level of analysis used 
is the firm. On the face of it, this would seem to be the natural level of 
analysis at which to study the overall effectiveness of a particular 
organisational culture or programme of change. Looking at the firm as 
the unit of analysis makes it difficult to disaggregate the effects of the 
various elements of cultural change programmes and assess their 
effectiveness separately.
However, there are a number of issues that have been identified above 
which would appear to be susceptible to analysis at the level of the 
employee. Firstly, while culture is a complex concept, cultural change is 
essentially about changing employee beliefs about the firm and their
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relationship to it and their values. Secondly, for cultural change to be 
effective it should increase employee commitment. Thirdly, employee 
commitment should lead to improved employee motivation. Finally, if 
PRP is a mechanism for achieving cultural change, it is more likely to be 
successful in changing culture in those instances where it is also 
successful in increasing employee motivation. This in turn means that the 
PRP scheme should be more likely to increase the motivation of 
employees who become more committed to the employer, through the 
programme of cultural change.
This three-stage analysis of cultural change can be tested using three 
hypotheses. Firstly, if cultural change is achieved by changing employee 
attitudes in such a way that their commitment to the firm is increased, it 
can be predicted that changes in employee attitudes, in line with the 
programme of cultural change, will be associated with increased 
employee commitment. This can be expressed in the following way:
Hypothesis 3(a)
The Thames Water programme of cultural change will 
have brought about a change for some employees in 
their view of the relationship with their employer, and 
that will in turn have increased the commitment of 
those employees to the employer;
Secondly, according to the model being suggested, employee 
commitment should lead to greater employee motivation. Clearly
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this is predicated on the assumption that employees who are more 
committed to their employer will be more motivated than those 
who are not so committed. This can be hypothesised as:
Hypothesis 3(fr)
' Employees who are more committed to their 
employer will be more highly motivated by PRP than 
employees who are less committed to their 
employer.'
Finally, if PRP is used as a mechanism for achieving cultural change, by 
changing employee attitudes, it would follow that it is more likely to have 
worked as an agent of cultural change in those cases where it has also 
been successful in its own terms. In other words, PRP is more likely to 
be effective in changing corporate culture where it also works to increase 
employee motivation. Thus it is hypothesised that:
Hypothesis 3(c)
'PRP will be more effective in changing organisational 
culture where the PRP scheme is also successful in 
motivating employees.'
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Chapter 6 
Thames Water and PRP.
Introduction
This thesis has looked at PRP using both qualitative and quantitative 
research to examine why PRP was introduced in Thames Water, how 
successful it has been as a motivator for employees, and why Thames 
Water continues to use PRP. This chapter specifies the research approach 
adopted, explains why Thames Water was chosen for this research and 
describes the nature of the Thames Water PRP scheme.
While some of the theories being tested have been developed using both 
laboratory and field research, there is a clear advantage to be gained from 
using a field test to see how far those theories go to explain the motivational 
effectiveness of PRP. Although it might be possible to simulate PRP in a 
laboratory setting, there is a danger that a laboratory setting would fail to 
capture all the different aspects of a working environment that influence the 
effectiveness of PRP. The advantage of a field setting is that it brings into 
play a number of environmental elements that would be difficult to replicate 
in a laboratory study. By the same token this means that field studies may 
be criticised on the basis that they fail to capture or allow for important 
environmental influences. Kessler (2000) for instance has pointed out that 
much of the critical evidence about the motivational effectiveness of PRP
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comes from the public sector where there are constraints regarding the 
nature of the workforce and the nature of the organisation, which may 
undermine the effectiveness of PRP. Consequently it is important to bear in 
mind the environmental constraints that might impact on PRP in Thames 
Water when considering the results of the research.
Effectively, by focusing on one firm the individual employee becomes the 
unit of analysis. Some studies have used the firm as the unit of analysis 
(Bevan, Thompson & Hirsch 1991, Thompson 1993), and although they have 
managed to get an overall picture about the motivational effects of PRP 
within the firms studied, a more detailed quantitative analysis of the 
individual PRP scheme is needed in order to understand the motivational 
effectiveness of that scheme. Marsden and Richardson (1994) and then 
later Marsden and French (1998) conducted quantitative research into the 
Inland Revenue PRP scheme, which gave a more detailed picture of the 
effectiveness of a particular PRP scheme. That process has been taken one 
step further in this thesis by looking at the effects of PRP on individual 
employee's motivation and correlating the level of motivation with specific 
facets of the PRP scheme and other aspects of the employee's relationship 
with the firm and other employees. By using the individual as the unit of 
analysis in this way it is possible to explore the Thames Water PRP scheme 
and identify those aspects of the scheme which are most important in 
motivating employees.
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Quantitative and qualitative research
Both qualitative and quantitative research methods have been used in the 
thesis (see Appendix A.i). Qualitative research gives a general background 
to the scheme and specifically helps to explain the reasons why Thames 
Water introduced PRP. Quantitative research methods are particularly useful 
for testing the hypotheses about the motivational effects of PRP. By using 
the individual employee as the unit of analysis it is possible to examine, first 
of all to what extent PRP is motivating employees, and then to analyse how 
far particular facets of the PRP scheme can be associated with the 
motivational effectiveness of the PRP scheme. In so far as those facets of 
the PRP scheme which are associated with the motivational effect of PRP are 
consistent with any of the three theories of motivation being examined in 
this thesis, it will then be argued that theory gives an insight into the 
mechanisms by which PRP is motivating employees. This analysis is 
pertinent even if only a minority of the employees surveyed is motivated by 
the PRP scheme. Indeed, by utilising those facets of the PRP scheme that 
are germane to the theory or theories that are identified by the analysis, it 
may be possible to improve the motivational effectiveness of the PRP 
scheme.
There is now a substantial body of evidence, largely from the public sector 
(Kessler 2000), to show that PRP is not a particularly strong motivator 
(Bevan, Thompson & Hirsch 1991, Thompson 1993, Marsden and Richardson
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1994, and Marsden and French 1998), yet PRP continues to be a popular 
payment system, and it is therefore pertinent to ask why a firm chooses to 
use PRP. Cannell and Wood's (1992) survey suggested that firms use PRP 
for a number of reasons, and that motivation is only one of those reasons, 
indeed they found some scepticism amongst personnel managers about 
PRP's effectiveness as a motivator. It is hypothesised that Thames Water 
may be more concerned with other benefits of PRP, than they are about its 
effectiveness as a motivator. Qualitative research has been used in order to 
contextualise Thames Water's decision to use PRP, and examine the reasons 
for that decision.
Qualitative research has also been used to look at cultural change within 
Thames Water, and the extent to which PRP has been used as a tool to 
achieve cultural change. Although PRP can be an important tool for 
changing an organisation's culture (Kessler 1994), it is only one of a number 
of possible levers of cultural change. It is therefore important, if PRP has 
been used as a lever for cultural change, to understand why PRP is being 
used and to understand the objectives of the cultural change programme. 
Qualitative analysis has been used to examine the extent to which Thames 
Water were pursuing a programme of cultural change and how far PRP was 
a part of that programme. The effectiveness of Thames Water's programme 
of cultural change and PRP as a mechanism for achieving cultural change 
has then been tested using quantitative analysis. It is thus possible to bring 
together both qualitative and quantitative research in an area of research
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where the use of purely qualitative analysis has been criticised for giving too 
narrow a perspective on the subject (Denison 1990, Milkovich 1991).
Why Thames Water?
Thames Water presents an interesting opportunity to explore PRP because of 
its size, history and approach to the future. Taking size first of all, the 
Thames Water area comprises the Thames basin, stretching from Cirencester 
in the west to Erith in the east, up as far north as Banbury and down as far 
south as Godalming. Thames Water supplies clean water to over 7 million 
people and treats waste water for over 11 million people1. In 1995, when 
the survey of Thames Water employees was conducted, the Thames Water 
Group employed a total of 10,473 people of whom 6,673 were employed by 
the utility part of the Group, the bulk of the rest were employed on 
international work (1,135) and in products and services (2,603), which 
included subsidiaries, such as the Brophy Group, engaged in non utility work 
(Annual Report and Accounts 1995). There were therefore sufficient number 
of people employed in the utility part of the business to make it possible to 
conduct quantitative analysis, which would provide useful results.
This thesis has focused on the utility part of the Thames Water PLC for four
1 The difference is accounted for by the supply of clean water by 
smaller Water Companies to some households in the Thames Water area -  
these Water Companies only supply clean water.
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reasons. Firstly and decisively, it was only the utility part of the Thames 
Water PLC group that used a standard PRP scheme, some of the other parts 
of the Group did not even have PRP. But it is also worth noting that the 
utility part of the Group represents a reasonably hetrogeneous employment 
environment, with a substantial number of employees being engaged in the 
continuous processes necessary for water production and waste water 
disposal, which in turn tends to moderate the environmental differences 
between subjects within the utility. In addition, the historical development of 
the utility part of the business from a nationalised industry into the private 
sector presented a further dimension to the study, which did not apply to 
other parts of the Group, such as Brophy, which was acquired from the 
private sector and had always been in the private sector. Finally, while 
Thames Waters status as a Public Limited Company (PLC) means that its 
annual reports and accounts are publicly available, those reports also give 
utility specific information, which makes it possible to focus on the utility 
business and still get relevant PLC information.
The development of Thames Water as a private company ought to be seen 
in the context of the water industry in the late 1980s. In England and Wales 
the water industry prior to privatisation comprised a number of large publicly 
owned Water Authorities; Thames Water was one of these Authorities. The 
Water Authorities were responsible for the provision of clean water and 
disposal of waste water in their areas, although there were also a number of 
statutory water companies, which provided clean water. The Water
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Authorities were bound by government rules on public sector borrowing and, 
by the end of the 1980s, they were widely perceived to have been under- 
investing in the water infrastructure. This made them an ideal target for 
privatisation, especially by a Conservative government ideologically 
committed to privatisation. However water supply and waste water 
treatment are natural monopolies, at least in terms of ownership and 
deployment of the assets.
In 1983 the government appointed Roy Watts as chairman of Thames 
Water; he had previously worked for the newly privatised British Airways. 
Roy Watts shared the Thatcherite enthusiasm for privatisation and believed 
that the Water industry should be privatised. In 1988 Thames Water was 
the first Water Authority to leave national pay bargaining and put its 
managers on personal contracts. This was seen as a precursor to a move 
into the private sector, representing as it did a break with the old 
nationalised industry commitment to national pay bargaining. It is perhaps 
interesting to note that Thames used a change in personnel policy to signal 
its commitment to water privatisation. Then in 1989 Thames Water and the 
other Water Authorities were privatised. The privatisation followed the same 
pattern as privatisation of the other utilities had, but in the case of the new 
water companies the standard pricing formula of RPI - X, which had been 
applied to the other privatised utilities, was changed to RPI + K 2, to provide 
more money for investment. This pricing formula allowed Thames Water to
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increase its capital programme from £247m to £392m in 1990 (Annual 
Report and Accounts 1990/91) and by 1998 the company's capital 
investment programme had increased to £485m (Annual Report and 
Accounts 1998). Utilities other than water on the other hand were faced 
with a decline in income and the prospect of competition in the future.
While Thames Water was not faced with the same pressure on price as the
other utilities, it wanted to increase efficiency for a number of reasons.
Firstly, increased efficiency improved shareholder value. Secondly, Thames
were keen to become a major international water company with subsidiaries
around the world and, in order to win contracts abroad, they needed to be
seen as an efficient operator at home. Thirdly, the formula itself was subject
to periodic review and the outcome of any review was likely to be more
advantageous if the company could show that it had increased efficiency
without regulatory pressure. Privatisation was seen as giving Thames Water
the managerial freedom to adopt a more efficient and more market-
orientated approach to its business. Reporting a 15% increase in earnings
per share, Roy Watts said in the 1990/91 Annual Report;
'I question that such results and improvements could have been 
achieved but for privatisation. Managerial and financial freedom have 
been a stimulus/
The impact of the so-called managerial freedom brought about by 
privatisation was particularly evident in the field of industrial relations. Prior
2 K=-X+Q where X= efficiency expectations and Q= quality obligations
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to privatisation the industry had conducted national pay bargaining in
respect of three distinct groups of employees; namely manual, craft and
staff. This meant that each group had separate terms and conditions agreed
both nationally and locally. Thames Water broke away from national pay
bargaining in 1988 a year before privatisation. Then after privatisation,
Thames continued reorienting its personnel policies to reflect the new
commercial environment. In September 1990 the company announced the
Employee Project. This new initiative aimed to:
'Support the modernisation of working practices and continued 
efficiency improvements by establishing common basic terms and 
conditions for all employees, greater opportunities for training, and 
the introduction of a single negotiating forum/(Annual Report and 
Accounts 1990/1991)
Essentially, the company was embarking on a programme of change, moving 
away from job demarcation to a unified and more flexible approach to 
working practices. Job evaluation and PRP were both introduced as part of 
the employee project. Overall the aim was to change the culture of the 
organisation from a public sector organisational culture to a more 
commercially focused organisational culture. For Thames Water that meant 
that in the field of industrial relations there needed to be greater flexibility so 
that managers and employees would feel that they had the freedom to 
respond to commercial pressures. In particular it meant that employees and 
managers had to take responsibility for delivering the business aims and to 
see performance as key to the success of the business. PRP was a central 
part of this because it allowed Thames Water to cascade down the business
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aims through the process of objective setting. At the same time it required 
managers to address the issue of employee performance.
The Introduction of PRP.
In 1990, the year after privatisation, Thames Water launched the 'Employee 
Project1 with the aim of revisiting the relationship between the Company and 
its employees. This project encompassed a range of different policies, 
including training, employee communication, and payment systems. One of 
the underlying intentions was to simplify the employment relationship, by for 
example moving towards single table bargaining. PRP was one of the new 
policies, which was introduced as part of the Employee Project. One of 
Thames' Personnel Managers3 (Appendix A.i) described the aims and 
objectives of PRP as:
\..a mixture of things. Really a recognition that we needed to be able 
to reward good performance and, I guess, penalise poor performance, 
and reflect that in money terms. ...a very broad kind of motivational 
approach. ... we could use the performance related pay scheme to 
make clear to employees what we felt were the important issues in 
the Company, so that for example, the criteria that we ended up with 
in this scheme, things like team working, things like adaptability, we 
felt were important values to encourage amongst employees in 
recognition of the way that the company itself was changing and 
moving. Certainly since privatisation, the company has gone through 
so much change, we felt we ought to be actively encouraging that 
kind of approach amongst our employees, ...a way of getting a 
message to employees. Trying to use PRP to support cultural 
change../
3 Extract from an interview with Thames Water Personnel Manager - 9.11.94.
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PRP for white-collar staff in Thames Water was agreed in the 1991 pay 
settlement and implemented with effect from July 1992. The Thames Water 
PRP Assessor's Training Manual (1995) says that:
'The Company's pay strategy is designed to reward people for their 
contribution to the business. This means paying a fair rate for the 
job, recognising and rewarding individual effort and achievement and 
allowing employees to share in the success of the Company. The 
three elements of pay which enable the Company to achieve this 
strategy are described below:-
• Basic Pay - This is based on the appropriate grade for the job
as determined through Job Evaluation.
• PRP - Allows an individuals pay increase to be determined by 
their performance at work.
• Profit Sharing - Enables employees to share in the financial
success of the Company providing certain profit targets are achieved/
A more detailed statement of the objectives of the PRP scheme was given to 
the Trade Union Side of the Thames Water Company Council when the 
scheme was revised in 1994. The objectives of PRP were summarised in the 
presentation given to the Trade Union side of the Council, as being:
to recognise differing levels of performance, and by rewarding 
better performance to encourage and motivate employees to 
contribute to the best of their ability;
- to ensure a fair salary is paid which takes account of effort and 
achievement;
- to achieve a fair pay system in which equal pay is given for work of 
equal value carried out to equal levels of performance/
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Similar objectives are suggested by the introduction to the Thames Water 
leaflet 'Performance Related Pay - A guide for employees' (circa 1992) which 
says:
'Thames believes that people should be rewarded for their contribution 
to the business. This means paying a fair rate for the job, recognising 
and rewarding individual and/or team achievement and allowing 
employees to share in the success of the Company/
The emphasis in these documents is on ensuring the pay system is fair by 
rewarding performance. The motivation of employees is identified as one of 
Thames Water's objectives in using PRP only in the company's statement to 
the Trade Union Side of the Company Council. PRP is not presented in these 
documents as being a mechanism for achieving changes in the 
organisational culture. Yet PRP was originally introduced as part of a 
broader programme of cultural change within Thames Water, the Employee 
Project. This contrast is perhaps indicative of the difficulty in identifying a 
single objective as the sole reason why an employer has introduced PRP, and 
tends to confirm the view that there may be a number of different objectives 
(Cannell and Wood 1992).
The Thames Water PRP scheme.
The Thames Water PRP scheme depends upon annual assessments of 
performance in the year running from the 1st April to the 31st March. These 
assessments are normally carried out in the following May by supervisors or 
managers, who are trained Assessors. The assessment is separate from the
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Thames' Staff Performance Review (SPR), but the Assessor's PRP Training 
Manual advises Assessors to look at the SPR, when carrying out the 
assessment, and says that there should be 'a sensible degree of consistency 
in the messages given through each scheme'. The SPR scheme is intended 
to ensure that supervisors and managers communicate and agree clear 
objectives with their subordinate staff and give feedback on progress 
towards achieving those objectives. Supervisors and managers should have 
an SPR interview with those employees they are responsible for at least once 
a year, sometimes more frequently, although there is no set timetable for 
SPR interviews. The objectives identified at the SPR should also be used as 
one of the criteria for judging staff performance for the purposes of PRP. So 
that while the SPR and PRP schemes are formally separate, the PRP 
assessment is both, based in part on SPR objectives, and should also reflect 
the SPR assessment.
There are seven criteria which Assessors use in order to assess employees 
for PRP in Thames. They are Key Tasks, Targets and Objectives, Motivation 
and Commitment, Working Relationships, Adaptability, Customer Services, 
and Managing Others. Key Tasks comprise those tasks in the Job Profile, 
which need to be done in order to achieve the main purpose of the job. The 
Job Profile is effectively a job description for each post, which is produced so 
that the post can be evaluated using the Thames job evaluation Scheme 
'JET. The Job Profiles 'describe jobs in such a way that the different 
demands of the job can be properly recognised and evaluated but without
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including any unnecessary references to specific functional activities' (JET 
Guidelines for Managers 1994). Assessors first look at the Job Profile, then 
determine what are the Key Tasks in the profile, and then assess 
performance of those tasks as either: excellent, very good, good, acceptable, 
or unacceptable. Each of these categories or Performance Indicators, as 
they are called, is defined; ranging from excellent, which means 'Far exceeds 
the requirements and demands of the job', to unacceptable, which means 
'Consistently fails to meet the basic requirements of the job in most key 
tasks'.
Achievement of Objectives and Targets is a criterion, which can be based on 
an individual assessment or team assessment as appropriate. The objectives 
and targets are those that are set by management and communicated 
through local discussions with employees, either individually or collectively. 
The objectives and targets will include such items as SPR objectives, 
operational performance indicators, quality standards etc.' (Assessors PRP 
Training Manual 1995) and assessors are required to have regard to 
documented objectives and targets when assessing employees against this 
criterion. Essentially this criterion ensures that employees are assessed 
against the objectives and targets they have been specifically given by their 
managers. Assessors are told to consider any special circumstances outside 
the employees' control, which have significantly influenced performance 
either positively or adversely. The assessment uses the same five 
Performance Indicators as does the Key Tasks criterion, but the definition of
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those Performance Indicators is adapted to the specific criterion; so that for
example for this criterion excellent means:
'Targets and standards are frequently exceeded. Exceptionally 
difficult circumstances overcome without dropping standards or 
targets. Makes a significant contribution to the achievement of the 
department beyond established performance standards/
Four of the five other criteria are concerned with behavioural traits and so 
can be distinguished from the two already considered, both of which are 
concerned with performance against specific criteria which have been set 
and documented in advance. Motivation and Commitment looks at drive and 
determination that is to say the employee's attitude towards the company 
and job. Working Relationships relates to the employee's ability to work as 
part of a team, that is their attitude to other employees that they work with. 
Adaptability attempts to measure employee ability to initiate change and 
respond to it positively. And Customer Service looks at the employee's 
approach to both internal and external customers, to see how far they are 
focused on identifying customer needs and providing a service. It can be 
seen that for each of these four criteria, whilst employees will know in broad 
terms what behaviour is expected of them, they do not normally have any 
specific targets to work to. Finally, those employees who have responsibility 
for managing others are also assessed on their ability to achieve the best 
performance through effective motivation, delegation, and development of 
employees under their control. All of the criteria are assessed against the 
same five Performance Indicators, but the definition of each of the
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Performance Indicators varies between the different criteria in order to 
reflect the different attributes that each of the criteria are concerned with.
Once each of the seven criteria has been assessed, an overall assessment is 
made of the employee's performance based on an overview of performance 
against the seven criteria. The relative importance of each of the criteria will 
vary from job to job and 'the balancing of the criteria, and their contribution 
to the single overall performance assessment is ultimately a matter of 
management judgement' (Management Presentation to the Company Council 
1994). The overall assessment is expressed in the same terms as the 
Performance Indicators; so that an employee's overall performance may be 
rated as excellent, very good, good, acceptable, or unacceptable. Potentially 
one of the problems with the scheme is that employees may be unsure 
about the relative importance of the seven criteria for their particular job. 
Indeed it could be argued that seven criteria against which to assess 
performance are too many. From the employer's point of view, it may look 
as if they have captured all the different aspects of performance that they 
might want to reward. From the employees' point of view having a plethora 
of targets may make it more difficult to understand what is expected of them 
and how they can achieve a performance payment.
The overall assessment made by the Assessor is countersigned by the 
Assessor's manager and that assessment is recorded centrally, so that 
Personnel can monitor the assessments. Personnel monitor managers'
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assessments first of all to see if there is a normal distribution of ratings, that 
is to say whether they correspond to the normal bell curve distribution, in 
practice the distribution is skewed to the right with a tendency for 
assessments to peak at very good. The assessments are then broken down 
according to gender and ethnic origin and then analysed to see whether the 
figures suggest that there is any bias in the assessments. If the monitoring 
process highlights any anomalies, these are discussed with the manager 
concerned. Some PRP schemes apply a forced profile or quota to the 
managers' assessments either before or after they are made, so that the 
number of employees who are rated in each category is limited. This helps 
ensure there is a distribution of the various category ratings and 
consequently helps to control salary costs, by ensuring that not everyone is 
in the highest category. Thames Water do not use a quota system or apply 
a forced profile, although presumably managers are aware that their 
assessments will be looked at by Personnel to see how far the distribution of 
assessments differs from others. Only the overall performance rating is used 
to determine the individual employee's entitlement under the PRP scheme.
The performance assessment is translated into a pay increase by applying 
the overall performance rating or assessment category to the relevant salary 
matrix. Each grade has a salary matrix which contains a scale salary range 
going from a scale minimum of 85% of the mid point of the salary scale to a 
scale maximum of 115% of the mid point of the salary scale, so that if the 
mid point of the salary range was for example £20,000, the range would go
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from a minimum of £17,000 to a maximum of £23,000. Each performance 
assessment category has what is termed a Natural Level within the salary 
matrix. The Natural Level for excellent is 115%, for very good it is 107.5%, 
for good it is the scale mid point, for acceptable it is 92.5% and for 
unacceptable it is 85%. Where an employee's salary is above or below the 
Natural Level for their performance, when their performance is assessed, the 
level of their performance payment should progress their salary towards 
their so called 'Natural Level', which is the level of salary that reflects their 
level of performance. So, for instance if employees are paid more than their 
natural level then their salary should increase by less than the movement in 
the salary band, so that as the salary band moves up their position moves 
closer to their Natural Level. Alternatively, if an employee is paid less than 
their Natural Level then they can expect an increase higher then the overall 
movement in salary bands. The further the employee is away from their 
Natural Level on the salary matrix the larger the movement in their salary 
relative to the general movement in the salary band.
Each employee's assessment is known before the annual pay negotiations. 
The annual pay increase is agreed between the Company and trade unions. 
Historically the trade unions have sought to protect the earnings of 
employees who are earning in excess of the salary paid for that employee's 
natural level on the salary matrix. An employee can be above their Natural 
Level on the salary matrix for a variety of reasons. For instance when PRP 
was introduced the salary scales were changed and employees were job
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evaluated onto the new scales, in some instances new grades attracted a 
lower salary than the employee's current grade, but the employee's salary 
was protected.
The speed with which an employee progresses towards their Natural Level 
depends upon how far they are away from that Natural Level on the salary 
matrix, so that the largest increase achievable would be paid to an 
employee, who was on 85% of scale and who was rated excellent. Equally, 
someone who was paid 115% of scale, but rated as unacceptable would 
move down through the matrix, because although they will not have their 
pay cut, their pay will not increase at the same rate as the matrix so that 
they will still effectively be moving down through the matrix. Anyone whose 
assessment category matched their current position on the salary matrix 
would already be at their Natural Level and so would not move on the salary 
matrix, although they would still benefit from any annual pay increase. One 
effect of this is that, in any one year, an employee whose previous 
performance has been poor might get a bigger salary increase, than an 
employee who has consistently performed very well, even though the 
difference in absolute salary levels would reflect the consistent performance.
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Progress through the matrix has also been affected by the low level of 
inflation since PRP was introduced, which in turn has meant that the level of 
pay increases has been relatively modest. As the Personnel Manager4said:
'the first year we settled at something like 4.5%, the second year 2%, 
and this year just under 3%, so given we are talking about 30% wide 
scale, it is really very difficult to make a lot of progress, so I think 
inflation is a problem/
Another personnel manager commented that the problem with the scheme is 
that salary increases were driven by the employee's position on the salary 
matrix rather than the employee's performance. In 1994, International 
Survey Research Limited conducted an employee opinion survey for Thames 
Water. Thames published a summary report of the results of the survey for 
employees in 'Viewfinder 94', an internal employee communication 
publication. The survey showed that 54% of Thames' employees were 
satisfied with their pay and benefits, according to the report this contrasts 
with only 40% in Companies generally, although this may reflect 
comparatively high levels of pay in Thames Water. Surprisingly, perhaps 
given the complexity of the Thames Water PRP scheme, some 51% of those 
surveyed claimed to understand how their performance was judged for the 
PRP scheme. However the scheme was not thought by respondents to be 
rewarding good performance, only 15% thought PRP penalises poor 
performance and only 13% thought PRP rewards superior performance. The 
report comments:
4 Interview with Personnel Manager - 9.11.96
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'Performance -related pay is one particular cause for concern. 
Although people appreciated the scheme has some useful points - for 
example it helps prompt discussions on performance with managers - 
many question whether its usefulness is reflected in pay. Few of you 
feel it sufficiently rewards good performance, or that it penalises poor 
performance. Perhaps for these reasons PRP isn't motivating you as 
much as you'd like it to /
Clearly on Thames Water's own evidence the PRP scheme was not achieving
their published objective of rewarding individual achievement. Commenting
on this a Personnel Manager5 observed:
'I think there has been a recognition that it doesn't achieve a great 
deal in terms of motivation in its current form, that's for sure. I think 
the results of our internal review has demonstrated that people don't 
feel turned on by PRP and so from that point of view,...I guess we 
maybe parked that objective a bit. I certainly recognise that it is not 
one that's operating or has been achieved particularly well, but I think 
that the one about the cultural message is important to us/
Notwithstanding these concerns about the motivational effectiveness of PRP, 
Thames Water continued to use a PRP scheme to pay the bulk of their staff, 
although they discontinued use of the salary matrix to determine the level of 
increase in salary for a given level of performance in 1998. Instead the 
employee receives an increase in pay determined by their performance 
assessment and expressed as a percentage increase in pay. So that all 
employees who receive the same performance assessment will receive the 
same percentage level increase in their pay. At the same time Thames 
Water reduced the number of assessment levels from five to four. The 
number of levels of assessment was reduced partly because managers were 
perceived to be over using the middle assessment too much and it was felt
5 Extract form interview with Personnel Manager - 9.11.94 -
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that four levels of assessment would force a more honest assessment of 
performance to be made. One manager explained the continued use of a 
PRP scheme on the grounds that it focuses managers attention on the 
performance of the employees they are responsible for managing. Managers 
have to discuss targets with their staff and then assess how far those 
employees have progressed towards achieving those targets and the other 
criteria specified by the Company. That assessment is then translated into a 
payment. Consequently managers have to talk to their staff about 
performance and make a meaningful judgement on that performance. In 
other words PRP forces managers to manage. Thames Water see PRP as a 
fundamental part of the Performance Management because it forces 
managers to manage performance and by focusing managers on 
performance the company believes that PRP will help to bring about a 
change in culture within the company to a more commercially driven 
performance orientated culture.
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Chapter 7
Whv Thames Water introduced PRP?
In order to get a deeper understanding of the reasons why Thames Water 
introduced PRP, key managers who were involved in its introduction were 
interviewed (see Appendix A.i for description \of the key players interviewed 
and the structured interview approach adopted). This, together with the 
documentary record (Thames Water documents referred to are listed in 
Appendix A.i), provides a qualitative insight into Thames Water's objectives 
in introducing PRP. The interviews were primarily intended to give an 
understanding of why Thames Water introduced PRP. It soon became clear 
that the introduction of PRP in Thames was tied up with the whole process 
of water privatisation. Kessler and Purcell (1992) have argued that one of 
the reasons for the spread of PRP has been the privatisation of the 
nationalised industries, as these industries have used PRP to try to create a 
more commercially focused culture. Consequently the approach adopted in 
this chapter has been to look at the privatisation process in Thames Water 
and then to examine the specific reasons for the introduction of PRP in 
Thames Water.
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Thames Water in the run up to privatisation
In order to find out what Thames Water hoped to achieve by introducing
PRP it is first of all useful to look at the history of the company. As a Water
Authority, Thames had a strong public sector ethos. Derek McManus
described the change from the public to the private sector as having started
before privatisation.
'We were very much a local authority based organisation as Thames 
Water Authority. When the changes came about in the Water Act 
1983, I think there was a view that that was a precursor to 
privatisation, although I don't think the word was actually mentioned 
at the time... Chairman and Personnel Director made the decision to 
position the Company or Authority in such a way as to take advantage 
of privatisation as soon as it came round.'
The Chairman of Thames Water, Roy Watts, drove the whole process from
the top. Roy Watts had previously been Deputy Chairman of British Airways,
where he had been involved in pushing through a major programme of
change. Roy Watts was seen as a leading advocate of water privatisation.
In 1988 Thames Water was the first water authority to pull out of national 
pay bargaining. This was partly the result of frustration with a national 
system that meant that pay and conditions for the 9,000 to 10,000 Thames' 
employees were dictated by a body that Thames Water could not control. 
But it also reflected the drive to position the company for privatisation. It is 
worth noting that one of the first steps taken publicly to get Thames Water 
ready for privatisation involved a change to employees' terms and
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conditions. According to Steve Jay, the company saw the move as 'a matter 
of principle', a move to bring decision making closer to home.
Steve Jay had joined Thames Water three years before privatisation, 'not
quite knowing if they were to be privatised, but being quite interested in the
whole privatisation process'. His feeling was that there was not a specific
strategy for privatisation, but that the prospect of privatisation informed the
company's agenda for change.
'My recollection of those early years in the run up to privatisation was 
that the agenda was more about cultural change and it was less 
about being specific as to what the strategy was.... It was about 
changing the way the organisation thought about itself, so one of the 
things that was critical was to start getting people in what was the 
Thames Water Authority to think of themselves as being in a 
commercial entity.'
In addition to the move away from national bargaining, some 60 or 70 of the
top management team were taken off collectively agreed terms and
conditions and given personal contracts. Once again the company chose to
use an alteration of employee terms and conditions to communicate a
broader cultural change message about a transformation in the nature of the
company. This top management team was taken off to Templeton College,
Oxford for a week-long course, not on any particular management theory or
strategy, but to listen to people from outside the company talk about
privatisation. Steve Jay described the course:
'It was quite transformational exercise because most of the people 
there, apart from two or three of us from the private sector had 
grown up within the water industry. They were confident in their own 
areas of expertise but had never really considered themselves as part
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of a commercial entity and so didn't have a clear picture of a broad 
managerial agenda/
The company then cascaded some of these changes down to the next level 
of management, a group of about 200 to 300 people. New managers were 
brought in from the private sector, but long serving water industry managers 
were also retained to give the company what Roy Watts referred to as 'the 
strength of the mongrel'.
At the same time that Thames Water was trying to introduce changes in 
management attitudes in the run up to privatisation, the opportunity to 
introduce technological changes in the way that the industry operated was 
opening up. Although the fundamental operation of water supply and waste 
water treatment had not changed very much, it was felt that after many 
years of under investment there was a need to invest in some quite major 
projects such as the London Ringway and in new technology like remote 
control systems.
'so that instead of having people pushing levers and pressing buttons, 
it was all done in a central location. That had been tried in the water 
industry before, but was not reliable for whatever reason. 
Coincidentally, I think about the time of the managerial type changes 
the technology began to become more reliable and accessible.'1
In the run up to privatisation, Thames Water was being led by a Chairman, 
Roy Watts, who not only believed in privatisation, but wanted to position the 
company so that it was ready for privatisation. Fundamental to this move to 
position the company for privatisation was a drive to change attitudes.
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Firstly, by taking Thames Water out of national pay bargaining and so 
getting control of employee pay and conditions. Then by giving top 
managers individual contracts, and then training them in operating the 
company as a commercial organisation. The drive to change employee 
attitudes did not stop with privatisation, nor did privatisation diminish the 
role played by changes in pay and conditions as a mechanism for achieving 
changes in attitudes.
Post privatisation
Thames Water introduced the Employee Project in 1990, the year following 
privatisation, to bring about a fundamental change in the way in which 
employees' terms and conditions were discussed and the way in which 
employees were paid. Steve Jay described the origins of the employee 
project.
'There was a small group... this agenda wasn't handed down to us by 
Mike Hoffman (Chief Executive) or Roy Watts...it really came from that 
group. We had a brainstorming session...we had a whole cross 
section of managers in the operational area... and we asked two 
questions. One was if you had a blank sheet of paper as far as 
people are concerned, terms and conditions, the whole agenda, what 
would you do? The other question, which was the other side of it, 
was, if you look at what we now have, what's stopping you from 
managing the business what are the obstacles, the things that are 
getting in the way? And there were five or six things that just 
emerged. ... We summarised the five or six things and got some 
personnel people and some line managers in teams to work in those 
five or six areas for several months and then we pulled it all together 
and we presented that agenda to Mike Hoffman who was the Chief 
Executive...'
1 Derek McManus
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Mike Hoffman then outlined the objectives that had been agreed to the 
whole of the top management. A small project management group was 
established to deliver the objectives. The group did not know how they 
were going to deliver these objectives and they spent some time working out 
what the practicalities were with line managers.
The project group then talked to the trade unions. One of the principal 
objectives of the project group was to create a singe table for bargaining, as 
that was seen as a pre-condition for progress in other areas. Previously, 
employee terms and conditions had been discussed in one of three 
negotiating machines, depending on whether the employees were white 
collar staff, manual workers, or craftsmen. Thames Water wanted a simpler 
more straightforward system for determining pay and conditions. A feature 
of the discussions with the trade unions was that the project group did not 
have a definitive view of how the objectives that they wanted to achieve 
should be delivered. So for instance, when the project group suggested 
reducing the number of trade unions who were recognised by Thames 
Water, and the Thames Water trade unions said that they could work 
together through single table bargaining, the project group believed that 
delivered the key objective of single table bargaining.
Single table bargaining was introduced in Thames Water in 1992. Single 
table bargaining was just one of a range of changes which was introduced as 
part of the Employee Project. PRP was another aspect of the Employee
Project. The introduction of PRP for white collar Thames Water staff was 
agreed in principle in the 1991/1992 Staff Pay and Conditions Settlement 
which states: 'Joint Discussions to be held on criteria for the introduction of 
performance related pay from the 1st July 1992/ Following more detailed 
discussions during the PRP 1992/1993 pay negotiations PRP was introduced 
for Thames Water white-collar staff with effect from the 1st July 1992.
There was no formal statement of the objectives that Thames Water had in 
introducing PRP. As the Personnel Manager put it when she was 
interviewed:
'I am not sure that there were any aims and objectives formally 
written down at the beginning of the scheme, which is quite 
interesting for itself, but in reality I suppose it is a mixture of things/
PRP did not appear in Thames Water as part of a well-defined written
strategy nor as part of an overall reward strategy for the company. If it had
done, that might have led to a different PRP scheme being introduced,
perhaps one that would have been more effectively focused on achieving the
company's objectives.
Nevertheless it is possible to identify Thames Water's objectives from the 
company's overall objectives, the documentation, and the evidence of those 
who were involved at the time. Clearly PRP was part of the broader agenda, 
described by Steve Jay, which aimed to change peoples attitudes, in other 
words it was part of a programme of cultural change. But before looking at 
PRP in more detail as an agent of cultural change within Thames Water, it is
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worth considering some of the other objectives Thames Water intended PRP 
to achieve.
Wage reduction.
The Thames Water Company Proposals issued in response to the 1992/1993
Trade Union Side Pay and Conditions Claim made it clear that Thames Water
believed that they were more than competitive in the pay market. Indeed
the minutes for the Thames Water Company Council Pay Negotiating
Meeting held on 29th May 1992 record the Company's position as follows.
'Salaries and wages are the largest single item of cost. For 1990/91 
we had the highest pay per employee in the industry. Our average 
pay totalled £22,000 - £4,000 or 24 % more than the industry 
average. Our profit per employee stood at £26,800 and is nearly the 
lowest (8 out of 10) in the industry/
Managers were naturally concerned about this situation.
'considerable management discusssions about the rates of pay that 
we had inherited from various local authorities and indeed the 
increase because of normal pay rises, and there was a statistically 
demonstrated view that we paid 20% more than other water 
companies. I think there was an understanding that some 10% to 
12% of that was due to London Weighting and other geographical 
factors, but the remaining 10% to 8%, depending on how you like to 
describe it, was felt to be payment which was in excess of the going 
rate that other water companies were paying for any particular job. 
And I think there was a decision taken, partly due to outside pressure, 
that we would need to reduce the gap to get our general level of 
earnings, salary back by about 10% overall/2
PRP was seen by Thames Water as a mechanism by which they could control
excessive wage costs. The expectation was that the differential movement
of individual employees pay would allow those employees who were
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overpaid to be held in check, while others progressed through the salary
bands. Derek McManus estimates that about 40% of employees were paid
in excess of what was described as their natural scale position, that is to say
what the company thought was the rate for their job. Realistically, PRP only
offered an opportunity to manage down these excessive wage costs if the
level of pay increase in the years following its introduction gave enough
headroom to allow for that to happen. As Derek McManus explained:
'we introduced a new seven grade structure to replace what was a 
thirteen grade structure...It had the effect of squeezing a number of 
jobs into grade bands with a lower maximum. Since many, if not 
most, of our employees were at the maximum of the old scale, we 
had a large number of people who were overpaid in terms of the new 
scales. We thought we could control that through the application of 
performance related pay and it was not an unreasonable expectation 
because inflation rates were running at about 12% or 10%, which 
gave sufficient head room in the make up of the successive pay 
awards, annual pay settlements, to make some inroads into the so 
called overpayments. Almost immediately we introduced that system 
of performance related pay, inflation crashed, and we found ourselves 
on 3%, 4%, and 5% pay awards and even less in some areas, which 
meant there was no effective way to control the overpayments/
PRP has not proved to be particularly successful as a mechanism for 
reducing excessive wages, largely because wage increases generally 
followed inflation downwards in the period following the introduction of PRP. 
Equally by using PRP to manage wages downwards Thames Water have 
tended to undermine the effectiveness of PRP as a motivator. Firstly 
because employees may have perceived PRP to be a mechanism for reducing 
wages, as one respondent said in response to the open question in the 
survey of Thames Water employees conducted for this thesis:
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'PRP was not introduced for the benefit of employees, but with the 
intention of reducing the pay bill for Thames Water/
Such perceptions are likely to undermine any feelings of procedural equity,
and as has been argued above that would in turn detract from the effects of
any performance payment as a motivator. In addition, there was by
definition a substantial body of employees (Derek McManus put the figure at
40%), who because in the company's view they were overpaid, would not
receive any real benefit from PRP. For these employees PRP had a negative
effect. The way in which this works was explained in one of the answers to
the open question in the survey.
'If a person was over salary scale when PRP commenced there is no 
way, no matter how hard you work or how dedicated your 
performance is, that you will get anything other than the PRP%. This 
is soul destroying when you find that another person, perhaps only 
N/A (not acceptable), because they are lower down on the scale, in 
fact receives a higher percentage overall. Surely there is something 
wrong with such a system?'
Nevertheless wage control was clearly an important issue for Thames Water 
and it was always going to be difficult to manage wages downwards. While 
PRP may not have delivered a solution as quickly as Thames Water had 
hoped, it did give the company a mechanism for moving wages towards the 
'natural salary scale point'. It is not clear whether the advantages of wage 
control outweighed the potential damage to the motivational effectiveness of 
the PRP scheme. Nor is there any evidence that Thames Water considered 
these competing concerns when they introduced PRP.
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Fairrness.
The published justification for introducing PRP was set out in a leaflet 
Thames Water issued to employees entitled 'Thames Water Utilities - 
Performance Related Pay - a guide for employees'. The first paragraph of 
the leaflet states:
'Thames believes that people should be rewarded for their 
contribution to the business. This means paying a fair rate for the 
job, recognising and rewarding individual and/or team achievement 
and allowing employees to share in the success of the company.'
The central message to employees is that reward should be linked to their
contribution to the business, and that this link between reward and
achievement is a fair mechanism for paying employees, which enables them
to share in the success of the company. Clearly the link between pay and
performance was fundamental to Thames Water's thinking about PRP on a
number of different levels, some of which might be viewed by at least some
employees as contradictory. For example, an employee whose wages are
being managed down is unlikely to feel that they were having their
achievements recognised or being allowed to share in the success of the
company, indeed there is a danger that they might view the system as being
somewhat less than fair. Equally it could be argued that they might be less
susceptible to some of the other objectives the company had in introducing
PRP. Nevertheless PRP was a powerful tool for communicating with
employees.
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Cultural change.
First and foremost linking pay to performance sent a clear message about 
the company's priorities. In other words it was part of the cultural change 
process aimed at changing Thames Water from a nationalised industry into a 
commercial organisation. It was about focusing employees and managers 
on performance. All four of the managers interviewed in the research for 
this thesis believed that PRP had an important role to play in bringing about 
cultural change.
'we were very keen to make a differentiation between the company 
that we had been, as a nationalised industry, to the company that we 
wanted to become, and we saw pay as a very significant factor in how 
we could achieve that. By putting in new systems, new organisation, 
new management structures and by adjusting pay, we thought we 
had a real lever on changing the culture of the organisation.'3
'There was a view that the new pay system which included 
performance related pay was necessary to change the culture of the 
company. I don't think it was particularly published at the time.'4
It is difficult to know how far companies can engineer cultural change,
because of the problems over measurement and causality, particularly
where, as in this case, the employer uses a number of different mechanisms
to achieve cultural change. Most of the work that has been done on cultural
change has relied on qualitative research rather than quantitative research
(Dennison 1990). Some of the items in the survey questionnaire have been
designed to measure cultural change and the results are dealt with in
3 Malcolm Carr
4 Derek McManus
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subsequent chapters of this thesis. Certainly Steve Jay thought that PRP had
played a part in changing the corporate culture in Thames Water:
'Trying to describe exactly the part it (PRP) played in any change of 
culture and attitude was just about impossible, but I think it's got the 
issue, even if it's in a fairly contentious sort of way in some places, of 
performance into the language... the bloodstream'
Derek McManus thought that PRP had probably contributed to about 10% of
the cultural change in Thames Water.
Performance Management.
However, PRP was not just about changing individual employee attitudes to
performance, it was also about getting managers to talk to their staff about
performance. There was a very real concern about the ability of managers
to manage. Steve Jay put it this way:
'We felt we had management and supervision generally who didn't 
manage people and were generally poor man managers and indeed 
hadn't been expected to manage people. It was quite common for 
mangers to talk about... the authority doing this or the Authority 
doing that and abdicating responsibility for managing people, so we 
thought it would bring the linkage with employees and their 
performance right into the centre of the stage.'
For Thames Water PRP was both about changing employee and
management attitudes, and also bringing about structural changes in the
relationship between managers and employees that would encourage good
management. This was a major departure from what had happened in the
past. Derek McManus contrasted it with the previous incremental system.
'the concept of personal performance was something that was quite 
new to Thames. The concept of a manager actually assessing and
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marking an individual's personal performance was unique as far as 
Thames Water was concerned. Previously increments had been paid 
on a regular basis and to have an increment stopped, it was 
necessary for the employee to be quite hopeless at the job he or she 
was doing, and even then the stoppage could only be for a limited 
period and after about 3 or 6 months the increment would 
automatically be paid. So performance pay is thus seen as a method 
of involving management in the assessment of employees and in 
determining the level of pay that a particular employee should have 
and I think this was a major departure from what had gone before.'
Thames Water clearly hoped that by embedding performance in the 
relationship between the manager and managed, both would focus on 
performance. Steve Jay was sceptical about how far PRP had affected the 
performance of very good or bad mangers, but he believed it had helped to 
underpin the relationship the majority of managers had with their employees 
by making discussion about performance a legitimate and key part of that 
relationship. Two comments from the replies to the open question on the 
questionnaire illustrate the different experience different managers and 
employees have of the PRP process, as a mechanism for communication 
between management and employees. In one case the respondent thought 
that PRP was used by managers as a 'substitute' for feedback; while in the 
other the respondent commented that 'the words and feedback given are 
nearly as important as the pay'.
Motivation.
Linking pay to performance allowed Thames Water to reward good 
performers and penalise poor performers. This is as the Personnel Manager
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put it 'a very broad kind of motivational approach'. Thames Water did not 
have a particular motivational model in mind, but there was a belief that 
linking money to performance would stress the importance attached to 
performance and that employees would work harder to achieve a better 
performance payment. However the difficulty for Thames Water was that 
PRP was only ever intended to be a small part of pay. As Steve Jay 
explained:
'we never thought it (PRP) ought to be a large chunk of pay, not in 
this kind of cultural setting and also we were dealing with an industry 
which was the opposite of volatile, a long term industry where we 
didn't want a kind of lottery mentality developing amongst our 
workforce. We were more about making a point and so we never, 
ever thought that performance related pay would contribute a great 
slice of pay.'
PRP was kept as a relatively small element of pay in Thames Water by virtue
of the fact that PRP was part of the consolidated annual pay increase. Even
though the salary range in the Thames PRP scheme goes from 85% to
115%, so that potentially the difference in pay between a poor performer
and an excellent performer could be 30%, the actual difference in any one
year was determined by the level of pay increase. As has already been
noted, the level of pay increase in the years after the introduction of PRP
was relatively low, largely because inflation was relatively low.
'the pay increases that we could afford to pay even to the excellent 
performers was quite limited and was not motivating and indeed was 
almost de-motivating, because it was not very helpful to describe 
somebody as an excellent performer and only be able to pay 3% for 
that privilege, so it was a a sort of reverse motivation. But certainly 
motivation was one of the things that was claimed at
155
the time. I think part of it was jargon at the time. I think that's the 
claim for all PRP, but we did actually believe we could deliver against 
that criteria.'5
In hindsight motivation has not been viewed as one of the benefits of PRP
for Thames Water.
Tt is noticeable that the issue about reward motivation, those sort of 
comments were dropped quite early on from our justification for it 
and we concentrated and still do concentrate on the management 
employee relationship, as being the thing that has improved during 
the currency of this scheme.'6
Nevertheless motivation and indeed de-motivation are important issues for 
any pay system. There is a very real paradox in Thames Water using a 
payment system because it focuses employees and managers on 
performance, while at the same time the company does not know whether 
the payment system is motivating employees to improve their performance.
Hypothesis 1.
The first hypothesis that this research was intended to test is that:
Hypothesis 1.
' Thames Water will have introduced PRP in order to achieve a number 
of objectives, but principally in order to achieve a change in corporate 
culture following on from privatisation. Increased employee 
motivation will have been only a subsidiary consideration in the 
decision by Thames Water to introduce PRP.'
5 Derek McManus
6 Derek McManus
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Both the documentary evidence and the interviews with those involved show
that there were indeed a number of objectives that the Company was
seeking to achieve through the introduction of PRP. There is however a
difference between the documented reasons for the introduction of PRP and
the principal reasons for the introduction of PRP that emerge from the
interviews. 'Performance Related Pay -  a guide for Employees' and the
Performance Related Pay Assessors Training Manual (1995) both give the
following rationale for PRP:
'Thames believes that people should be rewarded for their 
contribution to the business. This means paying a fair rate for the 
job, recognising and rewarding individual and/or team achievement 
and allowing employees to share in the success of the Company/
The emphasis here is on fairness. This explanation seems to be distilled
from the presentation given to the trade union side in 1994 pay negotiations
where the company said that PRP was intended:
'- to recognise differing levels of performance, and by rewarding 
better performance to encourage and motivate employees to 
contribute to the best of their ability;
- to ensure a fair salary is paid which takes account of effort 
and achievement;
- to achieve a fair pay system in which equal pay is given for 
work of equal value carried out to equal levels of performance.'
While the emphasis is again on fairness it can be seen that PRP is also seen 
to be a tool for increasing employee motivation.
This can be contrasted with the views expressed by Steve Jay and Derek 
McManus, both important players at the time that PRP was introduced. It is
clear from what they say that the principal driver for the introduction of PRP 
was the Employee Project, which was a programme of corporate cultural 
change aimed at giving Thames a greater commercial focus following 
privatisation. Indeed all the managers interviewed for this thesis expressed 
some scepticism about the usefulness of PRP as a mechanism for increasing 
employee motivation. And while greater fairness was clearly one of the 
objectives the company had in introducing PRP, it has to be said it was 
fairness from the Company's perspective. Thames Water was equally happy 
to use PRP as a mechanism for reducing wages.
Thames Water also used PRP to ensure that managers, and the employees
they were responsible for, entered into a dialogue about performance. It
was about getting managers to manage. As Steve Jay put it:
'We felt we had management and supervision generally who didn't 
manage people and were generally poor man managers and indeed 
hadn't been expected to manage people. ...so we thought it would 
bring the linkage with employees and their performance right into the 
centre of the stage.'
Cannell and Wood ( 1992) found an element of this when they surveyed 
employers to find out why they had introduced PRP, a number of their 
respondents referred to PRP as a mechanism for improving communication 
between managers and employees. Essentially the evidence from Thames 
takes that one step further and shows PRP being used to improve 
managerial skills.
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The evidence supports the first hypothesis. Thames Water did have a range 
of objectives that went beyond improving motivation, which led them to 
introduce PRP. It would appear that the principal reason for introducing PRP 
was to bring about cultural change. This supports the arguments put forward 
by Kessler and others (Kessler & Purcell 1992, Kessler 1994, and Kessler 
2000) about the importance of cultural change in certain contexts as a 
reason for the introduction of PRP. The programme of cultural change was 
in turn driven by the perceived need to make the company more 
commercially focused following privatisation. Thames Water also saw PRP as 
a way of focusing managers on performance in their dealings with the 
employees that they managed. Employees were told that PRP was a fairer 
pay system, at the same time it was clearly being used to manage down 
wages, which for some employees made it a less than fair pay system. 
Perhaps the least important objective appears to have been to increase 
employee motivation. Certainly there is some evidence that this was one of 
the objectives at the time PRP was introduced, but subsequently there has 
been some scepticism about the effectiveness of PRP as a motivational 
technique.
Nevertheless the important question remains does PRP increase employee 
motivation and if so how? And can the motivational effectiveness of PRP be 
improved? After all if employee motivation can be increased then the 
company's overall performance should improve. Equally it is important to
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understand whether or not the PRP scheme is demotivating employees and, 
if so, whether that outweighs the benefits of the scheme.
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Chapter 8
The effectiveness of PRP in Thames Water.
Introduction
This chapter examines the results from the survey of Thames Water
employees (see Appendices A.i & A.ii for details) conducted as part of this
thesis to see how far the Thames Water PRP scheme can be said to have
been a success from the employer's perspective. It is the success or failure
of the Thames Water PRP scheme which contextualises the results of each of
the hypotheses being tested in this thesis. It does this, firstly, because the
effectiveness of any one motivational theory needs to be judged against the
overall motivational effect of the PRP scheme. Secondly, by looking at
success criteria other than the motivational effectiveness of PRP, it is
possible to make an assessment of whether the PRP scheme can be judged
to be successful by Thames Water against criteria other than simply whether
or not it motivates employees. After all, from the employer's point of view
success can be judged against a number of different criteria (Cannell &
Wood 1992) and motivation of the workforce is only one of those criteria. It
is important to note, however, that not all of the possible success criteria are
susceptible to measurement from the results of an employee attitude survey.
Where the survey results shed light on the success or otherwise of the
Thames Water PRP scheme, those results are reported. Equally, it is
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important to examine the potentially negative effects of PRP, which might on 
balance outweigh its positive effects. And where the survey results shed 
light on the negative effects of PRP, those results are reported.
Thames Water commissioned International Survey Research Limited to 
conduct a survey of the opinions of employees in Thames Water Utilities in 
1994. The survey was conducted on a confidential basis, with the overall 
results being communicated to employees in a report entitled Viewfinder 
94'. The 1994 survey is interesting, firstly, because it is unusual for 
employers to evaluate the effects of PRP schemes (Cannell & Wood 1992) 
and the 1994 survey does this, if only to a very limited extent. The fact that 
the survey was conducted and its results reported to employees suggests 
that Thames Water were perhaps more open and rigorous in their approach 
to PRP than the majority of employers (Cannell & Wood 1992). 
Paradoxically, it also shows that even though Thames Water were aware of 
some of the deficiencies of their PRP scheme, they chose to continue to use 
PRP to pay employees. In addition, the results of the Thames Water survey 
provides a point of comparison for some of the results obtained from the 
survey conducted for this thesis. The results of the Thames survey in 
Viewfinder 94 are reported where relevant.
Results from other surveys of employees in receipt of PRP are also reported 
in this chapter for comparison. The results from the survey of Thames 
Water white collar employees are broadly consistent with the results of
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similar surveys of employees in receipt of PRP, both in terms of the opinions 
expressed about the PRP in principle and the motivational effects of the 
individual's own PRP scheme. Respondents were generally favourably 
disposed towards the principle of PRP, but felt less positive about their 
employer's PRP scheme.
Finally, the data has also been analysed to see how far the gender of the 
survey population has influenced the results. Any difference in the way in 
which PRP is applied to men and women may be discriminatory and 
therefore unlawful. The European Court of Justice decided in the Danfoss 
(1989) case that:
"the quality of work carried out by a worker may not be used as a 
criterion for pay increments where its application shows itself to be 
systematically unfavourable to women."
Consequently, it is important that any PRP scheme should not be 
systematically unfavourable to women. In this chapter the results of the 
survey are examined to see whether there is any significant difference 
between the way in which the performance of men and women are assessed 
in Thames, whether there is any evidence that they are performing 
differentially, and whether the results of the performance assessment are 
reflected in the position of men and women on the salary matrix.
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Attitude to PRP
The majority of respondents thought that PRP was a fair way of paying staff,
66%, thought that performance related pay was a fair way of paying staff,
while only 18% said that they did not believe that it was a fair way of paying
staff (Appendix B.fi). This opinion was also reflected in some of the
comments made in reply to the open question:
"There are a lot of different claims made for performance related pay, 
for instance it is sometimes claimed that performance related pay 
motivates employees to work harder, but on the other hand it is also 
said that performance related pay may cause jealousies between staff 
and damages teamwork, could you summarise your own experience 
of performance related pay in Thames Water in your own words?"
Even when respondents were critical of PRP in their response to the open 
question, many prefixed their comments with statements such as 'PRP is 
good in theory...' or 'PRP is a good idea in principle...' or 'PRP sounds fine'.
The level of support for the principle of PRP amongst Thames Water 
employees can be compared with that found by Marsden and Richardson 
(1994) and Marsden and French (1998), when they surveyed of Inland 
Revenue staff in receipt of PRP. Inland Revenue staff were asked whether 
The principle of relating pay to performance is a good one.', the results in 
each year were similar:
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Table 8 i -  IRS PRP fair payment system
1991 1996
Agreed 57% 58%
Disagreed 40% 37%
At 66%, the level of support for the principle of PRP, among Thames Water 
employees, is closer to the 70% support reported for the civil service as a 
whole (Marsden and Richardson 1994), so it would appear that Thames 
Water employees were more favourably inclined towards PRP than Inland 
Revenue staff.
Union membership and PRP
Intuitively, it might be thought that the trade union members surveyed 
would be more strongly associated with opposition to PRP than the 
population in general, either because trade unionists could see PRP as 
antipathetic to long cherished trade union principles, such as 'the rate for the 
job', or because the focus on the individual in PRP would run counter to the 
collectivist values of trade unions. Comparison with the Inland Revenue 
results suggests that this is not the case. The 1991 survey of Inland 
Revenue staff (Marsden & Richardson 1992) was conducted with the 
assistance of the Revenue and included both union and non-union 
employees. The 1996 survey of Inland Revenue staff (Marsden & French
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1998) was conducted without the assistance of the Revenue and 
encompassed only union members. The two survey results for Inland 
Revenue staff in 1991 and 1996 are similar, which suggests that there is 
little difference in attitude between union and non-union members towards 
PRP in the Inland Revenue. Likewise the comparatively strong support for 
PRP amongst Thames Water employees responding to the survey, suggests 
that there is little innate hostility amongst the trade union members 
surveyed towards PRP.
PRP and fairness
On the face of it, support for PRP as "a fair way of paying staff' amongst the 
majority of respondents gives credence to the argument advanced by some 
employers, including Thames Water, that PRP is a fairer way of rewarding 
employees, reflecting new perceptions of equity (Armstrong & Murlis 1994). 
However, respondents' support for PRP in principle contrasts with what 
respondents felt about the Thames Water PRP scheme in practice, a clear a 
majority (72%), did not believe that they had been paid more fairly as a 
result of the introduction of PRP; while only a minority (11%), thought that 
they had been paid more fairly (Appendix B.fii). An even higher proportion 
of respondents (82%) felt that their employer failed to adequately reward 
hard work (Appendix B.fiii). So, while a majority of respondents thought that 
PRP was a fair way of paying staff in theory, in practice, an even larger 
number of respondents thought that it not increased the fairness of their
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pay. On this evidence, even if Thames Water felt that they had introduced a 
fairer payment system when they brought in PRP, this was not a view shared 
by the majority of their white-collar employees.
Thame's own survey in 1994 found that only 15% of employees though that 
PRP penalised poor performance and only 13% of employees thought that 
PRP rewarded superior performance. These results support the survey 
finding that employees did not believe that the PRP was fair in practice. 
They also show that Thames were aware of employee perceptions about the 
fairness of the PRP scheme.
Looking at other surveys, Mark Thompson (1993) found in a study across 
three organisations in food retailing, finance, and local government, that 
employees were uncertain as to whether PRP rewarded them fairly or not. 
However, on further analysis Thompson found that high performers tended 
to see PRP as being a fairer way of recognising individual contribution than 
low performers did. One explanation for the different perspectives of high 
and low performers is that the level of performance was defined by the 
performance rating for PRP purposes, which in turn determined how much 
performance payment individuals received. An employee who received a 
larger performance payment might, after all, view the PRP system as being 
fairer than an employee who received a lower performance payment. From 
the employer's point of view, this raises the question of whether it is the 
absolute salary level compared to other employees or the increase on
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previous salary which influences respondents' perceptions of fairness. If it is 
the former, then high performers who have reached the top of the salary 
scale may feel they are being treated fairly even if they do not receive a 
large year on year increase. If it is the latter, then high performers will be 
looking for a large increase in salary, year on year, even when they are at 
the top of the scale.
The thesis survey results for fairness reported in Appendix B.fii have been 
crosstabulated with the frequencies for the respondent's last performance 
rating and their last salary position against scale salary, to see whether the 
results are similar to those found by Thompson. The results have been 
tested using the chi-square statistic to see whether the null hypothesis could 
be rejected on basis of the variance between observed and expected counts, 
and to consequently establish whether more highly rated or paid staff were 
more likely to find the PRP scheme fairer. The chi-square statistic is used 
because it is robust for testing categorical data. However, if more than 20% 
of the cells in the crosstabulation have expected values of less than 5, or if 
the minimum expected frequency is less than one, then the observed 
significance level based on the chi-square distribution may not be correct 
(J.Healey 1990). The expected values of the cells were increased in this 
case by combining values using the recode procedure to ensure that these 
parameters were so far as practical not exceeded.
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Crosstabulating the respondent's performance assessment with their 
reported views on whether or not they had been paid more fairly as a result 
of the introduction of PRP, produced the following results:
Table 8 ii -  Crosstab Performance/views___________________________
Fairness/
Assessment
Count
(Expected
Value)
Not paid 
more 
fairly
not sure Paid
more
fairly
Chi-square
Pearson Value 46.01452
needs
improvement
14
( i i )
1
(3)
0
(2)
Degrees of 
freedom
4 Acceptable 240
(216)
45
(52
14
(32)
Significance .00000
good 94
(121)
37
(29
37
(18)
This suggests that there is a significant relationship between the assessment
that individuals receive and their perceptions about the fairness of PRP.
Looking at the observed count in each of the cells and comparing it to the
expected count, it can be seen that the observed count exceeds the
expected count in relation to a belief that respondents are being paid more
fairly only where respondents are also assessed as good performers. This is
hardly surprising, as intuitively it might be assumed that respondents whose
performance was judged to be good would believe that the system was
operating more fairly. But more critically, the number of respondents who
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were rated as good by their manager who felt that they were not paid more 
fairly as a result of the introduction of PRP, is more than twice the number 
who did feel they were paid more fairly. This may mean that it is not just 
poor performers who become alienated by PRP. One of the benefits claimed 
for PRP is that poor performers are encouraged to improve their 
performance or leave, presumably because they do not believe that they are 
being fairly rewarded for the work that they do. However, if it is not just 
poor performers who believe that they are not being fairly paid, but also a 
substantial number of good performers, then the scheme may not be 
delivering the benefit claimed for it in this respect.
Poor performers are also more inclined to believe that they are not being 
paid more fairly as a result of the introduction of PRP than expected. 
However, despite the aggregation of values for both these variables to 
increase cell values, two of the nine cells contain expected frequencies of 
less than 5 and this equates to 22.2% of the cells. Consequently although 
the chi-square statistic shows that the variance between observed and 
expected counts is significant, it is difficult to be sure that the significance is 
reliable, because that statistics is based on breach the conventional rule that 
only 20% of expected values should be less than 5 (J.Healey 1990).
It was suggested above that one possible explanation for the relationship 
between a good performance rating and a belief that the PRP scheme is fair 
is that the respondent's view of fairness is influenced by the relative earnings
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that they receive. A further crosstabulation of the respondent's view of 
fairness, this time with their last salary position against scale salary, shows, 
however, that there is no significant relationship between perceptions of 
fairness and position against scale salary (table 8 iii).
Table 8 iii -  Crosstab salary/views________________________________
Fairness/salary
level
Count
(Expected
Value)
Not paid 
more 
fairly
not sure Paid more 
fairly
Chi-square
Pearson Value 3.51209
Below
scale
138
(137)
30
(30)
19
(21)
Degrees of 
freedom 4
scale 63
(58)
9
(13)
7
(9)
Significance .47604
Above
scale
105
(112)
28
(25)
20
(17)
Salary position relative to scale salary in Thames Water is complicated by 
protection arrangements, which means that individual employees may have 
achieved a higher than scale salary simply because that is where they have 
been placed in order to protect overall earnings.
The evidence from this survey suggests that there is no relationship between
an individual's position on the salary scale and their feeiings about the
fairness of the PRP scheme. There does however appear to be some
relationship between rating assessment and perceptions of fairness. From
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the employer's point of view this means that those they deem to be the best 
performers, that is to say those who get the best assessment, are more 
likely to find the system fairer, irrespective of their salary position. On the 
face of it this may be an attractive outcome for Thames Water, as it may 
encourage the better performers. The problem from the company's point of 
view is that the majority of employees, 72%, feel that they are being unfairly 
paid as a result of PRP and this may have a demotivating effect on them. It 
is also clear from the two crosstabulations above that the number of 
respondents saying that they felt that they were not rewarded more fairly 
was substantially greater than those who felt that they were being rewarded 
fairly, even amongst those who were rated as good or paid above scale. 
This again raises the question of whether or not PRP is acting as an incentive 
for poor performers to leave the organisation and good performers to stay. 
Respondents were asked two questions about leaving Thames Water. They 
were asked how strongly they agreed with the following statements:
"I sometimes feel like leaving this employer for good"
and
"Even if the firm were not doing too well financially, I would be
reluctant to change to another employer."
The data from the survey shows no significant relationship between either 
assessment or pay and the intention to leave Thames Water. Therefore the 
survey evidence does not support the proposition that the Thames Water 
PRP scheme is encouraging good performers to stay and poor performers to 
leave.
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If fairness is being used as a determinant of which pay system employers 
should use, then the question arises, whose perceptions of fairness are the 
determining factor? The evidence from surveys of employers (Cannell and 
Wood 1992) and the prescriptions in management texts (Armstrong and 
Muriis 1994) are ambiguous about whose perceptions of fairness PRP is 
supposed to satisfy. From a theoretical point of view employers ought to be 
concerned with their employees' perceptions of fairness. Equity theory 
predicts that employees will adjust their work effort where those employees 
believe that comparators are being paid significantly more or less for 
comparable levels of work effort. Applying equity theory, employers ought 
to be concerned with employees' perceptions of fairness, as it is those 
perceptions which will have a direct effect on work effort. In this case the 
evidence from the survey shows that while Thames employees may view 
PRP as fair in principle, they do not believe it is fair in practice. Indeed given 
the report in Viewfinder 94, it is clear that Thames were aware of employee 
perceptions about the fairness of their PRP scheme.
Motivation
In contrast to the largely positive view taken by respondents to the principle 
of relating pay to performance, a majority of respondents thought that the 
Thames PRP scheme failed to motivate employees. The survey asked 
employees whether they agreed that PRP had encouraged them to work 
harder, 70% disagreed with that statement, while 18% said that they had 
been encouraged to work harder by PRP (Appendix B.fiv).
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Similar results were obtained in relation to two other questions, which also 
tried to ascertain the effects of PRP on employee motivation. Respondents 
were asked whether PRP was an incentive to exceed the requirements of the 
job and encouraged then to give sustained performance, roughly the same 
number said that PRP encouraged them to give sustained performance as 
those who felt PRP motivated them to work harder, rather less respondents 
felt that PRP was an incentive to exceed the requirements of the job 
(Appendikx B.fv & fvi).
Individuals may not be the best judges of their own behaviour (Crozier 
1964). They might, after all, be reluctant to attribute purely mercenary 
motives to their own efforts. Accordingly employees were asked whether 
PRP had encouraged other employees to work harder. It turns out that 
fewer respondents thought that PRP was motivating other employees to 
work harder, than those that believed that they had been encouraged to 
work harder by PRP, with a higher proportion of respondents being uncertain 
about whether PRP was encouraging others to work harder or not. These 
results set out in Appendix B.fvii suggest that respondents were perhaps 
reluctant to attribute motives to their fellow employees.
This view of the motivational effectiveness of PRP was reflected in some of 
the answers that were given to the open question in the survey, which 
ranged from scepticism about the motivational effectiveness of pay, as in
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The relationship between work and PRP is so tenuous little motivation is pay 
related1 to more cynical view of the scheme, for example 'PRP is merely a 
management tool to distribute a fixed sum of money in the pot to the 
workforce, regardless of individual performance. As such it is unfair divisive 
unworkable and loathed by all.1
Taken at their best, these results show that PRP was having a motivational 
effect on 18% of respondents (Appendix B.fiv). Ideally the employer would 
no doubt want the PRP scheme to motivate all employees. However, even if 
only 18% of employees are motivated by the PRP scheme, it may 
nevertheless provide a cost benefit to the employer if the increased 
productivity form those 18% of employees outweighs any costs and 
disbenefit associated with the scheme. Some of the supposed disbenefit 
associated with PRP were dealt with in the survey, and the results from 
those questions are examined later in this chapter.
Work quality
One of the supposed advantages of PRP, over payment by results systems, is 
that PRP allows employers to direct effort into things other than the simple 
quantity of work produced. As payment is contingent on inputs as well as 
outputs, it is possible for employers to link pay to quality and other 
measurements of a more complex nature, as well as the amount of work 
produced. The Thames PRP scheme contains a number of these more
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complex measures of work performance. In order to try and assess the
effectiveness of this aspect of the scheme, Thames employees were asked
whether they agreed that:
'The existence of performance related pay has made you 
willing to improve the quality of your work."
The responses to this statement (Appendix B.fviii) were in fact very similar to
the same statement about quantity of work (Appendix B.fix).
"The existence of performance related pay has made you 
willing to improve the quantity of your work."
It is difficult to be sure whether respondents felt able to distinguish between
quantity and quality of work, but there is nothing in these results to suggest
that PRP was having a differential effect on quality of work compared to its
effect on quantity.
Work priorities
Another supposed advantage of PRP is that it enables firms to cascade
business objectives down through the organisation so that effort is focused
on the firm's priorities. In other words PRP targets should lead employees to
concentrate on achieving goals that are important to the employer. If the
scheme was effective in guiding employees towards achieving organisational
goals then it would be prioritising their work. Employees were asked
whether they agreed that:
"Performance related pay has given you a greater incentive to 
get your work priorities right."
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The results show that 73% of respondents did not feel that PRP was an 
incentive for them to get their work priorities right, and only 17% thought 
that it was (Appendix B.fx). One of the features of the Thames Water PRP 
scheme is that performance is assessed against seven criteria. The use of so 
many criteria may make it difficult for employees to identify quite what 
priorities Thames water wants them to concentrate on.
Cultural change
Some organisations use PRP as part of a programme of cultural change 
(Kessler 1994) or as part of a strategic human resource management 
approach to employment (Tichy, Forbrun and Devenna 1982 and Thompson 
& Milsome 2001). Thames Water introduced PRP as part of their Employee 
Project, which aimed to generate a more flexible approach to work by their 
employees by breaking down some of the traditional barriers between 
groups of workers and between management and workers. The survey 
included a number of questions which aimed to test employee perceptions of 
the changes that had taken place in Thames during the period in which PRP 
had been in operation, without necessarily linking those changes to PRP. On 
the one hand, it would have been unfair to link the questions solely to PRP, 
as PRP was part of the wider Employee Project. On the other hand, by 
relating the questions to the time during which PRP had been in use, it is 
possible to get some feel for employee perceptions of the changes that have
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taken place since the introduction of PRP. The introduction to these
questions stated:
"This section asks about some of the other things that have 
been happening at work in the last two or three years."
The questions can be grouped into four categories,
i) Work intensification:
Firstly there were two questions which aimed at assessing whether 
employees felt about increasing workload. Nearly all respondents (92% 
Appendix B.fxi) felt that the pressure of work had increased in the last two 
or three years. Respondents' perceptions about workload appear to reflect 
employment trends in Thames. The number of employees in the area 
covered by this research, that is the regulated utility part of Thames Water's 
business, dropped from approximately 7,562 in 1992 to 6,673 in 1995 
(Annual Report and Accounts 1993 and 1995). As a natural monopoly in the 
utility side of its business, Thames has a stable market and consequently 
reductions in the workforce will probably be achieved by increasing 
efficiency, which in may mean work intensification for a smaller workforce. 
At the same time employees continued to feel that there were likely to be 
further reductions in the workforce.
Only about 4% of respondents thought that there were unlikely to be any 
further reductions in the workforce, while 76% of respondents disagreed 
with the proposition that there was unlikely to be a further significant
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reduction in the workforce (Appendix B.fxii). Taking these two results 
together, it is apparent that the majority of respondents felt that they were 
under increasing pressure as work intensified and numbers reduced.
ii) Communications:
Secondly, there were two questions which asked about communications 
between Thames Water and their employees (Appendix B.fxiii & fxiv). While 
the majority thought that communications had not improved, there were still 
a substantial number who thought that there had been an improvement and 
that Thames was more likely to listen to employees. Both these questions 
were testing improvements in communications, so that even though a 
majority said there was none, it could still be significant for Thames that as 
many as 30% of respondents (Appendix B.fxiii) thought there had been an 
improvement.
iii) Employee identification with Thames Water:
Respondents were also asked a series of questions that explored the extent 
to which employees identified with the employer. These questions were 
looking at how far old pluralist divisions had been replaced by a more 
unitarist view, where employee and employer interest were seen as the 
same by employees. Employees were asked whether the organisation's core 
values were supported by a larger proportion of the workforce than they 
used to be. While nearly 38% (Appendix B.fxv) thought that they were not,
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a significant number, 26% thought that the organisations core values were 
supported by a larger proportion of the workforce.
When asked about divisions between employees and management, 77% did 
not feel that there was less of a feeling of 'us' and 'them' than there used to 
be, while only 12% of respondents thought that there was (Appendix B.fxvi).
Employees were also asked, whether they felt that they were being treated 
more as individuals, and whether PRP would lead to an increasingly 
individualised approach to the emolyment relationship by their employer. 
Essentially, this is a different approach to the same question about 
identification with the employer rather than with fellow employees. These 
questions are testing whether the employee believes that their individual 
contribution is valued or not and whether employees perceive that the 
employer is treating them as an individual rather than simply a cog in the 
machine.
A clear majority of respondents, 72%, did not agree that employees were 
more likely to be treated as individuals than they were in the past (Appendix 
B.fxvii). However, over half of respondents, 53%, thought that PRP would 
lead to an increasingly individualised approach in the future (Appendix 
B.fxviii). There is an apparent contradiction here, as most employees did not 
believe that they were being treated more as individuals than they had been 
in the past. At the same time, most employees thought that PRP would lead 
to a more individualised approach in the future. This highlights an important
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point. The first question is about the employees' perceptions about how 
they and other employees are treated. Employees did not feel that they 
were being treated as individuals. In other words, they did not feel that 
their views were being listened to, or that they were being treated with 
respect, or that their contribution was being valued. The second question is 
concerned with the nature of the employment relationship, that is whether it 
is a collective or an individualised relationship. Employees saw PRP as a 
move away from the collective relationship. However it is important to be 
clear that a move away from a collective employment relationship is not the 
same as valuing employees as individuals. Nor as the answers to the two 
questions show is it perceived by employees as that. As one commentator 
(Gilman 1989) has observed PRP can be used by firms to create the 
impression of individualisation of the employment relationship, while at the 
same time extending control and standardisation.
iv) Outcomes:
Ultimately organisations try to change their culture in order to bring about a 
change in outputs. The mechanisms through which a change in output 
could be achieved through a change in organisational culture are discussed 
elsewhere in this thesis. It is argued that one possibility is that employee 
motivation will be increased. Equally, improvements in productivity might be 
made as a consequence of greater flexibility in relation to changes in 
working practices. Employees were asked two questions about working
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practices, one dealt directly with flexibility and the other asked about trade 
union influence.
There was a roughly even split between those who thought that employees 
were more confident in being flexible about changes in their work and those 
who thought that employees were not more confident about being flexible 
(Appendix B.fxix). The question is asking about increased flexibility, rather 
than simply whether employees were prepared to be flexible, so the fact that 
40% of respondents said that employees were more flexible is clearly a 
positive response from Thames Water's point of view.
Turning to the issue of the trade union role, some employers have used PRP 
schemes to diminish trade union influence (Cannell & Wood 1992, Kessler & 
Purcell 1992, Heery 1997a and Gunnigle, Turner & D'Art 1998). The most 
obvious way of doing this is to exclude the unions from collective bargaining 
over pay when PRP is introduced. However, the introduction of PRP into 
Thames Water was part of the 'Employee Project', which was agreed with 
the recognised trade unions in Thames Water, as have any amendments to 
the PRP scheme. The annual increase in PRP payments is agreed by Thames 
Water and their recognised trade unions on an annual basis. Thames Water 
appear, at least on the face of it, not to have used PRP as a mechanism for 
diminishing trade union influence. Nevertheless, PRP may effectively 
diminish trade union influence, if it is perceived by employees as 
individualising the employment relationship and placing more power in the
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hands of line management, because they are responsible for performance 
assessment. And this appears to be what has happened in Thames Water. 
Employees were asked whether trade unions had a less important role in 
protecting employees than they used to have, 50% thought they had 
(Appendix B.fxx). It is worth pointing out that only trade union members 
were surveyed, so that one might assume that there would, if anything, be a 
bias towards believing that trade unions had a continuing role. While 
Thames Water appear not to have not actively pursued a policy of 
discouraging the trade unions, over the period that PRP has been in use 
about half the employees paid through PRP believe the importance of trade 
unions has diminished.
Overall, a rather complex picture emerges. While slightly more respondents 
thought that the workforce did not support Thames Water's core values, 
than those who did, a significant number were unsure. There is clearly a 
strong feeling that barriers between the workforce and employers have not 
been eroded in the last two or three years. On the other hand there was 
clearly perceived to be a move away from a collective employment 
relationship to an increasingly individualised one. Simply moving away from 
a collective employment relationship has not broken down barriers or 
increased identification with the company's core values.
Some of the views reported in Viewfinder 94 deal with the issues regarding 
company culture, which were tackled in the survey conducted for this thesis.
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In relation to job security, 73% of employees said that they wanted job 
security, but only 35% said that their jobs provided it and only 33% said 
that they were satisfied with job security in Thames Water. While 66% said 
that job security had got worse in the last year or so. These figures are 
broadly consistent with the results of the thesis survey. On the other hand 
the figures in relation to communications are slightly different. Viewfinder 
94 reports that 39% of employees were satisfied with communications, 
which is consistent with the thesis survey figures. Similarly 35% said that 
communications had got worse over the last year or so. However, only 12% 
thought that communications had improved in the last year or so, compared 
to around 30% of respondents to the thesis survey who said that they had 
found that communications had improved over the last couple of years. The 
questions asked were not the same and this may explain the discrepancy. 
Then turning to employee identification with the company, there seems to 
be a distinction in the results reported in Viewfinder 94 between employees 
views about their immediate working environment and their view of the 
wider company environment. A majority of employees were reported to be 
satisfied with working relationships (69%), supervisory practices (62%), and 
employee involvement (59%). But only a minority of employees was 
reported to be satisfied with company identification (49%), management 
effectiveness (32%), and company image (30%). Likewise, only 30% 
thought that Thames Water Utilities was well managed and only 20% 
thought that senior management provided a clear sense of direction. And 
therefore perhaps not suprisingly, only 47% of employees had a clear
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understanding of the goals and objectives of Thames Water Utilities as a 
whole. Employee views of the wider company environment are similar to the 
results obtained in the thesis survey in respect of employee identification 
with the company, if marginally more positive. This difference may be 
explained by differences in the questions asked. In particular it is not clear 
what question was asked for Viewfinder 94 to ascertain whether or not 
employees were satisfied with company identification, or what is meant by 
company identification in this context, presumably it is to do with the 
company's image.
Teamwork
One of the arguments used against PRP is that it damages teamwork 
(Demming 1982, Kanter 1989, Kohn 1993 and Pfeffer 1998). It is said that 
individual employees focus on the achievement of their performance targets 
to the detriment of team working, because those targets carry a financial 
benefit for the employee, while co-operation with the rest of the team does 
not. Many PRP schemes attempt to avoid this inherent problem with PRP by 
including team working as a target against which employees are assessed for 
the purposes of deciding whether or not they receive a performance 
payment. One of the seven criteria against which employees are assessed in 
the Thames Water PRP scheme is Working Relationships.
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Employees were asked two specific questions about the effect of PRP on 
team working. Firstly, whether they thought as a general principle that PRP 
could damage teamwork; 26% thought that it could (Appendix B.fxxi). 
Secondly, they were asked whether the Thames Water PRP scheme caused 
jealousies between staff; 17% thought that it did (Appendix B.fxxii). It is 
this 17% figure, which is important, because it is this proportion of 
respondents who believe that PRP is having a dysfunctional effect on team 
working in Thames Water in practice. Consequently this is one of the 
disbenefits that needs to be balanced against the benefits of PRP in Thames, 
in order to make an assessment of whether PRP is of overall benefit to 
Thames.
Working relationships
A related, but different point, about the negative effects of PRP concerns its
impact on employees' working relationships with their managers. Some
commentators (Kanter 1989, and Kohn 1993) have argued that the
relationship between employees and their managers should be based on
trust and co-operation. Instead, so the argument goes, PRP creates a
barrier between the employee and their manager, because the manager also
has to assess the employee's performance for the purposes of the PRP
scheme. Employees are more likely to be cautious about taking managers
into their confidence over issues which could affect their performance
payment, than employees whose pay is not contingent on the achievement
of performance targets. Equally, there is a danger that employees may be
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too eager to keep on the good side of a manager who is responsible for 
making a performance assessment that will affect their earnings.
In the view of some commentators (Lawler 1981 and Siegall & Worth 2001) 
employee trust in their manager is a necessary precondition to the effective 
operation of PRP. The importance of trust for PRP to be an effective 
motivator is evident from at least two of the theories being examined in this 
thesis. Expectancy theory predicts that an employee will work harder for a 
reward, if additional effort will be instrumental in achieving that reward. In 
other words the employee has to take a view about the probability of a 
future event occurring, namely the payment of the reward, this is essentially 
a matter of trust. Put simply the question is does the employee trust the 
manager to make as fair assessment of the employee's performance. 
Equally in the absence of trust there may be problems of procedural and 
distributive equity from the employee's viewpoint that result in the employee 
adjusting their work rate, for example by doing the minimum necessary 
work, in an effort to find a more equitable balance.
Taken together these two views suggest something of a paradox. While, on 
the one hand, trust between the employee and the manager who reviews 
that employee's performance may be a precondition for the effective 
operation of PRP. On the other hand PRP may damage the trust between 
the employee and the manager who reviews the employee's performance by 
reducing the relationship to an instrumental level. The danger is that rather
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than having an open and cooperative relationship with the manager the 
employee tries to manipulate the relationship in order to achieve a 
favourable performance assessment. This may adversely affect both the 
motivational effectiveness of PRP and also on then effectiveness of the firm.
The survey results suggest that PRP may have a negative effect on the level 
of trust between an employee and their manager. A substantial number of 
respondents, 44% (Appendix B.fxxiii), thought that PRP had eroded some of 
the trust that existed between them and the manager responsible for 
assessing them, while only 36%, thought that PRP had not eroded the trust 
between them and their manager. Similarly, 49% of respondents (Appendix 
B.fxxiii) felt that they had to keep on the right side of their manager to get a 
good rating. These results show that PRP is having a negative effect on the 
relationship between a substantial number of employees and managers. 
This ought to be an area of concern for Thames Water, both because it is 
likely to reduce the effectiveness of the PRP scheme and because of the 
wider implications in terms of the damage to then employee manager 
relationship.
Does sex matter?
It is important to Thames Water that the PRP scheme should not 
discriminate against women. In the first place, if it did, then the PRP 
scheme would not be operating efficiently, because it would not be directing
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additional pay to higher performers irrespective of their sex. Secondly, it 
would be illegal, following the Danfoss (1989) ruling in the European Court 
of justice, and would therefore potentially render Thames Water liable to 
additional costs from a successful court action. And thirdly, of course, any 
discrimination against female employees would contravene Thames Water's 
own equal opportunities policy.
Bevan and Thompson (1992) have argued that PRP may discriminate against 
women in one of two ways. Firstly, they argue that there is potential for 
discrimination in the PRP process, that is to say in the way in which 
performance assessments are structured and carried out. The performance 
criteria used in PRP normally include qualitative measures, which require a 
degree of objective judgement by the appraising manager. Bevan and 
Thompson found that managers valued different attributes in men from 
those they valued in women, this in turn tended to reinforce stereotypical 
views of the sexes, which could in turn influence the performance criteria 
that were used and the rating assessment that individuals got from their 
assessing manger. In short they argue there can be bias in the assessment 
process. However, in the three organisations that they studied, they found 
that the distribution of appraisal ratings for men and women were broadly 
similar, presumably on the basis that men and women were performing at 
broadly the same level.
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Bevan and Thompson go on to argue that the second way in which 
discrimination can occur is through the PRP outcomes. Assessment may lead 
to both further training opportunities or promotion, as well as an increase in 
earnings. They found that in two of the organisations that they were looking 
at men faired better than women in terms of the training and promotion 
opportunities that they were offered through the assessment process. Thus 
discrimination may not come about simply as a result of the assessment 
process, it may also be a product of the opportunities identified in the 
assessment process.
Thirdly, Bevan and Thompson found that there were differences in the merit 
payments received by the two sexes, which reflected the structure of the 
payment system. In one of the organisations that they looked at job grades 
which were dominated by men tended to attract higher levels of 
performance pay increase than job grades dominated by women. In two of 
the organisations, performance increases were to be linked to length of 
service, which in turn tended to favour men over women because women 
often leave the labour market to care for children. On the other hand, in 
two of the organisations, women tended to get higher percentage increases 
in earnings than men, because the PRP scheme gave a higher level of 
increase to those the lower down the salary scale, and the women were 
generally lower down the salary scale than men. The results obtained by 
Bevan and Thompson show that while discrimination may occur through the
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appraisal system, it is also important to look at the way in which that is 
translated into earnings.
The results from the thesis survey have been analysed to see whether or not 
there is a significant difference in the performance assessment ratings given 
to men and women. But it is not sufficient to simply look at the performance 
assessments for men and women to see whether there are any significant 
differences. After all, there may be no significant difference in the 
performance ratings achieved by the two sexes, and yet that would still be 
discriminatory if women were out-performing men. First of all a comparison 
needs to be made of the inputs and outputs for men and women, and the 
assessments that are made of those outputs in the performance assessment 
process. If the inputs and outputs for each sex are not on average very 
different, then there should be no significant difference between the 
performance assessments. Conversely, if one or other of the sexes is 
performing significantly better than the other, then that should also be 
reflected in the performance assessments for the two sexes.
It is difficult to identify a useful measure of performance inputs and outputs 
to use in testing whether there is a significant difference between the 
performance of the two sexes. Ideally, it should be the same measure as 
that used for the performance assessment, but not the performance 
assessment itself. In the absence of such a measure, motivation has been 
used as a proxy for performance inputs and outputs, on the premise that
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motivation reflects inputs, which then vary according to the individuals level 
of skill, and are then in turn reflected in outputs, which will vary according to 
other external factors. In other words, while motivation does not give the 
full measure of performance, for the purposes of the performance 
assessment, it is clearly a key element.
Table 8 iv__________ Sex/Motivation
Count
(Expected
Value)
Male female
Strongly
motivated
6
(7)
4
(3)
Chi-square
Pearson Value 4.56399
Motivated 46
(50)
25
(21)
Degrees of 
freedom 4
Do not know 47
(42)
13
(18)
Significance .33503
Not
motivated
165
(169)
74
(70)
Strongly not 
motivated
77
(73)
26
(30)
Respondents' answers to the question do you agree "Performance related
pay has encouraged you to work harder" have been crosstabulated with their
sex. The results have been tested, using the chi-square statistic, to see
whether the null hypothesis can be rejected on the basis that there is a
significant difference in the motivation of men and women. It can be seen
from the results in table 8 iv, that there is no significant difference in the
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motivation of men and women. Taking motivation as a proxy for 
performance, it should follow that there is no significant difference in the 
performance assessment achieved by men and women.
The assessment rating for men and women has been crosstabulated to see 
whether there is any variance in the way in which men and women and 
rated. The chi-square statisic has again been used to see whether there is 
any significant variance between the way in which men and women have 
been rated at their performance assessment. The ratings in the PRP process 
have been amalgamated to ensure that there is a higher count in each of the 
cells, otherwise the results would be unreliable as the chi-square test is 
sensitive to low cell counts. The conventional rule is that if the expected 
frequency is below 1 or there are more than 20% of the cells with an 
expected count of less than 5, then the chi-square significance is viewed as 
unreliable (J.Healey 1990).
Table 8 v _______Sex/Assessment
Chi-square
Pearson Value .49162
Count 
(Expected Value)
Male female
Degrees of 
freedom 2
needs improvement 1 1
( 1 0 )
3
(4)
Significance .78207
acceptable 2 1 2
( 2 1 1 )
86
(87)
good 116
(118)
50
(48)
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It can be seen from the results in table 8 v that there is no significant 
difference in the performance ratings achieved by men and women in the 
previous year's performance assessment. Consequently it would appear that 
there is no significant bias in the distribution of either inputs or assessments 
between men and women. Thus the first of Bevan and Thompson's 
suggested discriminatory practices, namely through the operation of the 
assessment process, is not evident from the survey data.
The position of men and women on the salary matrix has also been analysed
to see whether or not there is any significant difference between men and
women. On the face of it, if men and women received non-discriminatory
performance ratings over a number of years then their earnings as a
percentage of scale salary should also show no significant difference
between the sexes. Each year's performance rating would lead to increases
in salary for employees where there was no significant difference between
those earned by men and those earned by women. Yet it can be seen from
table 8 vi that there is a significant difference between the percentage of
scale salary earned by men and women. Fewer men and more women than
might be expected, earned less than 92.5% of scale salary. Likewise there
were more men than women earning over 107.6% of scale salary than might
have been expected. Although looking at the cells it can be seen that the
variation from the expected count is no more than seven in any particular
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case, there is a significant difference between men and women's earnings. 
In contrast, there is no significant difference between the performance 
assessments achieved by men and women (Table 8.vi).
Two possible explanations for the difference in results between performance 
assessment and earnings seem likely. Essentially, that difference occurs 
because in some cases the employee's position in the salary matrix does not 
reflect that employee's rating at the last performance assessment. One 
explanation for this is that the initial assimilation on to the new grades, when 
PRP was introduced in Thames Water included a system for protection of 
earnings, which meant that employees were placed on different parts of the 
salary matrix according to their previous earnings. Consequently, if the 
assimilation system favoured one sex or the other, then that would distort 
the results. A second possibility is that women tend to take time out of the 
job market as carers. Length of service will clearly have an impact on the 
respondent's position within the salary scale, as even the best performer can 
only progress to the top of the scale after going through a number of 
assessments. A third possibility is that men are being appointed to new jobs 
higher up the salary scale. Thames Water does not always appoint new 
recruits at the bottom of the salary scale. Adopting Bevan and Thompson's 
analysis of discrimination, these three possible explanations would reflect 
structural discrimination in the pay system.
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Table 8 vi Sex/Salary
Count male female
(Expected
Value)
Chi-square less than 9 12
Pearson Value 19.56589 85% (15) (6)
Degrees of 85-92.5% 48 27
freedom 6 (54) (21)
92.6-99% 72 19
Significance .00331 (66) (25)
scale 59 20
salary (57) (22)
101- 59 26
107.5% (61) (24)
107.6- 37 5
115% (30) (12)
over 17 7
115% (17) (7)
Another alternative is that the difference may be due to differential 
assessments over previous years, in which case the question is whether 
those assessments were based on an objective assessment of differential 
inputs and outputs, or whether they reflect past discriminatory practices. In 
other words there may have been bias in the assessment in previous years, 
which was still reflected in the position on the salary scale. This seems 
unlikely simply because it is unclear why bias in assessment would cease to 
be evident in the year that the survey was conducted.
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The difficulty for Thames Water is that for what appear to be structural 
reasons, that is to say bias within the salary structure and its operation, 
women are placed lower on salary scales than men, even though there is no 
significant difference between the performance of men and women. The 
water industry is a traditional engineering process industry and like similar 
industries tends to conjure up an image of an industry dominated by men. 
It is to Thames Water's credit that their assessment system appears not to 
be discriminating in terms of the assessment process. The difference in 
position on the salary scale between men and women does however raise 
serious questions about whether or not the PRP system discriminates in 
favour of men. If there is no significant difference between the performance 
of men and women then there should be no significant difference in their 
position on the salary scale.
The cost benefit of PRP
PRP is more than simply a motivational technique, employers may use PRP 
to achieve a number of different outcomes. The thesis survey focuses on 
the motivational effectiveness of PRP in order to test a number of 
hypotheses, which are based on various theories of motivation, about the 
way in which PRP motivates individuals. However, it has also been possible 
to use the results of the thesis survey to see to what extent the Thames PRP 
scheme can be said to have motivated employees and how far the Thames 
PRP scheme can be said to have achieved other potentially positive
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outcomes. The thesis survey results also show some of the negative effects 
of the Thames Water PRP scheme.
The positive and negative effects of the Thames Water PRP scheme need to 
be weighed up to see whether the PRP scheme is beneficial to Thames 
Water. There is a very real danger that employers fail to appreciate that PRP 
may have negative as well as positive outcomes. Perhaps it is because they 
do not appreciate the potentially negative effects of PRP that employers 
generally do not evaluate the effectiveness of their PRP schemes once they 
are in place, other than through the anecdotal evidence of managers 
(Cannell and Wood 1992). In that respect, Thames Water are unusual 
because they did commission a survey of their employees to see what their 
employees views were on a number of issues including PRP. However, the 
Viewfinder survey did not attempt to quantify the potentially negative effects 
of PRP in Thames Water. It showed that employees were sceptical about 
the effectiveness of the PRP scheme to the extent that only 15% of 
employees thought that the PRP scheme penalised poor performance, and 
even fewer, 13%, thought that it rewarded superior performance. But 
Viewfinder94 did not provide an objective basis on which Thames Water 
could weigh the benefits of PRP against the disbenefits. Effectively it 
highlighted employee cynicism about the PRP scheme.
The thesis survey shows that while at best 18% of respondents thought that 
PRP might be having some motivational effect, there were also considerable
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disbenefits to Thames Water. Some 44% of respondents thought PRP had 
eroded some of the trust, which existed between them and the manager 
responsible for their assessment, and 49% of respondents felt they had to 
stay on the right side of their manager to get as good assessment rating. 
On the other hand, only 17% of respondents thought 'PRP has caused 
jealousies between staff, while 60% thought it had not. The lack of trust 
between employees and their managers may detract from the motivational 
effectiveness of PRP and may have a negative effect on the operation of the 
organisation. If employees simply see the relationship with their manager as 
instrumental and one, which they need to manipulate in order to secure a 
benefit, this may well distract them from wider corporate objectives or from 
taking appropriate risks. On balance, the survey appeared to show that PRP 
was having a detrimental effect on the working relationships of more 
employees than it was motivating.
One of the other benefits that is sometimes claimed for PRP is that it 
encourages good performers to stay and poor performers to leave. The 
evidence from the survey suggests that the Thames water PRP scheme has 
not been particularly good at achieving any of these objectives. There is no 
significant relationship between respondents' PRP assessment and their 
views about whether they were likely to leave Thames Water. Consequently 
it would appear that the Thames water scheme is failing to exercise either a 
pull on good performers or a push on poor performers.
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A cost benefit analysis depends upon quantifying the cost and the benefits of 
PRP. This must depend on the value that Thames Water places on both the 
costs and benefits that accrue from PRP. The issue is simply are the 
disadvantages of PRP outweighed by the benefit of the motivational 
effectiveness of PRP in respect of 18% of respondents, or are there other 
benefits that make PRP worthwhile for Thames Water, it has been argued in 
this thesis that Thames Water are more concerned with the benefits of PRP 
as a mechanism for achieving a change in organisational culture, than in any 
straightforward cost benefit.
The results from the survey in respect of cultural change are also mixed. 
Respondents were asked about changes over the last two or three years, 
that is to say over the life of the PRP scheme. While employees felt less 
secure in their employment, around a quarter of respondents also reported 
improved communications, and over 10% said that they identified more 
closely with Thames Water. Perhaps most important of all from Thames 
Water's point of view, 40% of respondents said that employees were more 
confident about flexibility at work. There also appears to be an unintended 
change in the culture in Thames Water, as a direct result of the introduction 
of PRP, as the relationship between employees and their managers changes 
and becomes more instrumental.
One difficulty with these results as a measure of PRP as an engine of cultural 
change, is how far change in culture can be attributed to PRP. While it is
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clear from the qualitative research that a number of key players saw PRP as 
being principally concerned with cultural change, it is less clear how far PRP 
has been responsible for bringing about cultural change in Thames Water. 
Privatisation, changes in the management as new managers were brought in 
from outside, reduction in the workforce, as well as changes in the messages 
coming from the company, may all have played a part in changing the 
corporate culture. The question is how far PRP contributed to the change in 
corporate culture In Thames Water. A model explaining the processes by 
which PRP might bring about cultural change was suggested in one of the 
earlier Chapters. Application of the model to the survey data suggests that 
PRP may have helped bring about cultural change in Thames Water but it is 
less clear how big a part it played. The evidence suggests companies may 
well be using PRP as a mechanism for bringing about cultural change, it is 
less clear how important PRP is as an agent for cultural change.
Cultural change may be the justification for using PRP, nevertheless the 
more effective the PRP scheme is in motivating employees the more 
beneficial it will be from the point of view of Thames Water. And to that 
extent the company has an interest in ensuring that the PRP scheme is 
motivationally effective, even if the principal objective in using PRP is not 
primarily to motivate employees. The difficulty with motivation is that the 
evidence, which can be quantified, shows that PRP is not a particularly 
effective motivator.
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Employers focus on soft outcomes such as cultural change, because these 
soft outcomes fit in with a broader agenda, but the results are less readily 
quantifiable. PRP may be attractive as an agent of change because:
•  Other companies use it, particularly in the private sector.
•  It gives managers greater power and forces them to manage.
•  It helps justify highly differentiated individual pay at the top of the
organisation.
Each of these elements can be seen as an aspect of cultural change. Using 
PRP because other private sector companies use it, is a way of signalling the 
type of organisation you are. This can be important especially for privatised 
companies like Thames Water. Empowering managers by devolving pay 
decisions to them, and forcing them to confront performance issues through 
the appraisal system is again an important message. Finally some of the 
biggest pay increases as a result of privatisation have been for those at the 
top, these increases have been justified by arguments about market rates 
and rewarding performance (Hodgson,Kirkwood & Smith 1999 and the Top 
Pay Research Group2003). PRP fits with an ethos of rewarding performance, 
even if the benefits are less dramatic lower down in the organisation.
Conclusions
PRP does not appear to be motivating the majority of Thames Water 
employees, the survey results suggest that at best it is only 18% who are 
motivated. Nor is there any evidence that PRP is encouraging poor
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performers to leave Thames Water. Indeed the evidence is that a majority of 
even good performers feel that PRP is not rewarding them fairly. On the 
other hand, it was clear from the survey that PRP is having a negative effect 
for a substantial number of employees on important working relationships. A 
number of respondents report that PRP was causing jealousies amongst 
employees and might damage teamwork. Perhaps more importantly nearly 
half said that it had damaged the trust between them and their manager.
Thames Water wanted to use PRP as an engine of cultural change and it 
might be argued that this meant that the motivational impact of PRP was 
less important to them. Even here the evidence is patchy. While a number of 
employees reported a less collective more individualistic working 
environment, most employees did not feel that they were more valued as 
individuals. A substantial number of employees reported an increase in work 
flexibility, but it was quite unclear that this was as a result of PRP. Perhaps 
the most important question for Thames Water in respect of cultural change 
is whether they wanted to create a culture in which employees reported that 
team working could be damaged and a lessening in trust in their managers.
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Chapter 9
PRP and motivation in Thames Water,
Introduction.
The outcomes of the Thames Water PRP scheme, from the employer's
point of view, were considered in Chapter 8 using the results of a survey
of Thames Water white-collar employees conducted for this thesis and
comparisons were made with other survey results. The survey shows
that fewer than 20% of respondents reported any positive motivational
effects from the PRP scheme. The results also show that the PRP
process may actually be making the relationship between managers and
employees more instrumental and reducing employees' trust in their
managers. It is argued in this thesis that a reduction in the lack of trust
between employee and manager may have an adverse effect on both the
organisation and the motivational effectiveness of PRP because of the
importance of trust in respect of both the instrumentality and fairness of
PRP. It is hypothesised that the motivational effectiveness of the PRP
scheme, or indeed the lack of it, can, at least in part, be explained by
various theories of motivation. Goal setting theory in particular might
explain the motivational effectiveness of PRP in terms of the performance
management elements of the PRP process, that is to say the appraisal,
rather than in terms of the financial reward. Finally, a mechanism has
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been proposed whereby PRP might bring about changes in organisational 
culture. This chapter tests these hypotheses.
The key elements, which are being tested from each of the various 
theories of motivation, are examined against relevant data from the 
survey, to see how far the results are consistent with those theories. 
Using the survey in this way gives an overview of the extent to which the 
Thames Water PRP scheme puts into practice the various elements 
necessary for the operation of each of the theories. However, these 
results need to be seen in the overall context that, at best, only 18% of 
those surveyed said they were motivated to work harder as a result of 
the introduction of PRP. It is the extent to which there is a significant 
relationship between employee motivation and the key elements of any 
particular motivational theory that determines how far a theory of 
motivation is useful in explaining employee motivation.
The elements of the theories.
This thesis has focused on the three theories of motivation, which it is 
argued are the most relevant to an understanding of the motivational 
effectiveness of PRP (see Chapter 3). Two of these theories, expectancy 
theory and goal setting theory, are cognitive theories of motivation 
(Vroom & Deci 1992). The other theory, equity theory, is concerned with 
the individual's response to how others are treated, that is to say it is a
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social cognitive theory of motivation (Arnold et al. 1995). These cognitive 
and social perspectives provide a useful framework for analysing the 
results from the thesis survey in order to see how far each of the three 
theories of motivation and associated hypothesis helps to explain the 
motivational effectiveness of PRP.
Cognitive theories of motivation focus on the processes by which the 
individual works towards goal achievement to explain motivation (Vroom 
& Deci 1992). They work on the premise that individuals will work to 
achieve a goal that they are committed to achieving. It is said that the 
amount of effort the individual will input to achieve the goal can be 
understood by reference to the process by which the goal is set and the 
mechanism by which the individuals commitment to that goal is obtained. 
So in order to understand how far these theories are relevant to the 
Thames Water PRP scheme it is necessary to look at the goal setting and 
goal commitment processes within the scheme.
The first step is to look at the target or goal setting process. The central 
concept in cognitive theories of motivation is the premise that behaviour 
will be directed, that is to say intentional (Lewin 1951). The process by 
which the individual's behaviour is directed or given a goal is therefore 
critical to an understanding of motivation using cognitive theories of 
motivation. This raises the preliminary questions has the individual been
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given a goal and if so is the goal clear to the individual. These issues are 
examined in the next two sections of this Chapter.
The directive effect of a goal will be a function of the individual's 
acceptance of and commitment to the goal. According to expectancy 
theory goal commitment is determined by the expectancy of a valent 
outcome. The greater the valence of the outcome the more motivated 
the individual will be to achieve that outcome. In expectancy theory 
valence, expectancy and instrumentality determine both goal 
commitment and motivation. Goal setting theory is less explicit about the 
determinants of goal commitment and predicts that goal difficulty rather 
than the level of goal commitment will determine effort. Goal 
commitment is examined after target setting and target clarity. The 
mechanisms for achieving goal commitment are looked at in terms of the 
outcomes for the individual. Those outcomes may be the explicit 
financial rewards: in the case of the Thames Water PRP scheme this 
means the performance payment. The individual's perception about the 
relationship between effort and the performance payment is critical to the 
process of motivation. For some individuals non-financial rewards may 
be important valent outcomes. Some of these non-financial rewards may 
be extrinsic, but others may be intrinsic that is to say arise from feelings 
that the individual experiences as a result of achieving their goal, such as 
feelings of self-efficacy. Both goal commitment and each of the potential 
outcomes are explored.
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Equity theory has been described as a social cognitive theory of 
motivation, because it predicts that goal direction for the individual will 
be critically determined through comparison (Arnold et al. 1995). In 
other words equity theory is concerned with the process used for goal 
determination and goal commitment. But it predicts that the individual's 
level of motivation to achieve that goal will be determined by reference to 
comparison with others in the broader social context. The individual is 
concerned with fairness and specifically comparative fairness. There are 
two aspects to fairness. One is procedural; are the procedures employed 
to determine the outputs the individual gets for their inputs fair 
(Greenberg 1987)? The second is distributive; is the ratio of inputs to 
outputs fair (Adams 1965)? Each of these aspects is considered in turn.
Finally two further aspects of the Thames Water PRP scheme are 
considered at the end of this Chapter. These are essentially aspects of 
the PRP scheme that seemed particularly important form the company's 
point of view. It is apparent form the qualitative research reported in 
Chapter 7 that, aside from managing their salary bill, the company was 
primarily concerned to achieve two objectives through the introduction of 
PRP.
♦ Ensure performance took centre stage in the employment relationship 
(Performance Management)
♦ Change the corporate culture
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In relation to the first point about Performance Management, the need to 
ensure that performance took centre stage in the employment 
relationship, there was a concern that mangers were not talking to 
employees about their performance. PRP was meant to ensure that 
mangers had to talk to employees about their performance. The issue of 
feedback from managers is explored towards the end of this Chapter. 
From a theoretical perspective, feedback forms part of the cognitive 
approach to motivation. Some of the goal setting literature emphasises 
the importance of feedback (Pritchard et al.1988). Nevertheless it seems 
appropriate to deal with it separately as one of the consequences 
Thames Water intended to come out of the introduction of PRP.
Cultural change on the other hand does not fit into the theoretical 
framework examined above. Corporate culture is seen as a means of 
exercising control over behaviour employee behaviour through a system 
of normative order (O'Reilly 1989). So it is argued that if an organisation 
can change its culture to one that fully supports the organisation's 
strategic aims it will become more effective by reducing transaction costs 
and improving performance as employees behaviour conforms to 
corporate objectives (Denison 1990). Thames Water saw the 
introduction of PRP as part of a programme of cultural change. It has 
been suggested that a substantial part of the explanation for the spread 
of PRP in the UK is its role as an agent of cultural change (Kessler 1994).
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The processes by which cultural change can be achieved were considered 
in Chapter 5 and those processes are examined further in relation to the 
survey evidence at the conclusion of this Chapter.
Target Setting
The Thames Water PRP scheme judges employee performance against 
certain general criteria or traits and against the achievement of specific 
targets and objectives set for the employee during their SPR. Although 
the SPR is not formally part of the PRP scheme it plays an important part 
in the PRP process, as it enables managers responsible for reviewing 
performance to set targets and discuss performance. All employees are 
meant to have at least one SPR each year, more can be arranged if it is 
felt appropriate.
The survey results show (item c l Numbersprs) that the majority of 
employees had one SPR (62%), with some (13%) having two, and some 
having three or more (2%), within the preceding twelve months. 
However, 22% of respondents reported that they had not had an SPR in 
the last twelve months. Less than 1% of respondents had been with 
Thames Water less than a year, so there was a fairly substantial 
proportion of the workforce in receipt of PRP who had had no targets set 
for them, at least not annually, even though they should have done. It 
turns out that the problem relates to the tenure of Thames Water
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Managers. Julia Cherrett, the Thames Water Director of HR for the UK
and Ireland, commenting on these figures said:
'The pace of change in the Company is now so fast that our own 
figures show that managers are in post for no more than 18 
months on average. This poses a real problem for us in terms of 
managers developing a relationship with those employees they are 
responsible for managing. My guess is that it is the turnover in 
managers that leads to such a high proportion of SPR interviews 
not being done/
Harris (2001) found in a survey of middle management attitudes towards 
PRP that 17% thought PRP was unworkable in a time of major 
organisational upheaval. The problem from Thames Water's point of 
view is that the survey of Thames Water staff was not conducted at a 
time of any greater upheaval than usual. Thames Water would argue 
that they are a dynamic company where managers can expect to move 
on rapidly. On the other hand one of the arguments Thames Water used 
to justify the introduction of PRP is that it would ensure that managers 
talked to the employees that they managed about their performance. It 
may be that without the incentive of PRP even fewer SPR interviews 
would have taken place, but if a fifth of those surveyed did not have an 
SPR in the last year then the PRP scheme is not being wholly successful 
in ensuring performance management takes place.
The SPR interview is critical to the operation of both the Thames Water 
PRP scheme and the operation of at least two of the theoretical models 
being examined in this thesis and the large number of staff not receiving 
an SPR interview could well have an adverse effect both on the
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motivational effectiveness of PRP and on its effectiveness as an engine of 
cultural change. On the face of it, failure to ensure that all employees got 
an SPR interview could well have had a damaging effect on the function 
of the Thames Water PRP scheme as an employee motivator. The 
danger is that in the absence of the annual SPR, the employee may have 
been left without objectives or targets against which their performance 
could be assessed, or the targets that they had may have been out of 
date or no longer relevant. If no targets are set, or performance against 
target is not appraised on a timely basis, then this is likely to have an 
adverse effect on employee confidence in the link between pay and 
performance. Indeed the setting of effective targets at the SPR would 
appear to be a precondition to the operation of both expectancy and goal 
setting theory. Yet a substantial proportion of the workforce appears to 
have had no SPR in the last twelve months.
The association between the SPR interview and the motivational effects 
of PRP can be tested using a crosstabulation of the effectiveness of PRP 
and whether or not the employee has had a SPR interview in the last 
twelve months. Somewhat surprisingly there appears to be no 
association. This suggests two alternatives. Objective setting may be 
irrelevant to the motivational effectiveness of PRP. Alternatively it may 
be other factors in the objective setting process that determine whether 
or not PRP has any motivational effect. The evidence supports the latter 
interpretation. Consequently the Thames Water survey shows that it is
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not the process of the SPR interview that makes PRP motivate 
employees, but other factors associated with that process. And that 
surprisingly employees can feel motivated by PRP even when they have 
not had an SPR interview, or at least not in the last twelve months.
Table 9 i Motivation/Number 
of SPR Interview in 
last year
Count Not Motivated
Chi-square (Expected Motivated by PRP
Pearson Value .69061 Value) by PRP
Degrees of None 74 9
freedom 1 (72) (11)
At least one SPR 348 58
Significance .40596 (350) (56)
Target Clarity
Target clarity is important for a number of reasons. The Thames Water 
PRP scheme requires managers to set clear targets and, if the targets are 
not clear, employees may not know or understand what is expected of 
them. Indeed research on goal setting theory (Earley, Connolly & 
Ekegren 1989) contrasts the motivational effectiveness of giving specific 
targets with the simple 'do your best' type of approach. Goal
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specification is also important in expectancy theory. If the goal that is 
set is ambiguous or unclear both the link between goal achievement and 
a valent outcome and the expectancy that there will be a valent outcome 
will be eroded.
The questionnaire asked respondents what had happened at their last 
SPR, whenever that was. Respondents were asked how long their SPR 
interview had taken (c8 Sprlength); 23% reported that the interview 
lasted less than 30 minutes, 32% said that the interview lasted more 
than 30 minutes but less than an hour, and 39% reported that it lasted 
over an hour. Most respondents (58%) seem to have had four, five or 
six objectives set for them during their SPR (c2 Numbergoals). If the 
manager allows insufficient time to explain all the objectives that are 
being set and how they are to be achieved, there is a danger that the 
employee be unclear about what is expected of them. Respondents were 
asked (c3):
'Was it clear to you at the Staff Performance Review how you
could achieve the objectives which had been set?'
A majority (63%) was either quite clear or very clear about how they 
could achieve the objectives that were set for them. This left 20% of 
respondents who were unclear about how they could achieve the 
objectives set for them at their SPR and therefore unsure as to whether, 
if they tried harder, they could increase the reward they received. The 
greater the length of the SPR interviews the greater the goal clarity (r.27)
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and the fewer targets set the greater the goal clarity (r.21). This would 
suggest that Thames Water training on the PRP scheme for manager 
should, amongst other things, ensure that managers avoid giving 
employees too many targets and ensure that they allow sufficient time at 
the SPR interview to explain the targets that they are setting. That 
should help to ensure that a higher proportion of employees is clear 
about the targets that have been set for them.
Commitment to the Targets
Respondents were asked about their commitment to the objectives that 
were set for them at the SPR interview. The goal setting literature in 
particular has emphasised the importance of the employees' 'buying in' to 
the objectives that have been set (Locke, Latham & Erez 1988). Some 
commentators have suggested that there is likely to be greater goal 
commitment where the employee agrees to the objectives that have been 
set (Latham, Mitchell 81 Dossett 1978, and Erez & Arad 1986); or where 
the legitimacy of goal assignment is accepted (Oldham 1975); or where 
there is a greater degree of trust between the employee and the person 
assigning the goals (Early 1986).
Employees were asked a number of questions about the nature of the 
goal setting process during the SPR interview (Appendix C.fi,fii &fiii). A 
majority of respondents felt that their manager took the SPR seriously
215
(54%) and that they had the right amount of influence over the process 
(51%). And a much larger proportion (83%) felt that the objectives that 
they were being set were relevant to their job.
When asked directly about their commitment to the goals that had been 
set for them (Appendix C.fiv), a clear majority (76%) of respondents 
reported being committed to the goals they had been set at the SPR, 
while only 11% said that they were not committed to the goals that had 
been set. Goal commitment is correlated to the manager taking the SPR 
interview seriously (r.30), the respondent feeling that they had the 
correct amount of influence over the goal setting (r.35), and the 
perceived relevance of the goal to work (r.37).
The literature suggests there is a link between employee feelings about 
involvement in setting targets, the legitimacy of those targets, the 
relationship with the manager, and goal commitment. It is clear from the 
survey that that there is an association between involvement with setting 
the targets, the legitimacy of those targets, the relationship with the 
manager, and goal commitment, in the Thames Water scheme. Indeed a 
majority of respondents reported being committed to achieving the goals 
that were set for them at the SPR interview. However, only 22% said 
they were very committed to achieving the targets that had been set for 
them. Greater emphasis by managers on getting employee buy-in to the 
targets that are set, either through greater involvement in setting those
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targets or through giving greater emphasis to the legitimacy of those 
targets, might increase the level of commitment employees have to 
achieving the targets.
Extrinsic employee rewards
The Thames Water PRP system links increased pay to the achievement 
performance criteria and specified objectives or targets. Employees were 
asked whether they thought they could get more pay by working harder, 
both in respect of the objectives set at the SPR and in respect of the 
performance criteria. In response to the question:
'Do you believe that by trying harder to improve vour performance 
in relation to the Performance Criteria it would be possible to 
increase the amount of pay that you earn?'
Yes ...19.7%
No ...73.4%
Do not know ...6.4%
A similar question was asked about the objectives set at the SPR:
'Do you believe that by trying harder to achieve the Objectives 
that are set for vou at the Staff Performance Review it would be 
possible to increase the amount of pay that you earn?'
Yes ...14.2%
No ...78.5%
Do not know ...5.6%
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A substantial majority of respondents clearly did not believe that they 
could increase the amount they earned by working harder to achieve 
either the objectives or performance criteria set for them. This is 
fundamental to the question of motivation. Expectancy theory in 
particular would suggest that motivation has a direct relationship with the 
ability to secure valent rewards such as higher earnings. It also seems to 
be at odds with the whole concept of relating pay to performance to have 
nearly 80% of the employees believing that they cannot improve their 
pay by working harder on the targets set for them.
Respondents were marginally more optimistic about the effects of goal 
achievement on future pay increases. They were asked whether by 
achieving the goals set for them, they would increase their pay prospects 
in the future (Appendix C.fv).Although a majority of respondents (55%) 
did not believe that their future pay prospects would improve if they 
achieved the goals set for them, some 27% believed there was a link 
between attaining their SPR goals and future pay increases. One possible 
explanation for the difference between the numbers who thought that by 
working harder they could increase their pay and the larger number who 
thought achieving their goal would improve their future pay prospects 
may be a belief in the increased prospect of promotion if you achieved 
your objectives, and it turns out that 21% (Appendix C.fviii) of 
respondents thought achieving your objectives would improve your 
prospects of promotion. However there is also an important difference in
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the wording of the two items, the questions about the immediate pay 
rise, items motivecriteria (h2) and motiveobjectives (hi), are asking 
about an effort reward relationship, whereas the item goalpayrise (d5) is 
concerned with the possible future outcomes. It is the effort reward 
relationship which is at the heart of PRP.
The relationship between effort and reward outcome
It is important to understand why the majority of respondents did not 
believe or expect increased effort to lead to an increase in pay. One way 
of looking at the issue is to consider it in three parts. Firstly did 
employees have the necessary skills and abilities in order to achieve the 
targets set for them? In other words were these achievable targets? 
Secondly, did they believe that they would have to work harder to 
achieve the objectives that had been set? There is always the possibility 
that employees believe that the targets would be achieved irrespective of 
any additional effort on their part. And finally, did they believe that by 
working harder they would achieve the target and get a performance 
payment?
Most respondents thought that they had the right skills and ability to 
achieve the targets that were set for them (Appendix C.fvi). It is 
important to note that 20% of respondents were either not sure whether 
or not they had the right skills to achieve the objectives that they had
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been set or believed that they did not have the necessary skills. Ideally, 
all employees should feel that they have the necessary skills and ability to 
achieve the target set for them. The Thames Water SPR interview is in 
part designed to address employee development issues and issues about 
skill levels and training should be addressed in conjunction with the 
target setting process.
Employees were also asked whether they agreed that:
'It will be necessary to increase your effort at work to achieve the
Objectives that have been set for you/
Nearly half respondents thought that they would have to increase their
effort in order to achieve the objectives that had been set for them
(Appendix C.fvi). This result is more interesting when looked at in
conjunction with the other evidence from the survey about respondents'
beliefs about their ability to achieve the objectives set for them and the
consequences for them of doing so. Not surprisingly there was an
association between respondent's belief about goal difficulty (Difficultgoal
D7) and respondents belief that they would have to work harder to
achieve the objectives that had been set for them, (r.41). Nevertheless
most respondents, 77%, thought that they had the skills and ability
necessary to achieve the targets that had been set for them. Yet only
20% of respondents thought they could earn more by working harder to
increase their performance in relation to the performance criteria set for
them (Motivecriteria h2). And even fewer respondents, 14%, thought
that they could increase their pay by working harder to achieve the
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objectives set for them at their SPR (Motiveobjectives hi). This cleariy 
suggests that respondents believed there were significant process 
problems in the Thames Water PRP scheme.
That still left nearly half of the respondents who either thought that they 
could not achieve the targets set for them through increased effort or 
who were unsure whether or not they could. Leaving aside those who 
were unsure about whether or not they could achieve the target set for 
them by increasing their effort. Just under a third of respondents who did 
not believe that they would have to increase their effort to achieve the 
target that they had been set. It follows that they either thought that 
they would achieve the targets without any additional effort or that they 
could not achieve the targets even with additional effort. Those who 
thought that they could not achieve their targets, even if they worked 
harder, seem likely to have done so for one of three reasons. Firstly, 
they may have believed that they lacked the relevant skills or ability. 
Secondly, they may have believed that the achievement of those targets 
was dependent on factors beyond their control. And finally they may 
have believed that their managers' assessment of whether or not they 
achieved the targets was likely to be unfair or biased in some way.
The employees' perceptions about the connection between effort and 
receiving more pay are also relevant to equity considerations. The 
implications are perhaps most obvious in respect of procedural equity. If
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the Thames Water PRP scheme is not perceived by employees to be 
operating fairly then procedural equity theory predicts they will actually 
decrease their effort in response to the inequity (Greenberg 1987). 
Distributive equity is based on the individual's perceptions about the 
treatment that they are receiving compared to others who they consider 
their relevant comparitors. If they believe that they are being less well 
treated then according to equity theory the amount of effort that they 
put in will be adjusted downwards to compensate (Adams 1965).
So in summary, it can be seen that there are two ways of looking at the 
theoretical implications of respondents' feelings about the link between 
effort and reward. Firstly using expectancy theory, scepticism about the 
link between hard work and pay can be seen as reflecting concerns about 
the instrumentality of the scheme or the expectancy of a valent outcome. 
And from an equity point of view, these same feelings can be seen as 
concerns about the fairness of the operation of the scheme. Essentially 
these are issues of trust, does the employee trust the manager who is 
responsible for assessing that employees performance to behave fairly 
and does the employee trust the employer to translate a fair assessment 
into an appropriate performance payment.
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Non pav extrinsic reward outcomes
PRP links pay to performance and consequently focuses on pay as the 
outcome for performance. From the employee's point of view there may 
be other perhaps more or equally important consequences. The survey 
questionnaire asked about job security, promotion and increased self- 
confidence as possible outcomes from achieving the SPR goals. 
Respondents were less optimistic about the impact of achieving their 
goals on their promotion prospects than they were about the impact on 
future pay rises (Appendix C.fviii). Only 21% thought that achieving their 
SPR goals would improve their promotion prospects. As against 51% 
who did not believe that achieving their SPR goals would improve their 
promotion prospects. These results may reflect Thames Water's decision 
to reduce the number of grades when PRP was introduced, which in turn 
would have reduced the opportunities for employees to get a higher 
grade.
Respondents were slightly more optimistic about the effect of achieving 
their SPR goals on job security (Appendix C.fix). Although a majority, 
51% of respondents did not believe that there was any link between the 
objectives set at the SPR interview and job security, 29% did. In fact the 
agreed redundancy selection process in Thames Water does take account 
of employees' performance in their job, so that there is a very real
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connection between job security and performance assessment. It is aiso 
worth recalling that 76% of respondents (i3 Nojobcuts) thought that 
there was likely to be further significant reduction in the size of the 
workforce, while Viewfinder 94 reported that 73% of employees said thet 
they wanted job security. It would appear that job security would be 
quite an attractive extrinsic reward for the majority of Thames Water 
employees.
The results of the survey in respect of pay increase, promotion, and job 
security, reflect respondents' beliefs about the instrumentality of the 
objectives in respect of extrinsic rewards. In no case did a majority of 
respondents see a link between attaining the objectives set for them at 
the SPR interview and the extrinsic reward. This may in part reflect some 
of the process problems encountered in respect of SPR interviews. The 
proportion of respondents who agreed that there was a link between 
achieving the objectives set for them and the three extrinsic rewards 
ranged from 14% to 29%.
Intuitively it could be assumed that pay increases would be more readily 
linked with performance than the other rewards, in a pay scheme that 
explicitly links pay to performance. Surprisingly, fewer respondents 
reported links between achieving the objectives set for them and pay, 
than between achieving those objectives and the other two extrinsic 
rewards. One possible explanation for this is that the more intangible
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nature of the non pay rewards may make it easier for respondents to 
believe that they are linked to achieving the objectives, than the more 
tangible reward of a performance payment.
Intrinsic employee rewards
Quite apart from any extrinsic rewards that the employee might expect 
as a result of achieving the objective set for them, there is the prospect 
of intrinsic rewards. These intrinsic rewards may come about through 
feelings of achievement or feelings of pride in a job well done. Porter 
and Lawler (1968) have elaborated on the basic expectancy model and 
argue that the individual's motivation will be a function of both intrinsic 
and extrinsic satisfaction. It has also been argued that personal goals 
are important in goal setting theory (Earley & Lituchy 1991), because the 
individual's feeling of self-efficacy is enhanced when those goals are 
achieved, which in turn improves their future performance. Respondents 
were asked whether they agreed with the following statement about their 
SPR interview:
'Attaining the goals set for you would increase your sense of self 
confidence at work.'
Over half of respondents, 56% (Appendix C.fx), thought that achieving
the goals set for them would increase their self-confidence, while only
30% said it would not. It is interesting to note that a higher proportion
of respondents thought that achieving their PRP goals would lead to an
intrinsic reward (56%), than believed that it would lead to an extrinsic
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reward (14% to 29%). The contrast between these figures may reflect 
employee perceptions about the instrumentality of the scheme. While 
extrinsic rewards depend upon the effectiveness of the scheme in 
delivering rewards for goal achievement; intrinsic rewards depend upon 
the employee's own feelings about achieving the goals set for them.
Fundamental and ancillary rewards
In assessing the Thames Water PRP scheme, it is worth noting that only 
one of the four potential outcomes above examined in the survey is 
fundamental to the scheme itself. The explicitly stated outcome for the 
employee, who achieves the objectives that have been set, is a 
performance payment. If employees believe that achieving the 
objectives set at the SPR interview will also improve their job security, 
promotion prospects and increase their self-confidence, these are 
ancillary and unspecified outcomes. They are also outcomes that could 
presumably be achieved without a PRP scheme. So, for instance, an 
effective appraisal or SPR system could lead to increased job security, 
promotion prospects, and increased feelings of self confidence for those 
who achieved the objectives that were set for them, without the need for 
a performance payment. This raises the interesting question of whether 
an appraisal scheme which did not involve monetary reward would have 
the same motivational effectiveness as the PRP scheme. Potentially such 
a scheme might also avoid some of the negative effects, which equity
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theory and some commentators (Marsden and Richardson 1994, Isaac 
2001, and Brown and Benson 2003) suggest might be associated with 
feelings of inequity about the level of reward some individuals receive. It 
has been argued that the danger is that managers might fail to carry out 
the appraisal if it had no financial outcomes associated with it. After all 
even in the Thames PRP scheme around 20% of respondents to the 
survey reported that they had not had an SPR in the last twelve months.
PRP and Eauitv
Most employees did not appear to be generally antipathetic to PRP in 
principle. Respondents were asked in Section A of the questionnaire for 
their views on PRP generally, as distinct from their views about the 
Thames Water PRP scheme. A majority, 67%, agreed with the 
proposition that PRP was a fair way of paying staff and only 18% said 
that it was not (Fairgen al). More respondents, 45%, agreed with the 
statement:
'Employers benefit from having a well designed performance 
related pay scheme, because employees work harder/
than disagreed with it, 32% (Prpmotivate a2).
However when it came to the Thames Water PRP scheme employees 
were less satisfied with the fairness of PRP, particularly as it affected 
them. When asked whether they agreed with the statement:
227
'You personally have been paid more fairly as a result of the 
introduction of performance related pay/
Fairme (h6)
72%, said that they disagreed with the statement, while only 11% 
agreed with it (Appendix B.fii). Equity theory suggests two mechanisms 
by which dissatisfaction with the fairness of PRP might adversely affect 
employee motivation, that is either through procedural or distributive 
equity.
Procedural equity
The procedure for setting targets and assessing employee performance 
against those targets depends on the employee's SPR. Some aspects of 
the SPR process have already been explored above and, in so far as that 
process fails to support the causal link between target setting, 
performance assessment and reward, this may have caused employees to 
believe that the PRP process was unfair. Employee perceptions of the 
fairness or otherwise of the procedure may also have been heavily 
influenced by their views about how fairly their manager had assessed 
their performance. This is an important issue from Thames Water's point 
of view. One of the company's reasons for introducing PRP was in order 
to create a more performance focused relationship between managers 
and employees. If instead of the employee manager relationship being 
positively focused on performance issues by the PRP scheme, that 
relationship is soured by employee concerns over the fairness of the
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manager's performance assessment, the PRP scheme may have the 
opposite effect to that intended.
Employees were asked whether their most recent assessment was a fair 
reflection of their performance (Fairgenassessment f4), and as can be 
seen from the Appendix, 57% thought that it was, while 25% thought 
that it wasn't (Appendix C.fxi). The 25% who did not feel that their last 
assessment was a fair reflection of their performance, clearly believed 
that there was some unfairness about the system of performance 
assessment. The results of the survey suggest a number of possible 
reasons for this.
Some of the problems appear to have been attributed by respondents to 
the specific assessment they been given. For some respondents the 
principal problem was the nature of the assessment criteria, as for the 
22% who felt that the performance criteria against which they were 
being assessed were not fair (Fairgencriteria f6). For other respondents 
it was their manager's ability to apply those criteria. Thus 33% of 
respondents did not believe that the manager knew enough about them 
to make an accurate assessment of their performance (Prpmanagerknow
f3)-
Clearly, the relationship between the manager carrying out the 
assessment and the employee being assessed, and the employee's
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perceptions about that relationship, are important to the operation of 
PRP. There is always the danger that employees will feel that their 
manager is doing the performance assessment subjectively, and using 
PRP to reward those employees who are most compliant or who fit in, the 
so called 'blue eyed boy syndrome'. When asked whether they agreed 
with the statement:
'You have to keep on the 'right side7 of your manager to get a
good assessment rating.7
48% of respondents agreed that they had to keep on the right side of 
their manager to get a good assessment rating (Appendix C.fxii). In 
some senses this is hardly surprising, indeed it is perhaps only natural for 
employees to believe that they would get a more favourable assessment 
from a manager they get on with. Nevertheless, if employees feel that 
there is bias in the performance assessment process that may affect their 
belief in the procedural equity of the PRP scheme, and so militate against 
the motivational effect of PRP. There is also a danger that, if there is a 
tendency to reward compliance and the ability to fit in, this will damage 
organisational innovation. Some commentators (Demming 1982, Kanter 
1989, Kohn 1993 and Pfeffer 1998) have argued that PRP is innately 
damaging to the dynamics of an organisation, precisely because it fosters 
conservatism amongst employees, by rewarding compliance with 
predetermined criteria and the achievement of set targets; as opposed to 
initiative, innovation, and risk taking.
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Even if the employee believes that their own manager would give them a 
fair assessment, there is always the danger that the employee will feel 
that the scheme is being manipulated by more senior managers, in such 
a way that the employee will not get a fair assessment. There is 
evidence in some schemes (e.g. the Revenue Scheme, Marsden & 
Richardson 1991 and Marsden & French 1998) of a perception that the 
employer is operating a quota system whereby only a certain proportion 
of employees are allowed to be placed in each performance rating 
category. Obviously from the employees' point of view the danger is that 
they are denied the assessment that they deserve either, because of a 
decision by a more senior manager or, because of the operation of a 
quota system. A majority, 55% of respondents thought that there was a 
problem with good assessments being overturned by more senior 
managers (Appendix C.fxiii). Only 15% of respondents thought that this 
was not a problem. According to the survey 59% of respondents thought 
that their own performance assessment had been fair, so it follows that 
quite a number of the employees who thought that their assessment was 
fair, nevertheless felt that the scheme was flawed because a fair 
assessment could be overruled. From the point of view of procedural 
equity its possible that even employees who thought that their own 
assessment was fair, may have felt demotivated by their concerns about 
the PRP scheme generally. There appears to have been little foundation 
for these concerns about a quota system or arbitrary intervention by
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more senior managers. This concern may be symptomatic of employees' 
low trust in the management.
The Thames Water PRP scheme requires assessors to get their 
assessment countersigned by their manager, personnel then record that 
assessment centrally (Chapter 6). Once the records of PRP assessments 
have been collated centrally the resulting data is looked at to see if there 
is a normal distribution of assessments, that is to say a bell shaped 
distribution. In practice Thames Water expect the distribution of 
assessments to be skewed to the right with a tendency for assessments 
to peak at 'very good'. The data is broken down according to gender and 
ethnic origin and then examined, to see whether there is any bias against 
any particular group. Any obvious anomalies, either in the way in which 
individual managers have scored the performance assessments, or in 
terms of bias against a particular group are then discussed with the 
manager concerned (ibid. Chapter 6).
In PRP schemes which use a quota system to ensure that the distribution 
of performance ratings conforms to a predetermined distribution, 
managers will be told in advance that a certain proportion of the 
workforce must be in each rating category. Consequently an employee's 
rating in a scheme with a quota system depends both upon the 
assessment of that employee's performance and the operation of the 
quota system. Thames Water does not operate a quota system and the
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statistical analysis done by Thames Water after the assessments have 
been done is aimed at identifying either bias or anomaly in the 
performance assessments. In the Thames Water scheme it is acceptable 
for a manager's performance assessments to deviate from the slightly 
skewed normal distribution that Thames Water generally find with 
assessments, provided that those assessments can be justified. 
Nevertheless, a majority, 67%, of the of respondents thought that there 
was a quota system being operated by Thames Water, which denied 
employees the performance rating that they were entitled to, while only 
11% believed there was no such system (Appendix C.fxiv). Paradoxically, 
it may be that the very mechanisms used by Thames Water to ensure 
that the performance assessments are being carried out fairly by 
managers may be seen by employees as an interference in the fair 
operation of the PRP scheme. This suggests employees do not fully 
understand the operation of the Thames Water PRP scheme. However, 
when Thames' employees were asked (Prpunderstand f l)  how well they 
understood the employer's performance related pay scheme, 73% said 
they either understood it very well or quite well, and only 21% saying 
they did not understand in part or at all. Even so, respondents may not 
have understood the scheme as well as they thought they did. 
Alternatively respondents' perceptions about the manager's assessment 
being overruled and the operation of a quota system may be indicative of 
a low level of trust. Employees may know about the operation of the 
mechanisms used to ensure fairness in the assessments, but nevertheless
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believe that in reality the scheme operates unfairly with managers' 
assessments being arbitrarily overruled and a quota being applied to the 
assessments. The survey results suggest that Thames Water would be 
well advised to try to ensure that employees are aware of the 
mechanisms that are used to avoid bias and anomalies, and see these 
mechanisms as distinct from any arbitrary interference in the fair 
operation of the assessment process. One way of achieving this sort of 
transparency would be to involve the trade unions more in the monitoring 
of the PRP scheme.
Finally it is clear that respondents were also concerned about the basic 
fairness of the link between effort and reward in the Thames Water PRP 
scheme. This has already been touched on in relation to the 
respondents' answers to the questions about the link between pay and 
performance, which showed that at best only 20% thought that they 
could increase the amount that they earned by working harder. It seems 
likely that respondents' scepticism about the link between performance 
and pay reflects some of the process issues identified above. However, 
there is also evidence from the answers given to the open question in the 
Questionnaire that there is confusion and resentment amongst 
employees over the operation of the Thames Water PRP system.
Respondents expressed resentment at the way in which performance pay 
reflected not only the employee's performance, but also their position on
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the pay matrix for their grade. The pay matrix was intended to bring 
employees to their so-called 'natural level' on the pay scale. This 'natural 
level7 was meant to reflect the level on the scale that corresponded to the 
employee's performance, so that a fully competent performer would have 
a higher 'natural level' than a less competent performer. Essentially 
movement to these 'natural levels' was achieved by determining the level 
of increase an employee received by reference to both their performance 
rating and their position on the pay matrix (Chapter 6). This meant that 
two employees who receive the same performance rating could get 
different levels of increase by virtue of being at different points on the 
pay matrix, and that the employee with the higher rating could get a 
lower increase if they were higher up the pay matrix. This was because 
the level of increase reduces for all levels of performance rating the 
higher the employee is up the pay matrix. The system was further 
complicated because initial assimilation onto the pay matrix depended in 
part on the employees previous grade, before the new pay and grading 
structure, which included a job evaluation scheme, was introduced. A 
number of respondents commented on the perceived unfairness of the 
system from their point of view: e.g.
'If a person was over salary scale when PRP commenced there is 
no way, no matter how hard you work or how dedicated your 
performance is, that you get anything other than the PRP %. This 
is soul destroying when you find that another person... because 
they are lower down on the scale, in fact receives a higher % 
overall.'
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and
'Having achieved 'very good' and 'excellent7 my PRP was limited to 
my position on the scale and this proved a disincentive../
From the comments received it would seem respondents to the survey 
may have been negatively influenced in their perceptions about the link 
between targets and future pay increases by the use of the pay matrix. 
This would suggest that the link between pay and performance is likely to 
be more readily understood by employees when the pay matrix is not 
used to determine the level of pay for performance.
In 1998 Thames Water stopped using progression through the pay matrix 
to determine the level of pay increase employees will receive for any 
particular PRP assessment. Instead, all employees who achieve a 
particular level of performance got the level of pay increase for that 
performance level until they reach the top of the scale; this change may 
have helped clarify the link between performance and pay for employees.
Distributive Equity
Respondents also expressed concern about the amount of pay they 
received compared to other employees. In theory PRP should ameliorate 
some of the equity problems caused by an incremental or rate for the job
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pay system. Where workers are paid the same for doing the same job, 
there is a danger that, if they believe they are working harder than other 
workers who are paid the same, they will resent the difference and 
reduce their effort (Adams 1963). PRP gets around this by relating 
reward to individual effort, so that at any particular level of skill and 
responsibility, a worker's individual effort will be rewarded by a 
performance payment that reflects that effort. However, the results of 
the survey of Thames Water employees in receipt of PRP suggest in 
practice Thames' employees had a rather different perception of the 
impact of PRP.
For PRP to be fairer than schemes that are based on the rate for the job 
or incremental progression there needs to be a direct relationship 
between effort and reward. Yet most employees believed that the 
Thames PRP system did not fairly reward hard work. Over 80% of 
respondents believed that their employer did not adequately reward hard 
work (Appendix C.fxv).
Adams' equity theory (1963) predicts that it is an individual's sense of the 
comparative merits of the reward they are receiving which will determine 
its motivational effectiveness. It is unclear from the literature who any 
given individual will choose as their comparators. For the purposes of 
this study it has been assumed that the natural comparator for Thames 
Water employees in receipt of PRP will be other Thames Water
237
employees in receipt of PRP. The survey asked employees whether they 
felt other colleagues or other parts of the organisation did better out of 
PRP than they did. Most respondents were uncertain whether it was 
easier to get a higher performance rating in other parts of the 
organisation. Most 55% were not sure, 37% thought that it was easier 
to get a better assessment elsewhere in the organisation, and only 8% 
disagreed with the proposition that it was easier to get a better 
assessment elsewhere (Appendix C.fxvi). There was a more even 
division amongst respondents about whether they did as well as their 
colleagues out of PRP (Appendix C.fxvi). On balance respondents were 
more likely to feel that their colleagues did better out of PRP than they 
did, with 39% saying they either agreed or strongly agreed that others 
did better out of PRP than they did. Just over a third, 35% said that they 
were not sure. And 26% did not believe that they did worse than their 
colleagues out of PRP. The overall picture that emerges is one in which 
there is a substantial amount of uncertainty among respondents about 
the distributive equity of the Thames Water PRP scheme. Just over a 
third of respondents thought that they were not being fairly rewarded for 
their work in comparison to what others were getting.
The results show that while a majority, 67% (Fairgen al), of Thames 
Water employees felt that PRP generally was a fair way of paying 
workers, a substantial number of them, between a third and two thirds, 
did not believe that the Thames Water PRP scheme was fair. Either
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because they believed the scheme was being applied unfairly by 
managers who did not understand their work sufficiently and whose 
assessment was, in any event, likely to be overturned. Or because they 
believed that they received less performance pay than others for 
comparable work. Overall only 11% of respondents thought that they 
had been paid more fairly as a result of the introduction of PRP, whereas 
72% thought that they had not been paid more fairly as a result of the 
introduction of PRP (Fairme h6). It seems that whilst Thames Water 
employees were largely objectively well disposed towards PRP as a fair 
payment system, their subjective experience of the Thames Water PRP 
scheme led them to believe that its introduction had not led to most of 
them being paid more fairly.
The problems over fairness have a double impact. First of all it is clear 
from the Company's own guidance notes for employees (Chapter 7) that 
Thames Water introduced PRP in the belief that it was a fairer way of 
paying employees. Indeed fairness is quoted in the literature that is 
supportive of PRP as one of the benefits of PRP (Armstrong and Murlis
1994). In practice the impact of PRP in Thames Water has done the 
converse of what was intended with most employees believing that it has 
not increased fairness.
There is also a danger that employee perceptions about the unfairness of 
the Thames Water PRP scheme will serve to demotivate employees. If
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the scheme is seen as being operated unfairly, then that will detract from 
employees' belief in its instrumentality in producing a valent outcome, 
and so employees will not develop expectancy that additional effort will 
produce a performance payment. The lack of procedural equity will also 
tend to demotivate employees (Greenberg 1987). Logically the lack of 
procedural equity is also likely to impact on distributive equity. If the 
system is flawed by lack of fairness it seems likely that the outcomes 
from that system will also be thought to be unfair. In any event the 
survey results show that a substantial number of employees felt that 
other Thames Water employees were being better rewarded than they 
were. Equity theory predicts that in these circumstances employees are 
likely to reduce their effort in order to ensure an equitable balance 
between their effort reward relationship and that of others. So it can be 
seen that inequity in the PRP system is likely to have a demotivating 
effect, from a number of theoretical perspectives.
Thames Water might be well advised to try and address the equity 
concerns highlighted by the survey. The Thames Water PRP scheme was 
specifically introduced with the declared intention of increasing fairness 
(Chapter 7). A review of the scheme and its operation focusing on the 
fairness of the scheme would therefore be consistent with the declared 
objective for the scheme. It would also have the advantage of re­
emphasising the fairness aspects of the PRP scheme. The point was 
made in the previous Chapter, that there is always a danger that the
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apparently limited benefits of PRP might in practice be outweighed by its 
disbenefits. In crude terms, if more employees are demotivated by PRP 
than are motivated by PRP, it could be said that overall PRP is having a 
negative effect on motivation.
Feedback.
One of the principal reasons for introducing PRP to Thames Water was to 
ensure that mangers talked to staff about their performance (ibid. 
Chapter 6). There was a concern that, to quote Steve Jay, the then 
Director of Personnel, managers were 'abdicating their responsibility for 
managing people'. PRP was intended, as the then Director of Personnel 
put it, to 'bring the linkage with employees and their performance right 
into the centre of the stage'. Clearly feedback from managers to the 
employees they were responsible for managing was an important part of 
the PRP scheme in Thames Water.
The Thames Water PRP scheme is based on targets set at the SPR, the 
SPR in turn should be used to give the employee feedback on 
performance (Chapter 7). Each employee is intended to receive at least 
one SPR a year, if not more. In one sense, the ultimate feedback in any 
PRP scheme is the performance assessment on which the performance 
payment is based. However, the survey results suggest that over a fifth 
of respondents did not get even this feedback from their manager, as
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22% of respondents claimed not to have had an SPR interview in the last
twelve months (cl Numbersprs).
When asked whether their manager was good at giving them feedback, 
only 38% of respondents disagreed (el Feedbackquality). About 47% 
thought that their manager was bad at giving them feedback. However, 
there is always the danger that a survey of employees will produce a 
distorted view of the process based on the subjective experience of the 
interview. An employee could for example take the view that a manger 
was bad at giving feedback, because the employee did not agree with 
their manager's assessment of their performance. Objectively, whether a 
manager is good at giving feedback or not seems likely to depend on two 
things, first of all the frequency, and secondly the quality of that 
feedback.
The frequency of feedback is important, because it gives the recipient of 
the feedback the opportunity to modify their performance in the light of 
that feedback. It should also be a more objective test in a survey than 
questions about the quality of the feedback received because the answer 
is less likely to be open to individual interpretation. The evidence from 
the survey suggests that managers were not particularly good at giving 
employees frequent feedback. The formal feedback process was 
determined by the number of SPR interviews employees had, and while 
22% said that they had not had an SPR interview in the last twelve
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months, only 16% reported having two or more SPR interviews in the
same period (c l Numbersprs).
As the comments by the Director of Personnel indicate, Thames Water 
were clearly hoping to build a culture in which the relationship between 
manager and managed focused on work performance. For this to 
happen, performance had to become something more than an issue that 
was discussed once a year at the SPR interview, it needed to be a key 
issue on which the employee received frequent feedback about their 
progress. In addition to the formal feedback given during the SPR 
interview, managers gave employees informal feedback. When asked 
how many times they had received informal feedback during the last 
year, 39% of respondents said they had not received any, 10% said they 
had it once, 16% twice, and 27% said that they had been given informal 
feedback on three or more occasions. Respondents were also asked 
whether they agreed that:
'You receive frequent informal feedback from your manager
regarding your progress towards the Objectives set for you at your
Staff Performance Review/
About a quarter of respondents thought that they did get frequent 
informal feedback and this roughly corresponds with the number who 
said that they had been given feedback on three or more occasions 
(Appendix C.fxvii).
The overall picture that emerges is that only 16% of respondents had
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more than one opportunity for formal feedback during the course of the 
last twelve months, while 25% agreed that they had received frequent 
informal feedback. In terms of the frequency of the feedback being 
given the PRP scheme appears to have failed to place the linkage 
between performance and people at 'the centre of the stage' for more 
than a quarter of Thames Water employees.
In terms of the quality of the feedback received, respondents were asked 
whether or not the feedback they had received had been encouraging or 
not. Over half, 54%, reported that it had been encouraging, with only 
18% saying that it had not been encouraging (Feedbackencouraging e3). 
If recipients of the feedback think that it is encouraging, then that 
suggests that the feedback is playing a positive role. This would seem to 
be the most useful indication of the quality of feedback from a survey of 
the views of those receiving the feedback. So that while feedback was 
not given frequently enough, when it was given, it appears that in just 
over half the cases it was good in that it was felt to be encouraging.
Two further questions dealt with employees' views about the importance 
of feedback: the answers suggest that feedback was important to 
employees and reinforce the importance of feedback to the operation of 
the Thames Water PRP scheme. A substantial majority of employees 
found feedback useful both in terms of increasing their sense of 
achievement (Appendix C.fxix) and more directly in helping them to
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achieve their objectives (Appendix C.fxx). The two questions are in a 
sense complementary, as feelings of achievement may increase 
performance and therefore help employees to achieve the targets set for 
them.
Increased feelings of achievement may help increase performance and 
therefore the ability to achieve goals, by increasing the individual's 
feelings of self-efficacy (Bandura 1986). As the individual's self 
confidence grows through increased feelings of achievement, so it is 
argued their performance will improve, both, because individuals will then 
set and accept higher targets for themselves, and because the 
individual's performance will be improved by their belief in their ability to 
achieve their goal. In addition, increased feelings of achievement should 
increase the effectiveness of goal setting as a motivational technique, as 
self-efficacy is said to mediates the relationship between assigned goals 
and performance (Early and Lituchy 1991).
A larger majority of respondents, 81%, thought that feedback would help 
them to achieve the objectives set for them. In a sense this seems self- 
evident. Feedback to employees about their performance ought to assist 
them achieve their objectives by identifying what, if any, corrective action 
they need to take in order to achieve those objectives. Nevertheless, it is 
helpful to look at the literature and then consider some of the practical 
arguments around feedback, as these reinforce the importance given to
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feedback by both respondents to the survey and Thames Water.
The literature on goal setting in particular supports the importance of 
feedback. In a field study conducted with units of the United States Air 
Force, Pritchard et al. (1988) found that feedback increased productivity 
by 50%, before either goals were set or Incentives offered for the 
achievement of those goals. Feedback has been found to increase the 
effectiveness of goal setting as a motivator (Hall & Foster 1977, and 
Tubbs 1986). The literature on expectancy is less explicit about the role 
of feedback. Porter and Lawler (1968) proposed a model of expectancy, 
which included a feedback loop, however feedback in this model was a 
consequence of the individuals' previous experience of the expectancy 
cycle, rather than a consequence of information being provided by a third 
party.
Clearly one of the critical considerations is the individual's own 
performance. This may be self-evident, or it may be more difficult for the 
individual to evaluate their performance because of the nature of the goal 
that has been set. Some goals may be clear-cut from the outset, such as 
a particular level of production. Others, such as the way in which work is 
carried out are likely to be more difficult for the individual to assess. PRP 
schemes tend to focus on worker inputs, and the Thames Water scheme 
brings into assessment the way in which work is performed, what is 
termed behavioural traits for four out of the six or seven criteria against
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which employees are assessed. Thus from a practical point of view 
feedback from the manager may be the best way for an employee to 
know how their performance measures up against the criteria for a 
performance payment.
Thames Water introduced PRP in part to focus managers on the central 
importance of performance, to do this effectively managers need to give 
their employees feedback. It turns out from the survey that employees 
also feel that feedback is important both for their feelings of achievement 
and to help them achieve their job objectives. Yet the survey results 
show that only a quarter of employees felt they were getting frequent 
informal feedback about their progress towards the objectives set at their 
SPR. In those cases where feedback was given most of it appears to 
have been encouraging. Overall the results of the survey suggest that 
there is a lack of trust in the relationship between employees and their 
managers, which PRP seems to have contributed towards, and which has 
detracted from the effectiveness of PRP as a motivator. At the same time 
the results of the survey highlight the benefit employees feel that they 
get from frequent and encouraging feedback.
Cultural Change
The introduction of PRP formed part of a larger programme of cultural 
change within Thames Water, called the Employee Project. Thames
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Water wanted to change their culture from what they perceived to be a 
public sector type culture, inherited from the time when the water 
industry was publicly owned, to a more commercially focused culture. 
The Director of Personnel characterised this process as trying to get 
employees, particularly managers, to think about and accept 
responsibility for the performance of the organisation (Chapter 7).
The literature on changing organisational culture was examined in 
Chapter 5. Essentially cultural change involves changing the employees' 
beliefs and values so that they will use different beliefs and values to 
guide their behaviour. Clearly, from the organisation's point of view, the 
aim is to get the employee to adopt a belief and value system that more 
closely corresponds with the organisation's own beliefs and values, so 
that the individual will intuitively act in the interests of the organisation 
(Denison 1990). If the employees' beliefs and values are aligned with 
those of the organisation this should have the effect of reducing 
transaction costs and improving performance. Employees are more likely 
to align their beliefs and values to those of an organisation that they 
identify with, and both Denison (1990) and Brown (1995) have identified 
commitment as a key element in achieving a change in corporate culture. 
Thus the process can be seen as one in which the organisation sets new 
cues for employee behaviour, which should have the effect of increasing 
employee commitment, so that employees adopts a belief and value 
system more closely aligned to that of the firm.
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Pay systems are widely seen as an important cue or lever for achieving 
cultural change (Drennan 1992). Indeed, Kessler (1994) has suggested 
that one of the principal reasons why firms use PRP is because PRP is 
perceived to be a mechanism for getting an organisation's culture to 
change. Thames Water believed that PRP would play an important role 
in changing culture within the organisation (Chapter 7).
It is difficult to know how far the programme of cultural change in 
Thames Water has succeeded or indeed how much of any cultural 
change can be attributed to PRP. The survey questionnaire contained a 
number of questions concerned with employees' perceptions of change 
over the period since the introduction of the Employee Project. Overall 
most respondents felt that communications between management and 
workforce had not improved (Appendix B.fxiii & fxiv) and that employees 
were no more likely to identify with the firm (Appendix B.fxv & fxvi), 
since the introduction of the Employee Project. About the same number 
of respondents (40%) reported an increase in employees' confidence 
about accepting changes in working practices, as said that there had 
been no increase. About a quarter of respondents said that there was 
greater identification with the core values of Thames Water. But most 
significantly nearly 80% of respondents said that feeling of 'them' and 
'us' remained unchanged. And just over 70% of respondents rejected 
the idea that employees were being treated more like individuals than
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they had been in the past(Appendix B.fxvii).
From the Company's point of view, the fact that a proportion of 
employees reported what the Company would see as positive changes in 
attitude since the Employee Project can be seen as indicative of changes 
in employees' beliefs and values. At the very least it shows that some 
employees believe that attitudes are changing. There is the prospect that 
even those respondents who report no change in attitude in response to 
the survey may change their view over time. The survey was conducted 
about two and a half years after the introduction of PRP in Thames 
Water. It may take time for the programme of cultural change to be 
effective. Fundamental values and beliefs that have developed over a 
long period will take some time to change. From the Company's 
perspective at least some employees are reporting changes in attitude 
over important issues like flexibility over working practices. But the data 
should also give the Company cause for concern. A substantial number of 
respondents see the employment relationship as one of 'them and us' 
and nearly as many detect no move by the organisation to treat 
employees as individuals. These results suggest a degree of alienation at 
a time when the Company is trying to increase employee identification 
with the Company.
It is also crucial to consider the issue of causation in terms of the 
changes that have taken place. In other words, have the changes in
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employee values been brought about by the programme of cultural 
change introduced by Thames Water, or are they the result of other 
factors such as changes in society generally or other changes in the way 
in which Thames Water operates. And more specifically, what role has 
PRP played in changing organisational culture within Thames Water. 
Using the framework for understanding the process of cultural change 
described in Chapter 5, it can be seen that an effective programme of 
cultural change uses cues which lead the employee to adopt values and 
beliefs that are aligned with those of the organisation they work for. 
Consequently it has been hypothesised that where those cues have been 
effective in changing employees values and beliefs there should be 
increased commitment to the employer. In other words the product of 
an effective programme of cultural change should be increased 
commitment to the employer.
The evidence from the survey is that Thames Water employees were 
generally committed to their employer. A standard commitment 
questionnaire (Cook & Wall 1980) has been used in the survey to 
measure employee commitment. This comprises nine questions, each of 
which can be seen to fall into one of three categories (Cook & Wall 1980 
and Peccei & Guest 1993). The first is made up of three questions 
dealing with the respondents' pride in and identification with Thames 
Water. A summary of the results is set out in Appendix C. fxxi - fxxiii.
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It can be seen that between 55% and 67% of respondents identified with 
Thames Water, either in terms of the way they felt about the 
organisation or their pride in the organisation, while at most only 34% 
said they did not identify with the employer.
The second category concerns respondents' intention to stay with the 
employer or loyalty, a summary of the results are set out in Appendix C. 
fxxiv-fxxvi. Over half of respondents said that they sometimes felt like 
leaving Thames Water. Surprisingly rather less, only 47%, said that they 
would leave for the offer of a bit more money. Similarly the financial well 
being of Thames Water seemed to have relatively less bearing (36%) on 
respondents' views about whether or not they would stay with Thames 
Water. There were a number who said that they had thought about 
leaving, who did not identify money as influencing their views about 
whether or not they would stay with Thames Water.
Finally respondents were asked about their willingness to make an effort 
for the organisation or put another way their feelings of involvement 
(Appendix C. fxxvii-fxxix). A large number indicated they were keen to 
make a contribution to the success of the organisation. Some 77% said 
that they were prepared to put themselves out for the benefit of the 
organisation. Over 90% saw their work as being for the good of the 
organisation and not just their own benefit.
So broadly speaking it could be said that while a majority of respondents
252
had thought about leaving Thames Water, most of them identified with 
Thames Water, and the overwhelming majority said that they were 
prepared to put themselves out for the benefit of the organisation.
The differing levels of commitment identified in relation to the three 
elements in Cook and Wall's commitment questionnaire may reflect 
commitment to different aspects of the organisation. Organisations of 
the size of Thames Water are complex bodies comprising many different 
parts. Employees may distinguish between those different parts in their 
commitment to the organisation. For example employees may be 
distinguishing in their answers between Thames Water as a commercial 
entity and Thames Water as a supplier of essential services.
The service delivered by Thames Water Utilities is essential for public well 
being both in the delivery of fresh water and the treatment of 
wastewater. This may explain why respondents felt that they would be 
willing to put themselves out for the benefit of the organisation. In effect 
what they may have been saying is that they were prepared to put 
themselves out to deliver an essential public service, either out of some 
feeling of altruism or public duty. Anecdotally many Thames Water 
employees are seen as having a strong public service ethos. Many of the 
respondents had joined Thames Water when it was a public sector 
organisation. Intention to stay may in part be a reflection of the ethos of 
public service amongst employees. Julia Cherrett, the European Director
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of Human Resources for Thames Water has said:
'Many of our employees are proud to be working in an essential 
service and I have no doubt that explains some of their 
commitment to Thames Water/
Feelings about the company and the commitment to stay with company 
may reflect more ambivalence in the attitude of respondents towards 
Thames Water an employer, than in their attitude to Thames Water as 
the provider of an essential public service. However, from the company's 
point of view it could be argued that it is employees' commitment to the 
firm as a commercial entity that is essential to the transition form a 
nationalised industry to a private company. The commitment to the 
service exists because of the nature of the service that is provided; that 
is to say because it is an essential service to the public. Getting 
employees and managers to think about and accept responsibility for the 
performance of the organisation means getting the employee to identify 
with the organisation as a commercial entity and not just the service that 
the organisation provides.
These results raise interesting questions about the concept of
organisational commitment, such as commitment to who and to what
(Swailes 2002), which go beyond the scope of this thesis. There is also
some debate about how far increased commitment contributes to
improved organisational performance. Gallie, Felstead & Green (2001)
found in two surveys of commitment amongst British employees that the
impact of policies associated with increasing employee commitment was
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variable. It has been suggested that the lack of consistent evidence 
about a link between commitment and improved organisational 
performance may reflect problems over measurement (Swailes 2002). 
The argument in this thesis is that increased commitment increases 
performance by reducing internal transactional costs and increasing 
intrinsic motivation (Brown 1995). The extent to which PRP in particular 
has helped to increase employees' commitment to Thames Water is 
examined in the next Chapter.
Conclusion
The survey identified serious gaps in the operation of the PRP scheme in 
Thames Water. About a fifth of respondents reported that they had not 
had an SPR in the last twelve months. This means that those respondents 
were getting no formal feedback on their performance and that any 
targets that they were working to achieve could be out of date. A similar 
number of respondents doubted that they had the skills and ability 
necessary to achieve the targets they had been set. These are serious 
process issues, which may go some way to explain the scepticism of 
respondents about the link between performance and pay.
Around 80% of those surveyed believed that they could not increase their 
pay by working harder. Respondents were generally more likely to 
associate intrinsic rewards and other non-pay rewards with goal
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achievement than they were monetary rewards. The problem appears to 
be a lack of trust in the system and the way it is operated. Many 
employees believed that their assessment was liable to be altered by 
someone other than their manager, or that it was possible to do better in 
other parts of the organisation, or that there was some sort of quota 
system in operation. These concerns go to the instrumentality and 
fairness of the Thames Water PRP scheme and may help to explain its 
lack of motivational effectiveness for a large part of the workforce.
Thames Water also wanted to use PRP as an engine of cultural change. It 
as been argued in this thesis that in order for PRP to be effective as an 
engine of cultural change it needed to increase employee commitment. 
The survey showed that the majority of employees identified with the 
company and many were prepared to put in additional effort on the 
company's behalf. It is however unclear how far that commitment is as a 
result of PRP or whether it reflects other factors such as for instance the 
public service ethic that employees may feel in providing such vital 
services to the public.
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Chapter 10
The motivational effects of PRP explained?
Introduction
The two preceding chapters took a first look at the data from the Thames 
Water Survey in terms of both the outcomes from Thames Water's point 
of view and to see how far the data is consistent with the theoretical 
models of motivation identified in this thesis. However, the individual 
items from the survey do not capture some of the more complex 
psychological concepts relevant to an understanding of human behaviour 
(Bryman and Cramer 1990); further, some of the constructs in the 
theories being considered in this thesis are themselves not readily 
reduced to a single item in a questionnaire. Using principal component 
factor analysis it is possible to identify variables comprising items in the 
survey that are measuring the same underlying construct. Regression 
analysis using those variables identified from a factor analysis of the 
items in the survey gives a view of how far each of the theories identified 
in this thesis helps to explain the variance in motivation brought about by 
the Thames Water PRP scheme. This in turn highlights those elements of 
the PRP scheme that are most important in terms of the motivational 
effectiveness of the scheme.
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Factor Analysis and Scale Reliability
Principal Component analysis is a statistical technique, sometimes used to 
reduce items into a smaller set of variables by identifying through their 
correlation with each other those items which when taken together 
represent underlying constructs. Each of the items measured using 
continuous data in the questionnaire has been coded so that scores on 
reverse questions, that is questions which ask respondents their views on 
both positive and negative statements on the same issue, run in the 
same direction to ensure consistency of measurement. All of the 
continuous data from the survey, excluding biographical data, has been 
factor analyzed and the factors generated by that analysis have been 
used to represent the variables described below. Questions in the survey 
conducted for this thesis were grouped into Sections, which reflected 
specific aspects of employee experience of and attitudes to the PRP 
scheme and its outcomes. Factor analysis was applied to the data on 
both a sectional and global basis, that is to say each section was factor 
analyzed as well as the totality of the data, excluding biographical data. 
There was a consistency in the results from these two approaches to 
factor analysis. The results of the global factor analysis have been used 
to identify variables, because those results are based on a more rigorous 
process which captures items from the whole survey.
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Scales created using factor analyses have been tested for scale reliability 
using Cronbach's a. The conventional 'rule of thumb' is that a>  .7 (Leary
1995), in order to be confident that the scale is reliable. However, 
Cronbach's a can be shown as:
k~r 
l  + (k - l jr
Where k is the number of items in the scale, a is the average correlation 
between the items, where the items are standardized. It can be seen 
that a  is a function of both the number of items and their inter­
correlation, consequently the a score is sensitive to the numbers of items 
in the scale. It has been suggested that while the aim should be to 
achieve an a  level > .7, there is a hierarchy of confidence in scale 
reliability and that a reliability of a > .6 can at least be viewed as 
questionable (George & Mallery 1995). For this research the aim has 
been to get scale reliability of a  > .7, but given the trade off between the 
number of items comprised in the scale and the a  score, where a 
relatively small number of items have been used to construct a scale, a 
scale reliability of a > .6 has been taken as the threshold.
MOTIVATION
PRP is concerned with performance, that is to say that PRP makes 
pay dependent on performance. It is evident both from the
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literature (Cannell & Wood 1992 and Kessler 2000) and from the 
Thames Water case study that employers may Introduce PRP for a 
number of different reasons, not all of them directly related to 
performance. Nevertheless the performance outcomes of PRP are 
important. But performance is a difficult measure to use in terms 
of understanding the success or otherwise of a PRP scheme. First 
of all, objective measures of performance are not readily available 
in a field trial setting. Secondly, variables outside the employee's 
control may affect performance. Some of these variables may 
relate to the employee, for example the employee may not have 
the skills or ability to achieve the targets that have been set. Other 
variables may be beyond the employee's control, for example the 
targets that are set may be unrealistic or the performance of other 
workers involved in the process may adversely affect the 
employee's ability to achieve the targets set. An alternative 
approach would be to look at the subjective measure of 
performance used by the employer, that is to say, the performance 
assessment. Without a control group against which to compare the 
performance assessments it is unclear what this would tell you 
about the success of the PRP scheme. Employees who perform 
well and are appraised as good performers might have performed 
equally well without PRP.
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A critical measure for the employer Is the additional effort that the 
employee has put into his or her work as a result of the PRP scheme, 
because that is likely to be an indication of the additional benefit the 
employer gains from PRP. In this thesis that additional effort has been 
referred to as motivation. If PRP increases employee motivation, then all 
other things being equal, such as skill, ability and work organisation, the 
employer should be getting more performance out of their employees. 
Factor analysis of the data set identifies a factor which loads seven items 
all concerned with the employees views about the motivational effect of 
PRP (see Appendix D) a variable MOTIVATION. This factor loads on 
those items that measure the respondents' perceptions about the 
motivational effects of PRP on them and on their colleagues at work. 
Including a question about the motivational impact of PRP on other 
employees should make the measure more robust. There is a danger 
that simply asking employees about their own level of motivation may 
give a distorted view as they may be reluctant to attribute motivation to 
something outside their own control (Crazier 1964), so the questionnaire 
included an item reflecting respondents' perceptions about other workers 
motivation. The variable MOTIVATION is the key dependent variable in 
this study, because it gives a measure of the motivational effectiveness of 
PRP.
However it is important to bear in mind when considering the 
analysis that follows that very few of the respondents to the
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Thames Water survey reported being positively motivated by the 
PRP scheme; at best, in response to specific questions it was only 
18%. Consequently MOTIVATION is measuring a largely neutral, 
or even negative, response to a set of questions that capture the 
underlying concept of PRP as a motivator; indeed, only 15% of the 
scores in the variable MOTIVATION are positive. Each of the 
theories of motivation identified suggests a group of independent 
variables, which according to the theories will have a causal effect 
on MOTIVATION.
Expectancy Theory
In its simplest terms expectancy theory predicts that motivation is the 
product of valence, instrumentality and expectancy. Thus the three key 
variables are valence, instrumentality and expectancy, although Porter 
and Lawler (1968) have proposed a more complex model involving 
feedback and equity. The first arm of the expectancy equation is valence 
that is value of the outcome to the employee. Instrumentality is the 
belief that if given targets are met this will lead to a valent outcome. PRP 
schemes are predicated on performance being instrumental in producing 
a performance payment, which it is assumed the employee will view as a 
valent outcome. PRP schemes do this by making pay contingent on 
performance. The performance payment is the explicit valent outcome. 
But there are clearly other outcomes, some of which may be longer term
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in their nature, that may be of benefit and value to the employee such as 
promotion, job security or simply satisfaction at having achieved the 
targets that have been set. The difficulty is predicting the benefit to the 
individual of any given outcome. In the Thames Water scheme, the level 
of the increase in salary associated with any particular level of 
performance is determined at the end of the year and consequently 
cannot be predicted precisely by the employee while they are working to 
achieve the targets to which the salary increase will relate. This makes it 
difficult to specify valence other than in terms of an outcome, which 
would appear to be beneficial. The question then for the purposes of 
expectancy theory is, does the employee believe that achieving the 
targets he or she has been set will lead to a valent outcome, whether in 
terms of a performance payment or some other beneficial outcomes.
Ideally, one would want to identify the three separate variables, specified 
in expectancy theory, namely valence, instrumentality and expectancy. 
Unfortunately, factor analysis of the data did not provide a neat three 
variable solution. Analysis identified one variable INSTRVAL which loaded 
on three items each of which identifies a connection between achieving 
the goals that have been set and an outcome that is likely to be of value 
to the employee, in effect this gives a measure of both valence and 
instrumentality of the PRP process (see Appendix D). In addition to 
measuring instrumentality, INSTRVAL also provides some measure of the 
valence of the outcome because it comprises items measuring three
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positive outcomes for employees and the extent to which those outcomes 
are seen as connected to the PRP process is also therefore a measure of 
valence.
Expectancy is the employee's expectation that increased effort on his or 
her part will lead to a valent outcome. Expectancy differs from 
instrumentality, which is concerned with the belief that there is a causal 
link between target achievement and a valent outcome. Expectancy is 
concerned with the individual's belief that they can get the outcome that 
they want by improving their performance and factor analysis 
discriminates two items reflecting this belief (Appendix D) which has been 
used to identify a variable, EXPECTANCY. The two items used to 
construct the variable EXPECTANCY specifically relate to the employee's 
belief that by improving their performance they can get a performance 
payment.
Multiple regression (Table lO.i) shows that the independent variables 
INSTRVAL and EXPECTANCY are both positively associated with the 
dependent variable MOTIVATION (R .36) and that 13% of the variance in 
MOTIVATION is explained by the variance in INSTRVAL and 
EXPECTANCY. The Beta scores suggests that INSTRVAL is the more 
powerful explanatory variable, as the Beta scores demonstrate that a 
change of one standard deviation in INSTRVAL produces a change of .32
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standard deviations in MOTIVATION, compared to a change of .11 
standard deviations resulting from a similar change in EXPECTANCY.
TABLE lO.i -  Regression/Expectancy 1
Dependent Variable MOTIVAT[ON
Multiple R .36 VARIABLE BETA SIGT
R Square .13 INSTRVAL .32 .0000
Adjusted R Square .13 EXPECTANCY .11 .0096
Standard Error .72 (constant) .0000
F = 34.95 Siqnif F = .0000
Regressing the independent variables INSTRVAL and EXPECTANCY, which 
represent the three elements of expectancy theory, with the dependent 
variable MOTIVATION shows a significant association that is consistent 
with expectancy theory, which predicts that individuals will be motivated 
by valence, instrumentality and expectancy. Moreover the association 
between the variables INSTRVAL, EXPECTANCY and MOTIVATION 
supports the second hypothesis being tested:
Hypothesis 2(a)(1)
!Individual employee motivation will tend to increase as a result of 
PRP, where the employee has an expectancy that improved 
performance will Ibe instrumental in leading to a valent outcome."
However, the important point to bear in mind when looking at the figures
is that in the majority of cases employees were not motivated by PRP.
The figures from the survey show that only 15% of the scores in respect
of MOTIVATION related to a positive willingness to work harder as a
result of PRP. The mean score for MOTIVATION is 2.22 (S.D. .77) on a
Likert scale of five points, where five represents the greatest level of
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motivation and one the lowest. Consequently the regression analysis is 
largely a measure of how far expectancy theory can help to explain the 
ineffectiveness of this PRP scheme as a motivator. Nevertheless, overall 
the results support the hypothesis by showing that it is the variance in 
valence instrumentality and expectancy that explains the variance in 
motivation, and that valence and instrumentality explain more of that 
variance than expectancy.
Porter and Lawler (1968) have suggested a more complex model of 
expectancy theory in which feedback and equity are relevant. Taking this 
in stages it is possible to look at the additive power of these other 
variables, so looking at equity:
Hypothesis 2(aVlfl.
'The explanatory powers of expectancy theory in respect of the 
motivational effectiveness of PRP will be improved by factoring in 
Equity considerations'
For the purposes of this hypothesis, equity can be seen as the fairness of 
the process in terms of the ways in which the system works, that is to 
say whether it is seen as being operated fairly by the employee's 
manager. Factor analysis reveals a variable which reflects process 
fairness in relation to the assessment, which will be termed FAIRA 
(Appendix D). The three items against which FAIRA loads are concerned 
with the employees' feelings about whether or not the employee's 
manager made a fair assessment of their performance, in other words
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whether or not the procedure has been fairly applied.
Factor analysis identifies another variable termed INTERFEREA also 
concerned with procedural fairness. INTERFEREA combines three items 
related to employees' perceptions that PRP is subject to interference from 
others in the organisation, even if their own manager applies the scheme 
fairly (Appendix D). Adding these two variables to the regression analysis 
only increases the explanatory power of this model marginally (Table
lO.ii).
TABLE lO.ii - Regression/Expectancy 2
Dependent Variable MOTIVATION
Multiple R .39 VARIABLE BETA SIGT
R Square .15 INSTRVAL .28 .0000
Adjusted R Square .14 EXPECTANCY .09 .0319
Standard Error .71 FAIRA .09 .0416
INTERFEREA .11 .0169
(constant) .0000
F = 20.84 Signif F = .0000
It can be seen from the Beta scores in this regression analysis (Table
lO.ii) that INSTRVAL remains the variable that explains more of the 
variance in MOTIVATION than any of the other independent variables in 
the expectancy model, even when equity considerations are factored in. 
On the face of it, adding in the additional equity considerations suggested 
by Porter and Lawler (1968) adds only a little to the explanatory power of 
the expectancy model.
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However it is worth emphasizing that INSTRVAL includes both valence 
and instrumentality, and that instrumentality is the link between 
performance and a valent outcome. Thus INSTRVAL is a measure of 
both a specified valent outcome and connection between performance 
and that outcome. The link between performance and outcome is partly 
dependent on the fair application of the PRP scheme. If the scheme was 
being interfered with or applied arbitrarily then the employees are 
unlikely to see it as being instrumental in linking performance to 
outcome. Consequently INSTRVAL is in some senses a partial measure of 
the fairness of the scheme and this may explain why FAIRA and 
INTERFEREA do not add a great deal to the expectancy model. It turns 
out that when the analysis is confined to procedural fairness these two 
independent variables on together explain some 7% of the variance in 
MOTIVATION (Table lO.viii) and there is a significant correlation between 
INSTRVAL and both FAIRA (r .28) and INTERFEREA (r .23). In effect 
these elements of procedural fairness may already be accounted for in 
the measure of the instrumentality of the PRP scheme contained in the 
basic expectancy model.
Adding feedback variables, the other part of the Porter and Lawler (1968) 
model into the regression analysis does, however, make a greater 
difference to the explanatory power of the expectancy model. Factor 
analysis identified two feedback variables, which both measure different 
aspects of feedback. In the first one, GOODF (Appendix D), the three
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items that comprise the variable reflect the respondents' perceptions 
about how good their manager has been at giving them feedback. The 
second one, POSITIVEF (Appendix D) comprises three items which 
represent the respondents' need for positive feedback. Both of these 
variables capture aspects of the feedback loop that Porter and Lawler 
(1968) argued would help to improve the effectiveness of the expectancy 
theory model.
TABLE lO.iii -  Regression/Expectancy 3
Dependent Variable MOTIVATION
Multiple R .43 VARIABLE BETA SIGT
R Square .19 INSTRVAL .21 .0000
Adjusted R Square .18 EXPECTANCY .09 .0424
Standard Error .70 FAIRA .03 .5983
INTERFEREA .10 .0308
GOODF .08 .0960
POSITIVEF .18 .0001
(constant) .1678
F = 17.88 Siqnif F = .0000
Regression analysis using GOODF and POSITIVEF in addition to the other 
variables in the expectancy model explains 18% of the variance in 
MOTIVATION (Table lO.iii). It is worth repeating that MOTIVATION in 
the case of Thames Water is not for the most part a positive measure. 
These results support the third hypothesis about the relevance of 
expectancy theory to understanding the motivational effectiveness of 
PRP. Namely:
Hypothesis 2(a)(jii)
’The explanatory powers of expectancy theory in respect of the
motivational effectiveness of PRP will be improved by factoring in
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feedback.'
However the model itself could be more parsimonious. Removing 
variables from the model one step at a time selected on the basis that 
they add least in explanatory terms to the model produces a more 
parsimonious model. The first variable removed is FAIRA, which still 
leaves an expectancy model that explains 18% of the variance in 
MOTIVATION. Removing EXPECTANCY and INTERFEREA, reduces the 
explanatory power of the model by one per cent for each variable. This 
suggests a modified expectancy model comprising INSTRVAL, POSITIVEF 
and GOODF, and this explains 16% of the variance in MOTIVATION.
TABLE lO.iv - Regression/Expectancy.4
Dependent Variable MOTIVATION
Multiple R .42 VARIABLE BETA SIGT
R Square .18 INSTRVAL .25 .0000
Adjusted R Square .17 EXPECTANCY .20 .0271
Standard Error .70 POSITIVEF .14 .0039
GOODF .18 .0001
(constant) .0020
F = 25.38 Siqnif F = .0000
Overall it looks on the face of it as if feedback is a more important 
element in understanding the motivational effect of PRP in Thames Water 
than procedural fairness, possibly because procedural fairness is already 
captured by instrumentality. This suggests the formulation in Table lO.iv, 
which contains the three key elements of expectancy theory in the two 
variables INSTRVAL and EXPECTANCY, and the two feedback variables, 
and explains 17% of the variance in MOTIVATION.
Goal Setting
Goal Setting theory predicts that individuals will work harder to achieve a 
specific achievable goal that they are committed to achieving than they 
would do otherwise, and that effort will be monotonically related to goal 
difficulty. The majority of goal setting studies appear to have been 
conducted in a laboratory setting; Locke and Latham (1990) reported 
that 239 studies had been conducted in the laboratory and 156 had been 
conducted in a field setting. Nevertheless the quantity of evidence 
available from both laboratory and field trials is higher than in the case of 
most psychological theories, and as Locke and Latham (1990, page 46) 
observe:
'Few if any theories in the fileds of industrial-organizational 
psychology, human resource management, and organizational 
behavior, or even psychology as a whole, can claim such 
consistent and wide-ranging support/
Goal setting theory is concerned with objective goal difficulty but this is
difficult to measure in a field setting unless the tasks being measured are
homogeneous and readily quantified. The alternative is to try to measure
goal difficulty subjectively, as Locke and Latham (1990) say (page 75):
'Subjective difficulty typically correlates lower with performance 
than does objective difficulty. This may be because subjective 
goal difficulty is a confounded measure; it can reflect at least two 
different types of estimates: how hard the goal is objectively and 
the individual's self-efficacy.'
And (page 76)
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'This caveat poses the most serious problem in correlational field 
studies in which goal difficulty is typically measured with a 
subjective question (a procedure that is necessary if multiple jobs 
are included in the sample)/
The Thames Water study posed precisely these challenges and it is 
important to bear these problems in mind when considering the results of 
the analysis for goal setting.
Factor analysis produces factors that load two items relating to goal 
difficulty and three items that relate to goal specification (Appendix D). 
Factor analysis does not identify goal commitment as an underlying 
construct, although there is an item in the questionnaire dealing with 
goal commitment, but it does identify a measure of the respondents' 
belief in goal appropriateness based on three items. The three items 
have been used to create the variable RELEVANTG (Appendix D) which 
has been used as a proxy for goal commitment on the basis that the 
respondent's belief in the appropriateness of the goal is on the face of it 
likely to reflect goal commitment. DIFFICULTG and RELEVANTG both 
have a low scale reliability score (a=  .58 and a  = .56 respectively) and 
this is a further cause for caution in looking at the results of the analysis 
using goal setting. Only those cases where respondents reported having 
the skills and ability to perform the tasks set for them have been included 
in the goal setting model, because the objectives set must be achievable 
in order for goal setting theory to apply.
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Goal setting explains less of the variance in MOTIVATION, than 
expectancy theory does, 5% compared to 18% (Table lO.v); this may be 
due in part to the difficulties over measurement. The relatively poor 
explanatory power of goal setting may have more to do with the 
problems over measuring goal difficulty and commitment than with the 
theory itself, which has a substantial body of research evidence to 
support it. Whilst goal setting theory poses an interesting model for 
understanding the motivational effectiveness of PRP, not least because it 
suggests a model in which the financial element of the process may be 
less important than the nature of the goal setting process and type of 
goal set, the results from this study need to be treated with caution. 
Indeed, it is difficult to be confident from the results of this analysis that 
goal-setting theory provides a robust explanation of the variance in 
MOTIVATION, given these difficulties. Consequently, the results of this 
survey do not give much support to the hypothesis that employee 
motivation will be directly related to goal difficulty.
TABLE lO.v -  Regression/Goal Setting
Dependent Variable MOTIVATION
Multiple R .23 VARIABLE BETA SIGT
R Square .05 DIFFICULTG .09 .0860
Adjusted R Square .05 SPECIFICG .17 .0018
Standard Error .77 RELEVANTG .08 .1454
(constant) .0002
F =
7.14
Signif F
.0001
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Hypothesis 2 fbfl
'In so far as goal setting theory explains the motivational 
effectiveness of a PRP scheme, individual employee motivation will 
be directly and positively related to goal difficulty for specific goafs 
to which the employee is committed.'
There is also a debate in the goal setting literature about whether goal 
complexity adversely affects motivation, because of the additional time, 
which is spent in strategy selection (Earley, Connolly & Ekergen 1989). 
There is no continuous data in the data set concerning goal complexity. 
But respondents were asked about the number of objectives that they 
were set at their SPR and clearly the number of objectives set will have 
an impact on strategy selection. It turns out, the number of objectives 
set makes no difference to the explanatory power of the goal setting 
model. This may reflect the problems in operationalising the goal setting 
model or it may be that strategy selection does not adversely affect 
motivation in the Thames Water PRP scheme.
Some commentators (Kanfer and Ackerman 1989) have suggested that it 
is possible to reconcile expectancy theory and goal setting theory in one 
overall theory of motivation. Essentially it is argued that expectancy 
theory is both a distal and proximal determinant of resource allocation. 
Goal setting is concerned with the proximal allocation of resources. 
Another way of looking at this is to say that expectancy theory 
determines both goal choice and commitment and goal effort. Goal
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setting theory, on the other hand, predicts goal effort. If this model is 
correct and these are sequential elements in the motivational process 
then putting the elements of expectancy theory, EXPECTANCY and 
INSTRVAL in a regression analysis with DIFFICULTG and SPECIFICG, 
might be expected to explain either the same or more of variance in 
MOTIVATION than the models do on their own. If expectancy and goal 
setting theory are not sequential steps in the motivational process, by 
which PRP motivates employees; if instead they are measuring two 
different processes of motivation then their explanatory power seems 
more likely to be less than or the same as the aggregate explanatory 
power of the two models taken separately and indeed financial incentives 
may detract from the effectiveness of goal setting as a motivational 
technique (Lee, Locke & Phan 1997).
There is no need for a proxy for goal commitment in this model as 
expectancy determines goal commitment. In this thesis, it has been to 
argue that the two theories are distinct and that the effect will not be 
cumulative in this way.
Hypothesis 2 (c)
'Goal setting and expectancy theory will not be cumulative in the 
extent to which they explain the motivational effectiveness of the 
Thames Water PRP scheme.'
Analysis shows (Table lO.vi) that whilst adding DIFFICULTG and 
SPECIFICG increases the explanatory power of the basic expectancy
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model, it does not have a cumulative effect. So in the combined model, 
expectancy theory and goal setting explain 17% of the variance in 
MOTIVATION, but expectancy theory and goal setting theory on their 
own explain 13% and 5% of the variance in MOTIVATION. Although 
these results tend to substantiate the hypothesis, all the caveats that 
applied to measuring expectancy and particularly goal difficulty apply to 
this aggregate analysis as well.
TABLE lO.vi -  Regression/Expectancy -  Goal Setting
Dependent Variable MOTIVATION
Multiple R .42 VARIABLE BETA SIGT
R Square .18 EXPECTANCY .13 .0059
Adjusted R Square .17 INSTRVAL .32 .0000
Standard Error .72 DIFFICULTG .02 .6659
SPECIFICG .13 .0058
(constant) .0014
F=
20.07
Signif F
.0000
Equity
Equity theory predicts that employees may adjust their contribution to
ensure that the relationship between the effort they expend and the
reward that they receive for that effort is comparable to others who they
see as relevant comparators. Some commentators have argued that
procedural equity or justice can be just as important in determining
employee motivation (Greenberg 1987, Cropanzo 8i Floger 1991). Issues
of fairness arise in relation to PRP both in respect of the comparative
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rewards individual employees receive and in relation to the fairness of the 
mechanisms used to determine those rewards. Consequently both equity 
and procedural equity may be important issues in determining the 
motivational effectiveness of PRP from an expectancy theory perspective 
as well as from the perspective of equity theory.
The factor analysis did not identify a variable for distributive equity,
nevertheless there is an item Comparison ( f l l)  where respondents were
asked, whether they agreed with the following statement:
'You do less well out of performance pay than some of your 
colleagues/
The data from this item has been reverse scored and Comparison has 
been used as the independent variable in a regression analysis to test the 
explanatory power of Adams' (1965) distributive equity model In respect 
of the Thames Water PRP scheme. Regression analysis shows (Table 
lO.vii) that distributive equity as represented by the item Comparison 
explains only 2% of the variance in MOTIVATION.
The relatively poor explanatory power of the distributive equity model
may, at least to some extent, reflect the problems of measuring
distributive equity. These problems arise first of all in specifying the
comparitor group (Dornstein 1988). In the Thames water survey
employees were specifically asked about their colleagues. It may be that
employees compare their effort reward ratio with say people in their
social or family group, rather than with colleagues at work. The point is
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that whilst it is appropriate to use work colleagues as comparitors for the
purposes of equity theory in analysis of the motivational effectiveness of
PRP, that may not be the group that employees are actually comparing
themselves with. The second problem is that it would be preferable to
have a variable constructed from a number of different items rather than
just one item, as Oppenheim (p 143 1992) points out:
'An attitude precept or belief is, however, likely to be more 
compfexand multi-faceted ..., and so it has to be approached from 
a number of different angles. There is no external way of 
verifying the answers and the questions and responses are 
generally much more sensitive to bias by wording, by response 
sets, by leading, by prestige and by contextual effects. For all 
these reasons, which have been confirmed many times by 
experimental findings, it is most unwise to rely on a single (or just 
a few) questions when dealing with non factual topics../
Apart from the problems of measurement, there is one further quite 
fundamental problem with using equity theory to explain motivation. 
Equity theory (Adams 1965) simply predicts that where there is perceived 
to be an imbalance in the effort reward ratio between an individual and 
others in the comparitor group, the individual will seek to bring the ratios 
into balance. So for instance if someone else is being paid more, one 
way of balancing the effort reward ratio may be to do less work or to 
engage in cognitive dissonance. Equity theory does not predict what 
steps an individual will take to rectify an imbalance in effort reward 
ratios. Consequently the lack of a strong relationship between 
distributive equity and MOTIVATION, may simply reflect employees using 
other mechanisms to bring effort reward ratios into balance, such as
reducing their effort, so that in effect PRP becomes de-motivating.
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TABLE lO.vii - Reqression/Distributive Equity
Dependent Variable MOTIVATION
Multiple R .15 VARIABLE BETA SIGT
R Square .02 F ll Comparison .15 .0010
Adjusted R Square .02 (constant) .0000
Standard Error .76
F=
10.96
Signif F
.0010
Procedural equity, on the other hand, as represented by FAIRA and 
INTERFEREA, explains 7% of the variance in MOTIVATION (R .27)(Table 
lO.viii). Consequently, in the case of Thames Water the available data 
suggests that procedural equity is more important than distributive equity 
in explaining the variance in employee motivation resulting from PRP. 
This suggests that from the point of view of equity theory (Greenberg 
1987, Cropanzo & Folger 1991) it is the way in which the PRP scheme is 
managed rather than the amount paid as a performance payment that is 
more important in influencing employees' attitudes, judgement and 
performance.
TABLE lO.viii -  Regression/Procedural Equity
Dependent Variable MOTIVATION
Multiple R .27 VARIABLE BETA SIGT
R Square .07 FAIRA .18 .0001
Adjusted R Square .07 INTERFEREA .16 .0004
Standard Error .74 (constant) .0000
F=
18.71
Signif F
.0000
Procedural equity is also clearly an important element in the 
instrumentality of the PRP scheme from an expectancy viewpoint. In
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other words from a theoretical viewpoint procedural equity is important 
both in its own right in relation to the application of equity theory to the 
motivational effectiveness of PRP and also because it is an integral 
consideration in determining the instrumentality of the PRP scheme for 
expectancy theory. A PRP scheme that is perceived as being operated 
unfairly will lack both procedural equity and instrumentality. This point is 
illustrated by the fact that taken as two independent variables, without 
any other independent variables, FAIRA and INTERFEREA account for 7%
of the variance in MOTIVATION (Table lO.viii). However, when added to
TABLE lO.ix - Regression/Expectancy 5
Dependent Variable MOTIVATION
Multiple R .28 VARIABLE BETA SIGT
R Square .08 EXPECTANCY .13 .0059
Adjusted R Square .07 F ll Comparison .08 .0562
Standard Error .74 FAIRA .17 .0002
INTERFEREA .14 .0021
(constant) .0000
F=
13.76
Signif F
.0000
the basic expectancy model they increased its explanatory power from
13% (Table lO.i) to 15% (Table lO.ii). This would tend to support the
importance of instrumentality in the expectancy model and suggest that
procedural fairness is at least a part of the instrumentality measure in the
expectancy model. It is worth recalling that INSTRVAL, which gives a
measure of both valence and instrumentality, would appear to be the
single most important explanation for the variance in MOTIVATION in the
expectancy model judging from the Beta scores. Thus taken overall
procedural equity appears to be an important consideration both for the
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equity and expectancy models.
The three theories of motivation and the Thames Water PRP scheme
Overall expectancy theory appears to explain more of the variance in 
motivation amongst Thames Water employees than either goal setting or 
equity theory. This suggests that Thames Water may need to look at the 
extent to which PRP outcomes are viewed as being both attractive and 
achievable if they want to increase the motivational effectiveness of the 
PRP scheme. However, this may not be as simple as it seems. On the 
face of it increasing the performance payment available under the terms 
of the PRP scheme should make the scheme outcomes more valent. But 
the qualitative research showed that since the introduction of PRP in 
Thames Water the overall size of pay increases each year has been low 
because Thames water have felt themselves constrained in the amount of 
money they put into the annual pay award by low inflation. 
Consequently the level of increases for the different performance ratings 
have not been highly differentiated, so that poor performers have not 
faired as relatively badly as they might have done, if there had been 
more scope for differentiation in the amount of money available for pay 
increases. In Thames Water the very poorest performers get no pay 
increase, but while inflation is in low single figures the relative decline in 
the value of their income will be less than it would have been if inflation 
had been in double figures. At the same time Thames Water has
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restricted the amount of money available for the annual pay award 
because there is low inflation which means that there is less money 
available to reward those employees judged to have performed better. 
The low level of pay differentiation in the Thames Water PRP scheme was 
also initially exacerbated by the use of a pay matrix, which it will be 
recalled rewarded employees lower down the pay scale with a higher 
percentage increase than those higher up the scale for the same 
performance. Consequently it is difficult to see how the current scheme, 
where the performance payment takes the form of the annual salary 
award, can be used to increase the valence of the outcome without 
putting more money into the annual salary award. Employers sometimes 
argue that the improved performance from PRP will increase the amount 
of money available for pay increases allowing them to put more money 
into the annual salary award. However, the evidence from interviews 
with key players in Thames Water suggested that PRP was seen as a 
means of controlling the salary budget and not increasing it. Substantial 
increases above the rate of inflation in Thames Water pay would have 
altered Thames Water's position in relation to the market rate for pay, at 
a time when managers were arguing that Thames water was paying in 
excess of the market rate and needed to reduce pay levels.
This leaves the difficult question of how Thames Water should distribute 
the limited funds available for pay increases between employees in order 
to increase employee motivation. One approach is to give a
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comparatively large award to relatively few employees in order to 
differentiate awards employees receive. Unfortunately, while this may 
increase the instrumentality for a minority, it would also decrease the 
expectancy of achieving a valent outcome for the majority of employees. 
In short, given a limited wages pot, the more comparatively attractive 
wage outcomes appear for the high achievers, the less achievable they 
appear for the majority.
Valence is not limited to salary outcomes. Respondents were asked 
about a number of other potentially valent outcomes including 
promotional prospects and greater job security. The difficulty with these 
outcomes is that they are contingent on factors, which may be outside 
the employee's control. Employees may not face redundancy and there 
may be no promotion prospects. So that whilst valence instrumentality 
and expectancy may be important elements in the expectancy model, it 
may not be easy for Thames Water to do that much to the PRP scheme 
in these two areas to improve its motivational effectiveness. Thames 
Water may be more readily able to make improvements, which will 
increase the motivational effectiveness of PRP in other areas.
Perhaps the most obvious area for improvement is in respect of feedback. 
Feedback is important (Table lO.iii), for employee motivation, it improves 
the explanatory power of the expectancy model. As nearly a quarter of 
respondents had not been given an SPR in the preceding twelve months,
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Thames Water could readily improve the motivational effectiveness of the 
PRP scheme through a more rigorous application of the requirement that 
managers carry out an SPR. This would at least ensure that employees 
were getting some feedback through the SPR, though feedback should 
also happen through the year. In addition, training for managers on how 
to give feedback would also seem likely to be beneficial. Good feedback 
is important, but the survey shows that the most effective feedback in 
motivational terms was feedback that gave employees confidence that 
they could achieve the goals that had been set for them. Employees 
were more motivated where they felt that their managers were 
supporting them.
One of the arguments used by employers for adopting PRP, and adopted 
by Thames Water, is that PRP is a fairer way of rewarding employees 
than other payment systems (page 18 Armstrong and Murlis 1994). 
Fairness in this context means that reward should reflect effort. The 
results of this research show that employees may have a different 
perspective so far as fairness is concerned. Equity theory focuses on the 
comparative effort reward ratio between employees, which is in essence 
the employer's argument for adopting PRP, yet this accounts for only 2% 
of the variance in motivation. Employees it turns out are more concerned 
with procedural fairness, which accounts for 7% of the variance in 
motivation. Employees expressed two concerns about procedural 
fairness, first of all that the procedure was being applied fairly and
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secondly whether the manager's appraisal score was being overridden. 
The first question is whether the procedure is being applied fairly. There 
is research evidence showing that managers may adapt their appraisal to 
give what they feel is an appropriate rating (Harris 2001) or to reflect 
their prior commitment to the employee resulting from their involvement 
in that employee's appointment (Brody, Frank & Kowalzyk 2001) rather 
than applying the scheme objectively. However the survey results reflect 
the employees' perceptions about the fairness of the scheme, and while 
those perceptions may or may not be justified, they are effectively a 
measure of the employee's trust in the manager who conducts the 
appraisal. Turning to the question of interference, qualitative evidence is 
that Thames Water does not operate any quota systems to limit 
managerial appraisal scores, although they do monitor appraisals. 
Concern about interference with managerial appraisal scores may in part 
be a result of employee ignorance about the operation of the PRP 
scheme, but it largely seems to reflect a lack of trust in the firm. A 
scheme that from the employer's point of view was meant to increase the 
fairness of the pay system, is seen as unfair by many employees because 
of a lack of trust in their managers and Thames Water, which in turn 
damages the motivational effectiveness of the scheme (Lawler 1981 and 
Siegall & Worth 2001).
Initially one of the key aims of this research was to see whether goal 
setting theory provided a good explanation of the motivational
effectiveness of PRP. The research has not supported this approach. The 
quantitative research does not provide either reliable scales or a robust 
model of goal setting, but the difficulties of operationalising goal setting 
in a field setting only became evident once the research was under way. 
Nevertheless given the weight of evidence from both laboratory and field 
research supporting goal setting and its obvious affinity with PRP, it 
remains an attractive area for further field research.
Changing the organisation's culture.
To understand how far PRP accounts for changes in corporate culture in 
Thames Water, it is necessary to understand how PRP works as an engine 
of cultural change. It is argued in this thesis that PRP can change culture 
by reinforcing the importance of performance to employees and 
increasing employee commitment. PRP reinforces the importance of 
performance by putting performance closer to the heart of the reward 
calculation. Employee commitment is increased as key corporate 
objectives are cascaded down through the organisation, as the 
performance targets employees must achieve in order to get a 
performance payment. As employees strive to achieve the performance 
targets set for them so they will come to see the company's values and 
beliefs as legitimate values and beliefs that they share. If these 
arguments are correct and it is the focus on performance and the effect 
on commitment of cascading corporate objectives that lead to changes in
285
organisational culture then it follows that, in order to work effectively as 
an engine of cultural change, PRP must be effective in motivating 
employees. An effective PRP scheme will send a clear message about the 
importance that the employer attaches to performance and at the same 
time it will cascade key organisational behaviours and targets down 
through the organisation as performance targets which need to be 
achieved in order to earn a performance payment. A PRP scheme that 
failed to motivate, on the other hand, is hardly likely to reinforce the 
importance of performance for employees or get them to take on board 
the organisational behaviours and targets that are set as performance 
targets.
These propositions about PRP as a mechanism for cultural change have 
been tested using three hypotheses about the association between 
changes in corporate culture, commitment and motivation. The first of 
these is:
Hypothesis 3(a)
'The Thames Water programme of cultural change will have 
brought about a change for some employees in their view 
of the relationship with their employer, and that will in turn 
have increased the commitment of those employees to the 
employer.'
According to this hypothesis those employees who have believe there has
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been the greatest cultural change, will in turn have become more 
committed to the employer. Essentially this hypothesis is concerned with 
changes in attitude over time. Unfortunately within the constraints of the 
research it has not been possible to measure attitudes at different points 
in time. Instead regression analysis has been used to examine the 
relationship between respondents' views about the change in the 
employment relationship in Thames water since the introduction of PRP 
and their commitment to Thames Water.
The extent to which employees believe that there is a more unitarist 
employment relationship is captured by the variable UNITARY, which 
comprises six items that are based on respondent's own views of the 
change in the employment relationship over the period in question 
(Appendix D). Only 21% of respondents felt that there was a more 
unitarist employment relationship in Thames Water in the period since 
the introduction of PRP, the majority were either neutral on the subject 
or thought that there had been no change. This would appear to be a 
reasonably robust measure of employee views about the extent to which 
they believe that there has been a change in corporate culture.
Changes in the level of employee commitment over time have not been 
measured in the survey, instead respondents were simply asked about 
their current level of commitment using a standard commitment rating 
(Cook & Wall 1980). It is clearly an unsatisfactory to conflate a measure
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of change over a period of time with a snapshot of current attitudes and 
try and draw meaningful conclusions. However the importance of 
cultural change to the Thames Water PRP scheme was iess evident at the 
beginning of this research than subsequently, particularly because of the 
company's refusal to co-operate with the research at the survey stage. 
Crucially this meant that there was no access to the principal managers 
involved in introducing PRP into Thames Water until after the survey had 
been conducted. Consequently the importance of cultural change for 
Thames Water only became fully apparent after the quantitative data had 
been gathered.
However it is still interesting to see what association there is between 
perceptions about organizational change and employee commitment. 
Factor analysis of the data from the Thames Water survey identifies two 
variables that represent employee commitment. Cook and Wall (1980) 
originally conceived of the measure as having three dimensions, 
identification, involvement and loyalty. However a two factor solution 
where identification and loyalty form one of the constructs, and 
involvement Is identified as a separate construct appears a satisfactory if 
less desirable outcome (Peccei & Guest 1993). The first of these, 
BELONG comprises six items concerned with the employees level of 
loyalty and identification with Thames Water (Appendix D). The second, 
INVOLVEMENT comprises three items concerned with the employees 
willingness to 'go the extra mile' for the employer (Appendix D). These
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two variables have been produced using Cook and Wall's (1980) standard 
commitment questionnaire. Both BELONG and INVOLVEMENT have been 
used as the independent variables in a regression analysis of the 
relationship between current levels of commitment and perceptions of 
organisational change over a period of time. The results of the regression 
analysis may at least go some way towards supporting hypothesis 3 (a), 
firstly because UNITARY 'explains' 25% (see Table 10.X) of the variance 
in BELONG. It is perhaps not surprising that there is an association 
between UNITARY and BELONG, as an increase in the unitary view of the 
employment relationship by definition involves a feeling of identification 
with the employer.
TABLE 10.X -  Regression/Commitment 1
Dependent Variable BELONG
Multiple R .50 VARIABLE BETA SIGT
R Square .25 UNITARY .50 .0000
Adjusted R Square .25 (constant) .0000
Standard Error .98
F = 160.39 Signif F = .0000
Secondly, regression analysis also shows that UNITARY explains 13% of
the variance in INVOLVEMENT (see Table lO.Xi). INVOLVEMENT reflects
employees' willingness to put themselves out for the employers. From
the employer's viewpoint identification with the firm may be an attractive
trait, not least because it may cut down on transaction costs and lead to
behaviors, which tend to promote the values of the firm. However, the
employees' willingness to put themselves out for the firm offers the
prospect of a more immediately tangible benefit in the shape of
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additional work. Overall, the point that emerges from this association 
between UNITARY and the two commitment variables is that higher 
commitment is associated with the perception of a positive change in 
attitude that corresponds with Thames Waters' programme of cultural 
change. The crucial point, which it has not been possible to explore in 
this research, is the extent to which this association changes over time. 
Does increased employee identification with the employer lead to 
increased levels of commitment. On the face of it, commitment would 
seem to be a logical outcome of increased identification.
TABLE lO.Xi — Regression/Commitment 2
Dependent Variable INVOLVEMENT
Multiple R .37 VARIABLE BETA SIGT
R Square .14 UNITARY .37 .0000
Adjusted R Square .13 (constant) .0000
Standard Error .78
F = 160.39 Signif F = .0000
Increased employee commitment should it is argued in turn lead to
increased employee motivation as result of PRP. After all, it seems likely
that employees who identify more closely with the firm are more likely to
buy into two of the psychological mechanisms that are associated with
motivation. An employee who identifies with the firm may be more
inclined to have a greater expectancy in a valent outcome, as a result of
their belief in the organisation, so that according to expectancy there
should be greater motivation. If the employee feels a strong sense of
identification with the firm and wants to go the 'additional mile' to make
sure the firm succeeds, then intuitively it seems more likely that they will
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buy into the PRP scheme. Likewise, in terms of goal setting theory, an 
employee who is committed to the employer might be thought to be 
more likely to be committed to the goals that are set for them than 
employee who is not. Following this argument it has been hypothesized 
that:
Hypothesis
' Employees who are more committed to their employer will 
be more highly motivated by PRP than employees who are 
less committed to their employer.'
Employee commitment is associated with MOTIVATION in the Thames
Water survey, R.26 (see Table lO.Xii), but the amount of variation in
motivation explained by the two commitment variables is 7%.
Commitment explains less of the variation in MOTIVATION than
expectancy theory, but about the same amount as procedural fairness.
On the face of it this result seems counterintuitive, particularly in respect
of INVOLVEMENT, as an employee who says that they are willing to do
more for the firm might be assumed to be more motivated. However it is
important to bear in mind that the variable MOTIVATION is specifically
measuring motivation arising from the PRP scheme. Commitment may
explain rather more, or indeed less, of the variance in employee
motivation generally, that is to say motivation not specifically linked to
PRP. An employee may be committed to the employer to such an extent
that they want to make an additional contribution, irrespective of any
additional payment. However, the hypothesis being tested here is that if
PRP has a substantial effect in changing organisational culture, by
291
affecting employees' values and beliefs about the organisation, then there 
will be a link between PRP as a motivator and the other aspects of 
cultural change such as commitment.
TABLE lO.Xii -  Regression/Commitment 3
Dependent Variable MOTIVAT[ON
Multiple R .27 VARIABLE BETA SIGT
R Square .07 BELONG .18 .0005
Adjusted R Square .07 INVOLVEMENT .13 .0089
Standard Error .74 (constant) .0000
F = 18.65 Siqnif F = .0000
The fourth and final hypothesis about organisational culture was that PRP 
would be more effective in changing organisational culture in those cases 
where it had been more successful in motivating employees. For PRP to 
be successful in changing organisational culture, which operates at the 
level of the individual's belief system, logic would suggest that it must 
also be effective as a simple motivator. It has therefore been
hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 3(c)
'PRP will be more effective in changing organisational 
culture where the PRP scheme is also successful in 
motivating employees.'
MOTIVATION has been regressed against the dependent variable
UNITARY to test this hypothesis and it turns out that there is a strong
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association, (see Table lO.Xiii) which tends to support the hypothesis. 
This result needs to be seen with the results of the analysis relating to the 
two other hypotheses about corporate culture. Although the results, so 
far as they go, are all supportive of the hypotheses to some extent, there 
are a number of problems.
TABLE lO.Xiii -  Reqression/Culture
Dependent Variable UNITARY
Multiple R .44 VARIABLE BETA SIGT
R Square .20 MOTIVATION .44 .0000
Adjusted R Square .20 (constant) .0000
Standard Error .70
F = 119.07 Siqnif F = .0000
First and foremost, these three hypotheses are in effect testing an
analytical framework, which may not be that robust. The analytical
framework is based on previous theoretical work in a complex area where
there is relatively little quantitative empirical work on which to build.
Whilst there seems to be a level of agreement that pay is an important
tool for bringing about cultural change (Drennan 1992, Kessler 1994, and
Brown 1995); at least two commentators have highlighted the difficulty in
predicting the outcome of any particular strategy for achieving cultural
change (Kessler 1994 and Brown 1995). Organisational culture comprises
a number of different facets (Schein 1992), so that predicting which
mechanisms are likely to bring about a change in culture and how
effective those mechanisms might be, is difficult. External variables may
also have some affect on the impact of mechanisms used by the
organisation to bring about a change in organisational culture, making it
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even more complicated to predict the outcome of any particular strategy 
for bringing about change in organisational culture. Consequently the 
simple analytical framework suggested in this thesis for understanding 
whether or not PRP has helped to bring about a change in organisational 
culture, may well oversimplify the process and fail to capture the true 
picture.
The results gleaned from testing the analytical framework that has been 
adopted may be misleading. The danger is that the model misrepresents 
the flow of causation or fails to identify an important mediator. Put 
another way, do the results confirm that PRP needs to be effective in 
motivating employees in order to work as a mechanism for achieving 
cultural change within an organisation, or is there some other 
explanation? For instance, it could be argued that cultural change will 
encourage employees to work harder to achieve goals that they 
increasingly believe are in their interests, as well as their employers. The 
comparatively weaker correlation between commitment and motivation 
however suggests that it is more than simply a question of the employees' 
feelings about the employer, influencing their susceptibility to the 
motivational impact of PRP. It is the changing attitudes and perceptions 
associated with the Thames Water programme of cultural change which is 
more strongly associated with the effectiveness of PRP as a motivator. 
Given that PRP was a central part of the programme of cultural change 
introduced by Thames Water (see Chapter 8), the results would seem to
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support the hypothesis that PRP is more likely to be effective in 
engineering cultural change in those cases where it is effective as a 
motivator.
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Chapter 11
Conclusions
This thesis has examined the paradox between the continuing popularity 
of PRP and the widespread scepticism about the effectiveness of PRP as a 
motivator for employees. The approach adopted has been to use the 
evidence from a case study of PRP in Thames Water to address the 
following five questions.
• Why did Thames Water use PRP?
• How effective has PRP been in Thames Water as a motivator for 
employees?
• Why was PRP not more effective as a motivator for employees?
• How effective was PRP in delivering the other objectives it was 
originally intended to achieve?
• Why does Thames Water continue to use PRP?
Before bringing together the evidence from the research to address each 
of these questions it is important to understand the strengths and 
limitations of the research.
The strengths and limitations of the research design.
The results of this research into the Thames Water PRP scheme add to 
the general body of evidence about why firms use PRP and how
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successful PRP Is, both, in terms of increasing employees' motivation and 
in terms of some of the other benefits Thames Water hoped to achieve 
as a result of introducing PRP. The analytical approach adopted, using 
three theories of motivation as a framework against which to explore the 
motivational effectiveness of PRP, provides a new way of looking at the 
possible limitations on the motivational effect of PRP. This thesis touches 
on the question of whether and how PRP brings about cultural change; 
this in turn raises complex questions of causation, which call into 
question the effectiveness of PRP as a mechanism for bringing about 
cultural change.
The strength of a case study approach is that it is based on real events 
and gives a direct insight into how PRP is working in practice. However, 
the first hurdle with field research is getting access; this has proved 
particularly difficult in this case. The initial access to Thames Water was 
gained through the local branch of UNISON, the trade union, in 1995. It 
was not until 1999 Thames Water agreed to co-operate with the research 
for this thesis. The main research instrument adopted in this thesis, the 
employee survey, was drafted without the benefit of access to the 
employer for qualitative research. In the absence of any evidence to the 
contrary the survey focused on the justification given by Thames Water 
to the employees and Trade Unions for the introduction of PRP at the 
time when it was introduced. Thames Water produced 'A Guide for 
Employees' (circa 1992), which said that PRP was intended to provide a
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fairer system of remuneration and increase employee motivation. It has 
subsequently become apparent after research access was granted by 
Thames Water that one of the principal and more enduring aims of PRP 
for Thames Water was as part of a Performance Management Scheme 
intended to bring about cultural change in the organisation. However, the 
emphasis in the questionnaire used in that research was on the 
motivational effectiveness of PRP, and the survey looked at cultural 
change as a peripheral issue. On reflection and with the benefit of the 
qualitative research access subsequently granted by Thames Water, 
somewhat greater emphasis should have been given to cultural change in 
the research approach that was adopted.
Cultural change is a process that operates at a number of different levels 
(Schein 1992) indeed Thames Water were relying on a number of 
different instruments apart from PRP to bring about cultural change in 
their organisation. This suggests that a longitudinal survey or panel study 
could have been used to capture some of the changes in attitude, 
however one of the drawbacks of such studies is that there tends to be a 
diminishing rate of return on the survey over time (Oppenheim 1992). If 
the importance of cultural change had been appreciated at the outset, it 
might have been better to use a repeated cross-sectional study, using 
questions identified by focus groups. As it was, the problems over access 
rendered the use of focus groups impracticable and the questions in the 
initial study did not readily lend themselves to a follow up study looking
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at cultural change in Thames Water. The survey asked respondents 
about how employee attitudes had changed since the introduction of PRP 
and did not give a clear measure of corporate values and culture at a 
single point in time against which subsequent survey data from a 
similarly phrased survey could be compared.
The focus in the quantitative research for this thesis has been on the 
motivational effectiveness of PRP. Notwithstanding the importance 
attached to PRP as an agent of cultural change, Thames Water still ought 
to be concerned about the motivational effectiveness of PRP, both 
because of the overall cost benefit of PRP and because the motivational 
effectiveness of PRP may mediate the impact of PRP on corporate 
culture. After all, if the PRP scheme is not working in one respect, by 
motivating employees to improve their performance, there is a danger it 
may not be working, in another respect, by bringing about cultural 
change. In order to explore how PRP worked as a motivator, the three 
theories of motivation that seemed most likely to explain the effect of 
PRP on motivation were applied to the Thames Water PRP scheme. 
These three theories have been termed the framework of analysis. Each 
of the theories tends to highlight a particular aspect of the PRP scheme. 
Expectancy theory focuses on the valence of the outcome, while goal 
setting theory is concerned with the goals that are set, and equity theory 
is concerned with both the distributive and procedural fairness of PRP. 
However, there is an element of overlap between procedural fairness and
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expectancy theory in particular. According to expectancy theory to be an 
effective motivator PRP should be instrumental in producing a valent 
outcome as a reward for additional effort, but any unfairness in the 
process can introduce an arbitrary element which may disrupt the chain 
of causal connection linking PRP with a valent outcome.
The framework provides a useful tool for understanding the way in which 
PRP works as a motivator. However, the application of the theories to 
PRP highlighted some practical problems arising from both the way in 
which the Thames Water scheme was operated and the application of 
these theories in a field setting. In particular the amount of pay 
contingent on performance in the Thames Water PRP scheme during the 
period of this research was so relatively small that it may not have been 
sufficiently attractive to employees to act as a motivator either in terms 
of expectancy or equity theory. On examination, it became apparent that 
the Thames Water PRP scheme operated in such a way that, as long as 
the level of wage increase in the economy generally remained low, the 
amount of pay contingent on performance in Thames Water was likely to 
be relatively small. The very worst performers in the company were 
denied any pay increase at all, but there were comparatively few in this 
category and any who remained there for any period of time were at risk 
of losing their employment. For the vast majority of employees the 
likelihood was that they would receive a performance payment at or 
around the rate of inflation. PRP really meant that for a small proportion
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of the workforce it was possible to earn one or two percent more than 
the majority in their pay increase until such time as they reached the top 
of their grade, when a similar sum might be paid on an unconsolidated 
basis. Consequently in applying expectancy and equity theories to PRP in 
Thames Water, the study was in practice looking at how far employees 
were prepared to put in additional effort to achieve a comparatively small 
reward.
Goal setting theory turned out to be difficult to operationalise because 
the problems of measuring an objective variable, goal difficulty, in an 
attitude survey. Locke and Latham (1990, pp 75-76) say that goal 
difficulty in an attitude survey is unreliable because it is a confounded 
measure capturing both the goal difficulty and the respondent's feelings 
of self-efficacy. In practice it was difficult to identify a robust measure of 
goal difficulty from the Thames Water survey and this may help to 
explain the disappointing results obtained from trying to operationalise 
goal setting theory. Goal setting is a motivational technique, which could 
potentially justify moving from PRP to a system of goal setting and 
performance assessment unrelated to any financial incentive. If, as some 
critics (Kanter 1989, Kohn 1993 and Pfeffer 1998) have suggested the 
financial reward undermines teamwork and sours the relationship 
between managers and those they manage, removing the financial 
element, and focusing on the goal setting process might be an attractive 
alternative to PRP. Originally it had been hoped that the survey results
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would provide an opportunity to explore this possibility in more detail, 
unfortunately the difficulties of operationalising goal setting have 
hampered this area of research.
In addition to the issues around research access and the difficulty of 
operationalising the theoretical framework in a field setting, there have 
been time constraints on completing the research and writing up the 
thesis. This thesis has taken some time to finish because it has been 
completed part time and has necessarily had to compete against a 
number of other commitments at work and home. The original 
quantitative primary research on which the thesis is based was conducted 
in 1995. Relatively speaking little has changed in the Thames Water pay 
system applied in the utility business in the United Kingdom in the 
intervening period and the research remains pertinent. The relative 
stability of the UK utility operation is due in part to the nature of the 
business, which is focused on providing a consistent quality of service in 
the supply of water and wastewater services. International 
developments, including the purchase of Thames Water by the German 
multi utility group RWE and the expansion of Thames Water into the 
United States market through the purchase of American Water in 2002, 
may also have taken some of the focus away from the UK utility 
operation in the intervening years.
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This final Chapter has been used to update the picture of the Thames 
Water PRP system and compare views of both the company and 
employees over time, using information from a review of the reward 
system and an interview with the current Director of Human Resources. 
Thames Water have recently initiated a review of their reward system, 
and although the company is not intending to replace the PRP pay 
system in Thames Water, some of the preparatory work for the review 
provides an interesting if limited update on employee views regarding 
PRP. Thames Water established 12 focus groups from across all business 
units encompassing all grades of employees (the survey conducted for 
this thesis excluded manual workers); no notes were kept of who 
attended or of who said what in order to give a degree of anonymity. All 
views were included in the report prepared of the focus group work, the 
Reward Framework Project Focus Group Feedback Report (October 
2001). Where appropriate information from the Report has been used in 
this concluding Chapter. Likewise comments from the current European 
Director of Human Resources, Julia Cherrett have also been included at 
this stage to give an update on Thames Water's views on PRP.
Why did Thames Water introduce PRP?
Even though PRP was introduced by Thames Water ostensibly in order to 
provide a fairer system of rewards and increase employee motivation, it 
has been hypothesised that one of Thames Water's principal reasons for
introducing PRP was in order to help bring about cultural change 
following privatisation. The research evidence supports this hypothesis. 
Thames Water introduced PRP as part of a process of change aimed at 
taking what had been a nationalised industry and transforming it into a 
more commercially focused private company. Much of the drive behind 
these changes came from Roy Watts the Chairman of Thames Water. As 
a precursor to privatisation, Thames Water was the first water company 
to withdraw from national pay bargaining and some 60 or 70 members of 
the top management team were taken off collectively bargained terms 
and conditions and given personal contracts. Pay and changes to pay 
arrangements were clearly seen by Thames Water as sending important 
messages about the type of company Thames Water wanted to be. 
Watts also brought in managers from the private sector to give Thames 
Water what he termed the 'strength of the mongrel', by mixing those 
managers with experience of the water industry with managers with 
experience of the private sector.
After Thames Water was privatised a small group of managers looked at 
the personnel issues facing the company, according to Steve Jay, the 
then Director of Personnel, the group asked itself two questions. What 
would you do if you had a 'blank sheet of paper7 as far as personnel 
policies were concerned? And what is stopping you from managing 
effectively? The group came up with a proposal termed the 'Employee 
Project7, which was signed off by top management and implementation
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started in 1990, the year after privatisation. PRP, which was introduced 
in 1992, formed part of the employee project and was clearly part of a 
wider strategy aimed at transforming the way the company operated and 
changing the culture within the company.
Thames Water used pay as a mechanism for helping the company to 
realise its strategic business objective of getting greater commercial focus 
by putting performance at the heart of the pay bargain. Pay was being 
used to achieve a strategic business objective by bringing about cultural 
change within the organisation. This strategic approach is consistent 
with the concept of 'new pay' or strategic fit, but as Kessler (2000) 
observes the reward strategy not only has to fit corporate strategy, in 
order to be effective it the strategy has to be implemented and operated 
consistently. The Thames Water reward strategy contained some internal 
inconsistencies or tensions, which affected the implementation and 
operation of the strategy and militated against PRP achieving ail the 
objectives it was intended to.
The tensions within the reward strategy become apparent when Thames 
Water's objectives in introducing PRP are considered. The research 
shows that Thames Water hoped to achieve five objectives through the 
introduction of PRP. Those objectives were:
•  To motivate employees
•  As a way of managing down wages
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•  To make the system of reward fairer by rewarding contribution
•  To encourage managers to manage more effectively
•  As a mechanism for achieving cultural change
Initially it was explicitly the hard reasons of wage control (Minute 3 page
2 - minutes of Thames Water Company Council -29th May 1992), 
motivation and fairness that were used to justify the introduction of PRP 
(Thames Water Utilities -  Performance Related Pay -  a guide for 
employees -  undated circa 1992). PRP was intended to produce the 
immediate and hard benefits of controlling wage costs, yet reward 
contribution and motivate employees. On the face of it these were 
potentially conflicting objectives, as rewarding contribution and 
motivating employees might need more money for wages; not less. The 
contradiction between wage control and motivation is highlighted by the 
ACAS guidance on pay systems (2003), which advises that it is important 
to have the necessary finance in order to operate PRP, and goes as far as 
to warn that paying a small performance payment is unlikely to motivate 
and may even demotivate employees. It could be argued that, 
notwithstanding the views expressed by ACAS, the initial costs of 
introducing PRP with a level of performance payment sufficiently high to 
motivate employees should be recouped in the longer term through 
improved performance by the firm as a result of the incentive effects of 
PRP. However, Thames Water saw PRP as a mechanism for achieving 
wage control from the start and consequently did not want to put
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additional money into the pay bill to fund larger incentive payments even 
at the outset.
Thames Water hoped that by managing salaries on a matrix that was 
intended to put average performers on the mid-point of the salary range, 
wage costs could be managed down. When PRP was introduced headline 
inflation was running at a relatively high rate and wage increases in 
general were correspondingly high as pay settlements tended to keep 
pace with inflation. Thames Water believed that this would give them 
'room' in the annual pay awards to both significantly differentiate 
between the levels of performance achieved and use the performance 
payment to get employees to their natural level on the pay scale 
relatively quickly. However, a drop in the rate of inflation led to lower 
salary settlements, which meant that the pay increases after PRP was 
introduced were never large enough to allow sufficient differentiation in 
pay to make any significant impression on the anomalies brought about 
by salary protection. Thames Water, who already felt that they were 
paying above the market rate, were reluctant to give pay increases which* 
put them further above what they believed was the market rate. The 
managers who had been responsible for introducing PRP thought with the 
benefit of hindsight that it was low inflation that had been a barrier to the 
effectiveness of PRP as a mechanism for rewarding contribution, 
motivating employees and controlling wage costs. In retrospect it is clear 
that predicating pay strategy on continuing high inflation left the strategy
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vulnerable to changes outside Thames Water's control.
In any event, on closer examination it is apparent that the use of PRP by 
Thames Water as a mechanism to manage down wages has been 
counterproductive in terms of rewarding contribution and motivating 
employees irrespective of the rate of inflation. Essentially there were two 
problems: the lack of transparency in the process; and the absence of 
meaningful incentives. The PRP process was based on employees' 
performance payment being dependent on their place on the salary 
matrix so that wages could be managed down as employees gravitated to 
their so called 'natural' point on the salary matrix. However, the use of 
the salary matrix made the process so opaque and confusing that 
irrespective of the amounts involved many employees saw no link 
between reward and contribution and this undermined the motivational 
effectiveness of the scheme. The other problem was the apparent 
contradiction between trying to motivate employees with the promise of 
additional pay, while at the same time trying to control the pay bill. This 
meant that Thames Water were reluctant to increase their overall pay bill 
making it difficult for them to offer any substantial incentives to higher 
performers, without actually reducing pay for other employees. In 
practice it was only those few employees whose performance was 
deemed 'unacceptable' who were denied any pay increase. Consequently 
the amount of additional pay employees could expect to earn for 
'excellent' performance was only one or two percent more than those
employees whose performance was assessed as 'acceptable'.
These contradictions in the original objectives that Thames Water hoped 
to achieve through PRP were highlighted in a number of the answers 
given to the open question in the survey conducted for this thesis. The 
employer's own survey (Viewfinder 94) found that only 13% of 
respondents thought that PRP rewarded superior performance and 
commented 'Few of you feel it (PRP) sufficiently rewards good 
performance, or that it penalises poor performance'. Employees' 
motivation was soon discarded as an immediate and direct justification 
for PRP, because as Derek McManus, one of those closely involved with 
the introduction of PRP, said looking back it could be seen that PRP had 
not been a particularly effective motivator. This is a view shared in by 
the Director of Human Resources for Thames Water, Julia Cherrett, who 
has commented:
"...with the benefit of hindsight it is difficult to be sure how far PRP 
is helping to motivate employees. For us the importance of PRP is 
that it underpins our Performance Management processes..."
Julia Cherrett saw PRP not as a direct motivator of employees but as part
of a process of Performance Management, which would lead to improved
performance. At one level Performance Management is about getting
managers to ensure employees are aligned with the organisational
objectives, what Harding et al (2000) call 'the line of sight'. The original
aim for PRP in Thames Water of getting managers to take responsibility
for managing performance was essentially about more than simply
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ensuring the cascade of organisational objectives through the 
performance appraisal process; also it was about changing the way 
things were done and in consequence organisational culture. These 
cultural change objectives were not stated so explicitly at the time PRP 
was introduced, but can be clearly identified from the qualitative 
research.
Thames Water intended PRP to be a central part of performance
management from the outset. The idea was that managers would be
forced to address the issue of performance amongst the employees
whom they managed. This was important because from the company's
point of view it was part of a move away from the old public sector way
of doing things. As Steve Jay, who was in charge of employee relations
when the PRP scheme was introduced put it:
"...we had management and supervision generally who didn't
manage we thought that it (PRP) would bring the linkage with
employees and their performance right into the centre of the 
stage..."
Looking back on the introduction of PRP after ten years, Julia Cherrett
the current Director of Human Resources, saw its importance in terms of
performance management as key to the original introduction of PRP, and
as central to the continued use of PRP by Thames Water.
"For us the importance of PRP is that it underpins our performance 
management system. We believe that it is the performance 
management system that is instrumental in improving
performance and bringing about a change in culture."
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The evidence from those involved at the time was that PRP was 
introduced as part of a process of cultural change. Even though PRP was 
not explicitly recognised in the company's published statements as a 
mechanism for bringing about cultural change, it is clear from this 
research that the aim was to change the culture of Thames Water from a 
public sector culture to a more commercially focused one. Ultimately it is 
this longer term, softer justification for introducing PRP, which has 
proved most enduring. The harder more immediate benefits of PRP 
namely wage cost control and increased employee motivation, proved 
more illusory from the company's point of view and were soon discarded 
as a justification for using PRP.
How effective has PRP been in Thames Water as a motivator for
employees?
The survey evidence from the research conducted for this thesis shows
that PRP increased motivation in Thames Water for only a small number
of employees. At best, 18% of respondents to the survey said that PRP
had increased their motivation the rest either said that it had not or were
neutral on the subject. It is difficult to know whether this level of
increased motivation constitutes a net benefit to Thames Water. PRP has
potential disbenefits as well as potential benefits and the survey
attempted to capture information on the disbenefits arising from PRP as
well as the benefits. Some of the results from the survey reflect well
known arguments about the negative effects of PRP on team working
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and relations between managers and the employees they manage 
(Kanter, 1989 and Kohn 1993). Jealousy amongst employees was 
identified as a problem by 17% of respondents. Nearly half of 
respondents said that PRP had eroded their trust in their manager and 
practically half of respondents said that they had to keep on the right 
side of the manager to get a good PRP score. These negative effects of 
PRP need to be weighed against whatever positive impact PRP has on 
employee motivation, Performance Management and cultural change.
The evidence from the key players involved at the time PRP was 
introduced and from the current European Director of Human Resources 
is that Thames Water soon became aware that PRP was not particularly 
effective as mechanism for increasing employee motivation. The research 
evidence shows that PRP was viewed by Thames Water as a cornerstone 
of Performance Management and an important part of a wider 
programme of cultural change aimed at giving employees a more 
commercial focus. However this does not mean that the motivational 
effectiveness of PRP is therefore a redundant or at best peripheral issue. 
In fact, performance was and remains a central concern for Thames 
Water, hence their focus on Performance Management and a more 
commercially orientated culture. Performance is a product of, amongst 
other things, employee motivation, so for Thames Water employee 
motivation was not a redundant or peripheral issue; it was at the centre 
of what they wanted to achieve.
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The failure of the PRP scheme to motivate many Thames Water 
employees may mean that it has not been effective in helping to bring 
about the change in corporate culture that Thames Water wanted to 
achieve. Indeed, if PRP is eroding the trust between manager and 
managed there must be a danger that instead of improving Performance 
Management and helping to create a more commercially focused culture, 
PRP will have a negative effect on both Performance Management and 
culture. Consequently the failure of the Thames Water PRP scheme to 
motivate over 80% of respondents, is important not just in itself but also 
in terms of the objectives Thames Water hoped to achieve through PRP.
Why was PRP not more effective as a motivator for employees?
The approach adopted in this thesis has been to explore the motivational 
effectiveness of PRP through a framework of theories of motivation using 
hypotheses in Appendix F to test the extent to which the Thames Water 
PRP scheme engages each of the theories. The framework comprises 
three theories of motivation; expectancy theory, goals setting theory and 
equity theory on the basis that these are the theories that most closely 
model the PRP processes. The rationale for this approach is that by 
seeing how far each of the theories helps to explain the motivational 
effects of PRP it should be possible to identify which of the theories
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explain most the motivational effectiveness of PRP. Then the theory or 
theories or those parts of the theories that seem most pertinent can be 
used to identify and explore possible prescriptions for the improvement 
and strengthening of the Thames Water PRP scheme.
Expectancy theory explains more of the variance in the motivational 
effects of PRP than the other theories of motivation tested in this thesis. 
Equity and feedback variables, that is to say variables capturing the 
perceived fairness of the PRP scheme and the quality of feedback from 
managers, increase the explanatory power of the expectancy model. 
Depending on the complexity of the expectancy model used between 
13% and 18% of the variance in the motivational effect of PRP is 
explained by expectancy theory. However, a more parsimonious model, 
comprising the basic expectancy model of valence, instrumentality and 
expectancy together with positive feedback explains 16% of the variance 
in the motivational effectiveness of PRP. It is this more parsimonious 
model that appears to give the best trade off between explanatory power 
and parsimony. The relative importance of the expectancy model in 
explaining the variance in the motivational effectiveness of the PRP 
scheme highlights the importance of the reward aspect of the scheme 
and the linkage between performance and reward.
When it comes to the fairness of the PRP scheme, there were substantial 
differences in the explanatory power of the equity model based on
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distributive equity as described by Adams (1965) and procedural fairness. 
There are problems of specification with the distributive equity model of 
motivation particularly in relation to the comparator group and the 
remedial action employees might take if they feel there is an imbalance in 
effort reward ratios between them and their comparators, which make it 
difficult to apply. There were also problems with measurement. A single 
item had to be used to capture employees feelings about how well or 
badly they were paid in comparison to others in Thames Water and a 
single item is not a particularly satisfactory measure to use with data 
from an attitude based survey (Oppenheim 1992). These problems of 
specification and measurement may in part account for the relatively poor 
explanatory power (2%) of distributive equity in respect of the 
motivational effectiveness of the Thames Water PRP scheme. The results 
in relation to distributive equity are none the less interesting because 
distributive equity potentially provides an explanation for both the 
motivating and demotivating effects of PRP. Employees who feel that the 
amount of effort that they are expending in relation to the rewards that 
they are receiving is unfair when compared to the reward others are 
receiving for their efforts may respond by reducing their effort.
Procedural equity in Thames Water, on the other hand, explains more 
(7%) of the motivational effectiveness of PRP than distributive equity. A 
number of writers (Greenberg 1987, and Cropanzo & Folger 1991) have 
suggested that procedural equity may be a more important consideration
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than distributive equity in motivation. The concept of procedural equity 
is also implicit in the expectancy model, which predicts that a valent 
outcome will have a motivational effect in respect of action that is 
instrumental in producing that outcome. An action is only likely to be 
seen as instrumental in producing a valent outcome if the processes by 
which the outcome are determined are seen as predictable rather than 
arbitrary and unpredictable. Consequently in the case of PRP it is 
important that the process of determining the performance payment is 
fair in order to increase employee motivation both from the point of view 
of procedural equity and expectancy.
Goal setting theory poses a particularly interesting perspective on PRP, 
because it focuses principally on the nature and difficulty of the goal set 
rather than the prospective reward for achieving that goal. Potentially 
this means that the financial reward associated with PRP could be 
downplayed or removed and more emphasis placed on the goal setting 
process, with the same motivational effects being achieved without some 
of the problems over team working and employee manager relations. 
However, the problems of measuring goal difficulty in a field setting 
mean that the results of the analysis of the data from the Thames Water 
survey need to be treated with caution. At best it would appear that goal 
setting accounts for no more than 5% of the variance in employee 
motivation caused by PRP. Notwithstanding the relatively low level of 
association between goal setting and the motivational effectiveness of
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PRP in Thames Water this still appears to be an interesting area for 
further research. Not only is goal setting a plausible motivational 
technique; it also mirrors much of the PRP process. There is a 
substantial body of research evidence from the USA supporting the 
effectiveness of goal setting as a motivational technique ( Locke & 
Latham 1990). Furthermore, goal setting models the PRP process, 
without the reward element, thus potentially addressing some of the 
performance management issues without contaminating team and 
employee manager relationships with the problems associated with 
performance payments (Kanter 1989, Kohnl993 and Pfeffer 1998).
It would be wrong to assume that the analysis provided by the theoretical 
framework posed in this thesis is a simple prescription for increasing 
motivation either in Thames Water or any other PRP scheme. There are 
conceptual and, perhaps more importantly, practical problems in simply 
assuming that if Thames Water addressed the issues raised in respect of 
key variables in the models of motivation employee motivation would be 
increased. First of all of all it is worth considering some of the 
conceptual problems that apply to all of the theories of motivation tested 
in this thesis. In each case the theory is explaining the variance in what 
is a largely negative or neutral measure of motivation, because it turns 
out that relatively few Thames Water employees report being motivated 
to work harder by PRP. It may be that whatever improvements were 
made in the scheme the numbers or level of motivation would not be
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increased. There may be other variables either in the workplace or in the 
employment relationship that make employees reluctant to exert 
additional effort for Thames Water. For example, employees may feel 
that their jobs are at risk and resent any additional effort for a firm that 
they believe is going to make them redundant or they may believe that 
they are working as hard as they can for Thames Water already 
irrespective of the promise of an additional increase in salary through the 
PRP scheme.
Notwithstanding these conceptual problems, it is at least worth 
considering what 'lessons' can be drawn from the Thames Water case 
study about the sort of improvements that could be made to the Thames 
Water PRP scheme in order to improve its motivational effectiveness. 
The theoretical framework of analysis adopted in this thesis highlights 
three areas of the PRP scheme that appear to have a stronger effect on 
employee motivation than other aspects of the scheme. These are 
essentially:
• The value of the outcome
• Fairness and transparency
• Feedback
Focusing first of all on the value of the outcome, clearly in the case of 
PRP the explicitly valent outcome is the performance payment, which in 
Thames Water was in effect the level of the employees annual salary
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increase. Members of the Focus Groups used to assist in reviewing the
reward system expressed concerns over the small pay differential used to
reward different levels of performance in the Thames Water PRP scheme:
'Robbing "Peter to pay Paul" ...only limited budget to be 
distributed, ...the result was "a done deal" with little reference to 
actual performance ... PRP distributions are forced and that 
individuals have no influence over the outcome of their PDR 
discussions. (The Reward Framework Project Focus Group 
Feedback Report -  October 2001)
In other words the message from the Focus Groups was that the system
is incapable of rewarding individual performance fairly, because the
financial constraints delimit the total amount available to reward
performance.
It would presumably be possible to increase the valence of the Thames 
Water PRP scheme for employees by increasing the overall wage increase 
to employees. However, this prescription seems unlikely to appeal to 
Thames Water, particularly as PRP was originally introduced as a way of 
controlling pay. Another alternative would be to increase the level of PRP 
pay increase for those receiving the best performance rating, at the 
expense of those with a lower level of rating. While this might have the 
effect of improving the valence of the outcome for a few employees, it 
seems likely to decrease it for the majority of the others or at least 
reduce their expectancy of receiving a valent outcome.
Improving the fairness and transparency of the PRP scheme or at least its
apparent fairness seems to be more likely to be an effective prescription
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for improving the motivational effectiveness of the scheme. There are 
two reasons for this. First of all fairness is important to the motivational 
effectiveness of the scheme both because it is relevant to the 
instrumentality of the scheme and because procedural fairness turns out 
to be a factor in its own right and as an elaboration on the basic 
expectancy model. Secondly there are real practical steps that Thames 
water could take in order to improve the apparent fairness of the PRP 
scheme. In practical terms fairness and transparency mean that Thames 
Water needs to be more open and transparent about monitoring and 
ensure that managers are seen to manage the scheme more fairly. The 
SPR interviews, for example, provide an important opportunity for 
managers to give encouraging feedback to the employees that they 
manage. Without an SPR interview employees are unlikely to feel that 
they are being supported in achieving the targets set for them or that the 
manager takes the PRP scheme seriously. The evidence is that it is not 
so much the number of SPR interviews as the quality of the management 
support and feedback in those interviews that was important. Feedback, 
at least in so far as it is supportive of the employee in achieving the 
targets that they have been set is an important element in the 
motivational effectiveness of PRP in its own right. The role of supportive 
feedback in the explaining the motivational effects of PRP seems to 
reflect the importance of self-efficacy (Bandura 1986) in employee 
motivation. Managers need to make sure that they are not just giving 
feedback, but that the feedback is appropriate. The advantage from the
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company's point of view in addressing issues of transparency, fairness 
and feedback rather than question of relative level of reward is that taken 
at face value this looks like a relatively inexpensive improvement to the 
scheme. In addition the idea of making the scheme fairer, more 
transparent and more supportive of employees appears to be non- 
contentious.
How effective was PRP in delivering the other objectives it was originally 
intended to achieve?
Thames Water came to see PRP as primarily a mechanism for bringing 
about cultural change within the organisation. However, it is far from 
clear how successful PRP has been in achieving this goal. There are three 
reasons for this. The first is that organisational culture is a complex web 
that operates at a number of different levels and so is subject to a 
number of different influences (Schein 1992). Consequently, it is difficult 
to know how far PRP as opposed to say the introduction of more 
managers from the private sector (another mechanism explicitly used by 
Thames water to bring about cultural change) actually accounts for 
cultural change in Thames Water. Indeed it seems not only possible but 
likely that other developments such as the privatisation of the company 
will have had a more significant impact on the organisational culture 
within Thames Water.
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The second problem in identifying how far PRP has contributed towards a 
change in organisational culture is that there is no clear prescription as to 
how PRP would change organisational culture. While pay is seen as an 
important tool in changing culture (Drennan 1992, Kessler 1994, and 
Brown 1995) the mechanism by which a PRP pay system might bring 
about cultural change is less clear. The process suggested in this thesis 
comprises three stages. Firstly, PRP cascades corporate objectives to 
employees, and those employees who have been motivated by PRP in 
particular will tend to accept as valid and therefore adopt as their own 
the corporate objectives set for them. Secondly, employees who buy into 
the corporate objectives will also become more committed to the 
employer. Thirdly, the PRP scheme should be more likely to increase the 
motivation of employees who become more committed to the employer, 
through the programme of cultural change. This suggests a virtuous 
circle of an effective PRP scheme increasing employee commitment, 
leading to cultural change, which in turn improves the effectiveness of 
the PRP scheme. This analysis matches the view expressed by those 
involved in introducing PRP and the current Director of Human 
Resources, that PRP was essentially a key part of Performance 
Management, and that effective Performance Management would in turn 
help to produce a more commercially focused corporate culture. 
However, it may be that PRP far from encouraging employees to adopt 
the corporate objectives makes employees more suspicious of those 
objectives because they are seen as part of a commercial transaction
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where the company is trying to buy the employees' commitment. Indeed 
in the case of an essential public service such as the supply of water and 
wastewater services, employees may have a stronger sense of public 
service and so react more adversely to being offered more money to do a 
job that they feel is intrinsically worthwhile, than elsewhere.
The third problem is one of causation. While the model for cultural 
change suggested in this thesis may appear credible, it does not describe 
a clear causal mechanism. It is based on the hypothesis that successful 
cultural change should reduce internal transaction costs and is therefore 
concerned with increasing employee commitment (Denison 1990). But it 
is difficult to be certain from the results how the process works. Do 
changes in organisational culture lead to increased commitment, or does 
change in commitment lead to a change in culture, or is the relationship 
between commitment and culture endogenous? Just as importantly the 
model cannot identify the extent to which the PRP scheme is causing 
either increased employee commitment or a change in organisational 
culture. It seems more likely the PRP scheme will be effective in 
increasing employee commitment and changing culture in those cases 
where the employee accepts the objectives set during the SPR process 
and sees the benefit in working to achieve those objectives. That is to 
say PRP is more likely to be an effective agent of change where it is 
effective in motivating employees. However, it seems equally plausible 
that those employees who are most committed to the employer, at least
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as a commercial organisation, or who feel that there has been the 
greatest shift in organisational culture, are more likely to sign on to the 
precepts that make PRP an effective motivator. Alternatively, employees, 
who are committed to water supply and the treatment of waste water as 
a public service, might find the commercial approach adopted by Thames 
Water reflected in their PRP objectives and consequently find it difficult to 
reconcile those PRP objectives with their commitment to public service 
(Deci 1972). Consequently it is difficult to be sure how far the 
association between the motivational effectiveness of PRP, employee 
commitment and changes in corporate culture reflect a causal linkage.
Each of these three concerns needs to be borne in mind when looking at 
the results from the Thames Water case study. The evidence of 
successful cultural change was in any event patchy. Nearly 80% of 
respondents thought that the feeling of 'them and us' remained 
unchanged, yet at the same time about a quarter of respondents thought 
that there was greater identification with the core values of Thames 
Water. Only 21% of respondents thought that there had been an 
increase in the unitarist views of employees since PRP was introduced, 
the majority either thought that there had been no change or were 
neutral on the subject. This suggests that any change in culture that had 
taken place in the period since the introduction of PRP had only limited 
effect in reducing the transactional costs within Thames Water.
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Thames Water took the view that PRP, as an essential part of their 
Performance Management scheme, would ensure that managers and 
employees were more focused on performance and that this would in 
turn help change Thames Water from a traditional public service 
organisation into a more commercially orientated company. Cascading 
corporate objectives through the PRP scheme would give employees, 
what has been termed (Harding et al 2000), a clear 'line of sight' to the 
company's objectives and that employees would adopt these objectives 
as their own leading to a change in culture in Thames Water. There were 
practical problems with the operation of this model. Research showed 
that 22% of employees reported not having had an SPR (the interview at 
which goals are set and performance is reviewed by the manager) in the 
last twelve months. Julia Cherrett the European Human Resources 
Director thought that it might be the rate of change of managers in post 
that accounted for the high proportion of respondents reporting that they 
had not had an SPR in the last twelve months. Even so, if those 
respondents who said that they had no SPR during the previous twelve 
months are filtered out of the data, 20% of respondents reported being 
unclear about how they could achieve the objectives set for them 
(another 10% were not sure whether they were clear or not). Likewise 
24% of respondents who had an SPR in the previous twelve months said 
that their manager did not take the SPR seriously (18% were not sure). 
Even leaving aside the fifth of employees who reported not having had 
an SPR interview in the last twelve months, it is not clear that PRP was
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having the sort of proselytising effect that Thames Water hoped. Nearly 
half of all respondents said PRP undermined the trust between 
employees' and their managers and it seems unlikely that employees 
whose trust in their manager has been undermined by PRP will be 
inclined to adopt the values and objectives promoted by PRP.
Why does Thames Water continue to use PRP?
Thames Water continues to use PRP and there is no public indication that 
they intend to stop using PRP. Taken at face value this may signify a 
continuing belief both in the efficacy of PRP as a performance 
management tool and in its longer-term role in making the culture in 
Thames Water more performance orientated. But it is also worth 
considering what pressure there is on Thames water to change from 
using PRP and what options are available in order to get a full picture of 
why the company continues to use PRP.
Thames Water is again reviewing the employee reward system. There is 
no suggestion that PRP will be dispensed with by Thames Water. The 
comments from the Reward Framework Project Focus Group Feedback 
Report (October 2001) are interesting in this respect. PRP was described 
as the 'hottest topic' and it was said that in the main members of focus 
groups:
"Agreed with need to link pay and performance but did not like the
current system."
326
This comment fits in with the results of the survey of Thames Water 
employees conducted for this thesis (66% thought PRP was a fair way of 
paying employees) and the results of a number of other surveys of 
employees in other organisations (Marsden & Richardson 1994 and 
Marsden & French 1998). Support for the principle of a performance pay 
system and the 'heat' that such systems generated amongst Thames 
Water employees illustrates the difficulty in putting this seemingly 
straightforward concept of relating pay to performance into practice.
It seems more likely from the evidence of this research that a PRP 
scheme will command the support of employees, if those employees 
perceive it to be both fair and objective. This is more difficult than it at 
first appears, as individual employees may have inflated or unrealistic 
opinions of their own performance and may feel that any assessment to 
the contrary is in some way subjective or unfair. After all it is a rare gift 
to see ourselves as others see us:
"0 wad some power the giftie gie us -  
To see oursels as ithers see us!"
-  From Ode to a Louse 
Robbie Burns
Even the focus group identified the lack of objective managerial 
assessment of performance as a defect in the scheme.
327
"...(PRP) System only works well if managed well, good managers 
make the system work, but is dependant on subjective opinion of 
manager.../'
PRP was seen by employees, at least those in the focus groups, as being 
not so much about performance management, as dependent, for its fair 
and effective use, on good management. PRP was seen not as a 
management aid, but as a test of management. Amongst the solutions 
suggested by the focus group to this particular problem were the 
following two:
" Proposed Solutions:
- Remove the PRP system completely
- Replace system with one that doesn't rely upon management 
judgment..."
Dispensing with PRP seems unlikely to be an attractive proposition for a
company like Thames Water where there is a continuing focus on
improving performance. After all taking performance out of the effort
reward equation might send the wrong message to employees. Any pay
system may have a certain amount of inertia against change and because
of the messages PRP sends about performance, a company like Thames
Water may well be even more reluctant to change PRP than it would
another pay system. Pay is seen as sending a strong message to
employees because of its importance to them, consequently from the
employer's point of view this suggests that basing pay on corporate
objectives is one way of highlighting the importance of those objectives.
Whatever the reality of PRP in terms of its impact on employee
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motivation or corporate culture, perhaps the message that Thames Water 
is a performance-orientated company outweighs any problems associated 
with PRP.
Equally many of the alternatives to PRP may seem less attractive to 
Thames Water. Incremental pay or paying a rate for the job would both 
send the wrong message about the link between performance and 
reward as far as Thames Water is concerned, other alternatives such as 
capability based pay might well prove as controversial as PRP. One 
alternative to individual PRP suggested by Pfeffer (1998) is the use of 
group based reward schemes, such as profit sharing, stock ownership, 
gain sharing and group bonuses. In a group based reward scheme 
reward is not contingent on the performance of the individual but on the 
performance of the wider group. According to Pfeffer (1998, p. 223) 
'individual incentive schemes erode teamwork and trust and set people 
against one another in a competition for rewards'. Adopting a group 
reward approach overcomes these problems by emphasising the 
importance of the group and the value of team-working, while at the 
same time giving an incentive for improved performance. Thames Water 
already has share ownership and profit sharing schemes for all 
employees, indeed these schemes were introduced at the same time as 
PRP. For Thames Water the prescription offered by Pfeffer would mean 
abandoning the individual PRP scheme and either relying on the existing 
group reward schemes or perhaps even moving to some form of group
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bonus scheme, with bonus payments based on work group performance. 
Thames Water seem unlikely to adopt this approach for a number of 
reasons. One of the challenges with group PRP schemes is identifying a 
team against which meaningful team objectives can be set where 
employees will feel that their individual performance has a direct impact 
on team performance, Director of Human Resources Julia Cherrett saw 
this as major drawback for group PRP. A group PRP scheme would also 
be seen by Thames Water as diluting the Performance Management 
element of PRP. Individual PRP also gives a degree of consistency with 
the individual merit payment received by top management in Thames 
Water. Given the sensitivity (Hodgson, Kirkwood & Smith 1999) over top 
management pay, it may suit Thames Water to be able to argue that a 
consistent approach is adopted to employee reward, even if the 
magnitude of the reward is substantially different depending on the 
employees position in the hierarchy.
Conclusion
The link between pay and performance, explicit in PRP, turns out in this 
case study not to be particularly effective as a mechanism for improving 
employee performance. Over 80% of the Thames water employees 
surveyed said that PRP was not an incentive for increased effort by 
employees. The amount of money employees could potentially earn as a 
performance payment was relatively small and it may be that employees
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felt that It was insufficient incentive. However it is clear that Thames 
water originally intended to use PRP to manage down wage costs and 
were unlikely to be in a position where they would offer employees large 
performance payments. Essentially the contradiction inherent in both 
motivating employees and controlling wages meant that the PRP scheme 
was unlikely to achieve either of these objectives.
From Thames water's point of view it could be argued that the most 
important and enduring objectives they hoped to achieve were 
Performance Management and a more commercially orientated corporate 
culture. However, it seems unlikely that a PRP scheme that does not 
work in its own terms will operate effectively as either a Performance 
Management scheme or as an agent of successful cultural change. In 
addition, the survey evidence shows that there were a number of 
unintended consequences of the Thames Water PRP scheme, including 
an erosion of the trust between Managers and employees, which may 
well have undermined its effectiveness in terms of Performance 
Management or as an agent for bringing about cultural change.
The survey evidence shows that employees like the idea of PRP in the 
abstract, but do not like the practical application of PRP to them. Perhaps 
the problem is one of perception, employees may like the idea of PRP, 
assuming that they will do well from any assessment, but be alienated by 
a scheme which in practice gives them a lower level of assessment than
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they believe that they deserve. It is difficult to see how such problems of 
perception can be addressed. The evidence from the Thames water case 
study suggests that Thames Water would be well advised to focus their 
efforts on making the scheme more transparent and fair, at least in the 
eyes of their employees. To be more effective the scheme also needs to 
be properly managed so that employees get supportive feedback on their 
performance, a large number of employees reported receiving no formal 
feedback on their performance. Even if Thames Water addressed these 
issues there still remains a fundamental problem with the detrimental 
effect that PRP appears to be having on employees' trust in their 
managers. Some commentators have suggested that trust is a 
prerequisite to the effective operation of PRP (Lawler 1981, and Siegall & 
Worth 2001) in which case the damage to the relationship between the 
employee and manager done by PRP may also make the PRP scheme less 
effective as a motivator. But from the Thames Water's perspective the 
more worrying issue may be the effect this erosion of trust has on 
Performance Management and corporate culture, given that Thames 
Water does not believe that PRP is an effective motivator.
Thames Water continues to use PRP and there is no evidence to suggest 
that they will adopt a different reward system as a result of their current 
review of reward systems. Thames Water is aware of the concern 
amongst employees about PRP, both from their own survey evidence and 
from what employees have said to them. All of the managers
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interviewed for this thesis also recognised that PRP was not effective as a 
motivator for employees. So why do Thames Water continue to use PRP? 
Thames Water believed that PRP would support Performance 
Management and help make the company's corporate culture more 
commercially focused. This thesis suggests that PRP may not have been 
particularly effective in changing corporate culture in Thames Water. 
Although Thames Water appears to have given some thought to the 
effectiveness of PRP as a motivator it is not clear how far they have gone 
in assessing PRP as an instrument of Performance Management or 
cultural change. Thames Water's continued use of PRP may, however, 
also reflect the lack of alternative pay system that is as attractive as PRP 
to Thames Water. PRP puts performance at the heart of the employment 
relationship in a way that other pay systems do not. Thames Water wants 
to be seen as a commercially focused organisation and using PRP sends a 
message about the type of company Thames Water is. Perhaps the 
answer to the paradox between the continuing popularity of PRP and the 
ineffectiveness of PRP as a motivator is that it is the message that PRP 
sends about the company that is more important than the effectiveness 
of PRP in either, motivating employees, Performance Management or 
bringing about a change in corporate culture.
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APPENDIX A.i
Sources for this research included a survey of Thames Water employees 
in receipt of PRP and structured interviews with some of those managers 
responsible for the introduction of PRP to Thames Water. Other source 
material included internal documentation and Thames Water's published 
Annual Report.
The Survey
There was some difficulty at first over obtaining access to Thames Water 
managers and employees for this thesis. Thames Water initially refused 
to co-operate with the research for this thesis. Nevertheless it was 
decided to go ahead with the research and a survey of white-collar 
employees, who were members of UNISON and who were receiving PRP, 
was conducted in May 1995. Although Thames Water would not agree to 
actively co-operate with the research, they did not seek to stop or hinder 
it either. This meant that it was possible to conduct a survey of UNISON 
white-collar members who were in receipt of PRP using the internal mail, 
thanks to the co-operation of the Thames Water Branch of UNISON. The 
questionnaire comprised a number of closed questions, where the 
responses could be coded and turned into quantitative information and 
an open question about PRP, which provided some qualitative 
information.
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The survey questionnaire was distributed with the assistance of UNISON 
to 1,500 white-collar members of UNISON working for Thames Water at 
the end of March 1995. The Thames Water Branch of UNISON maintains 
a computerised record of their membership. The branch distributed 
1,500 questionnaires to the white-collar members on their register. 
Thames Water had approximately 3,000 white-collar employees in 1995, 
so questionnaires were distributed to about 50% of the white-collar 
workforce. Thames Water were in the process of introducing PRP for 
manual workers, at the time of the survey, but as the scheme had not 
been in place long enough for manual employees to have fully 
experienced its operation, only white collar employees were surveyed.
There were 489 usable questionnaires returned a response rate of about
33%. That response rate is not as high as either that achieved by
Thompson (1993), which varied over three organisations between 54%
and 82%, or that obtained by Marsden and Richardson (1991), of 60%
amongst Revenue staff. However, it is worth noting that both those
surveys were carried out with the support of the employers. When
Marsden and French (1998) conducted a further survey of Revenue staff,
without the employer's assistance, they obtained a usable response rate
of 30%. Oppenheim (1992) says that sponsorship of a survey by a
relevant agency can be powerful tool in increasing response rates. It
seems likely that the surveys conducted by Thompson, and Marsden and
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Richardson, were able to obtain a higher response rate because of the 
employer's sponsorship of those survey. Unfortunately, Thames Water 
declined the invitation to co-operate with the thesis survey.
The majority of the respondents were men (71%). About 38% of the 
white collar staff covered by PRP in Thames were women in 1993, which 
suggests that there was a slightly higher response rate from men to the 
questionnaire. Most of the respondents were between 25 and 55 years 
of age. Only 15 were under 25, and only 36 were over 55. The age 
profile may reflect the process of downsizing in Thames Water, where 
there has been little recruitment in some areas to bring in younger 
employees and, at the other end of the scale, a loss of older employees, 
who have left taking advantage of the early retirement provisions in the 
company's redundancy scheme. The number of years of service with 
Thames Water ranged from less than a year to 36 years, and the average 
length of service was 13.79 years (st. dev 8.6). There were only 18 part 
time workers amongst the respondents. Most of the respondents were in 
the job grades c to g.
Questionnaire Design
The Questionnaire comprised a number of distinct Sections, each one of
which was concerned with a particular aspect of employment. Section A
asked respondents for their views about PRP in general, as opposed to
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their views about the Thames Water PRP scheme in particular. Section B 
contains Cook and Wall's (1980) commitment Questionnaire, which is 
concerned with the employee's commitment to their employer.
Thames Water's PRP scheme requires managers to set employees' 
performance targets at their Staff Performance Review (SPR), and 
performance is then judged, for PRP purposes, against those 
performance targets. Goal setting theory predicts that the goal setting 
process, as in the case of SPR, will be of critical importance in 
determining employee motivation. Questions about the SPR were set out 
in Sections C and D of the questionnaire. It has also been hypothesised 
that feedback will play an important part in determining employee 
motivation, and Section E contains a number of questions about 
feedback.
Expectancy theory, on the other hand, predicts that it is the relationship 
between performance and reward that will determine employee 
motivation. Respondents were asked in Section F how they felt about 
their latest assessment, and the extent to which it accurately reflected 
their effort. The replies to questions about the relationship between 
assessment and effort are also relevant to equity issues.
The motivational effectiveness of the Thames Water PRP scheme needs
to be judged on the basis of the outcomes for the organisation. It is
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notoriously difficult to measure performance outcomes of PRP without 
conflating the direct effects of PRP with the impact of other variables, 
such as the impact of market changes. Two different approaches have 
been used in this research. Firstly self-reporting of the motivational 
effectiveness of PRP; the relevant questions were set out in Section H of 
the questionnaire. Secondly, employees were asked in Section G, what 
their last performance rating was and where they stood on the salary 
scale. On the face of it, this is a more robust measure of performance 
than self-reporting, because it gives a third party assessment of the 
individual's performance. However, this thesis is concerned with 
motivation not performance. Performance is the product of ability and 
effort on a particular task. Information about the performance rating and 
salary does not distinguish effort from ability. Consequently, an employee 
could receive a better performance rating, when compared to another 
employee, even though they are not trying as hard as that other 
employee, simply because they are more able. The self-report of the 
motivational effectiveness of PRP is therefore more relevant to this 
research, but the performance assessment's and salary are none the less 
interesting.
Section I of the questionnaire is concerned with organisational changes 
over the last two or three years. The employee's perceptions about 
changes in the organisation over the last two to three years helps to give 
an insight into cultural change in the organisation. The effectiveness of
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PRP as a motivator for individuals can then be compared with the extent 
to which they believe that their has been cultural change over the last 
two to three years, to see how far PRP and cultural change are linked. 
The evidence from the qualitative research suggests that Thames Water 
saw PRP as a key mechanism for achieving cultural change in the 
organisation.
Section J asks for biographical detail. And Section K of the questionnaire 
is an open question inviting respondents to say something about their 
experience of PRP. A copy of the Questionnaire is at Appendix A. Each of 
the items within the questionnaire has been identified firstly by the letter 
indicating which Section of the questionnaire it belongs to and then by 
sequential numbering within in each Section.
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Structured Interviews
There was some difficulty at first over obtaining access to Thames Water 
managers and employees for this thesis. Thames Water initially refused 
to co-operate with the research for this thesis. One of the Thames Water 
personnel managers supplied additional qualitative information on the 
PRP scheme prior to the survey being conducted, on the understanding 
that his name would not be quoted in the thesis. Even though Thames 
Water has subsequently decided to co-operate with the research for this 
thesis, the personnel manager's request for anonymity has been 
respected, and the information supplied has been attributed to a 
'Personnel Manager'
After Thames Water agreed to assist with the research, it was possible to
interview a number of the key players from the company. Structured
interviews were conducted with Steve Jay, Derek McManus and Malcolm
Carr. Each of the interviews followed a format similar toi that used with
the Personnel Manager, each interviewee was asked their history with
Thames Water, about the lead up to the introduction of PRP, the reasons
for the introduction of PRP, and for their views on the outcomes from
PRP. The interviews were recorded and transcribed and each of the
interviewees was given an opportunity to correct and amend the record
of their interview. Steve Jay had worked for Unilever as a personnel
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manager for ten years, after completing a postgraduate course in 
Personnel Management and Industrial Relations at the LSE. He joined 
Thames Water in about 1989 and occupied a number of important 
personnel posts, including that of Employee Relations Manager and Head 
of Personnel for the Utility, throughout the period during which PRP was 
being introduced. He subsequently became Personnel Director for 
Thames Water PLC. He has now left the company. Derek McManus 
transferred in to Thames Water Authority when it was formed in 1974, 
and became Employers Side Secretary of the three negotiating machines 
in Thames Water in about 1987. Derek McManus took over as Employee 
Relations Manager from Steve Jay. He has since left the company. 
Malcolm Carr has been with Thames Water for about 20 years and has 
worked in employee relations since about 1990. He took over from Derek 
McManus as Employee Relations Manager and Employer's Side Secretary 
on the Company pay and conditions negotiating machine in 1997.
Julia Cherrett, the European Director of Human Resources, was also 
interviewed. She had succeeded Derek McManus and before becoming 
European Director of human Resources. Julia Cherrett was able to give 
an update on Thames Water's approach to PRP and was asked to 
comment on the first draft of the final Chapter.
Thames Water have recently initiated a review of their reward system,
and although the company is not intending to replace the PRP pay
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system in Thames Water, some of the preparatory work for the review 
provides an interesting if limited update on employee views regarding 
PRP. Thames Water established 12 focus groups from across all business 
units encompassing all grades of employees (the survey conducted for 
this thesis excluded manual workers); no notes were kept of who 
attended or of who said what in order to give a degree of anonymity. All 
views were included in the report prepared of the focus group work, the 
Reward Framework Project Focus Group Feedback Report (October 
2001).
Documentary Sources
The following documents produced by Thames Water were relied on:
Thames Water (1991) 'Annual Report & Accounts 1990/91' - Reading:
Thames Water PLC
Thames Water (1991) 
Thames Water (1992)
Thames Water (1994)
'Pay and Conditions Statement 91/92' - Thames 
Water Company Council papers
'Thames Water Company Council Minutes 
25/5/1992' - Thames Water Company 
Council papers
'Annual Report & Accounts 1993/94' - Reading: 
Thames Water PLC
Thames Water (1994) 'JET Guidelines for Managers' - Reading: Thames
Water PLC
Thames Water (1994)
Thames Water (1994)
'Presentation to the Thames Water Company 
Council' -  Thames Water Company 
Council papers
'Viewfinder 94' -  International Survey Research 
Limited - Reading: Thames Water PLC
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Thames Water (1995)
Thames Water (1995)
Thames Water ( circa 
1995)
Thames Water (1999) 
Thames Water (2001)
'Annual Report & Accounts 1994/95' - Reading: 
Thames Water PLC
'Assessor Training Manual' - Reading: Thames 
Water PLC
'Performance Related Pay -  A Guide for
Employees' - Reading: Thames Water PLC
'Annual Report & Accounts 1998/99' - Reading: 
Thames Water PLC
'The Reward Framework Project Focus Group 
Feedback Report' (October 2001).- 
Internal Thames Water Report
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APPENDIX A.ii
The London School of Economics and Political Science.
Houghton Street, 
London WC2A 2AE
Qul.vii - 3 95
SURVEY 
QUESTIONNAIRE
This Questionnaire has been sent to 
you as part of a Survey being 
conducted for academic research at 
the London School of Economics.
O  The Survey is designed to  exam ine th e  motivational
effectiveness o f linking pay to  perform ance.
O  All answers to  the questionnaire are anonymous and
will be treated in strict confidence; they will only be 
used for the purposes o f overall analysis o f the  
attitudes o f employees.
O  The survey is being conducted with the agreem ent
and assistance o f the Tham es W ater N o .l Branch of 
UNISON.
O  Please return the completed Questionnaire to:
Jane Carless, or UNISON,
4th Floor, FREEPOST (R G 3143),
Nugent House. Reading R G 11B R
In  th e  attached envelope
O Thank you for your help. With the
Questionnaire.
357
Section A
In this section you are asked for your views on the use of 
performance related pay by employers in general. This section 
deals the general principles underlying performance related pay 
and not the specific scheme which applies in your organisation.
Do you agree with the following statements? Please tick 
the appropriate box.
agree agree not sure disagree disagree 
strongly strongly
In general relating pay to 91
performance is a fair way of SD 40 aD zD iD 
paying staff.
Employers benefit from a2
having a well designed
performance related pay SD 4D aD zD iD 
scheme, because employees 
work harder.
Employers run the risk that if 93
they use performance related iD zD aD 4D sD 
pay it will damage teamwork.
Performance related pay can 94 r-.
easily damage staff morale.
Section B
In this section we look at what it means to you being a 
member of your organisation. Some people feel 
themselves to be just an employee, there to do a job of 
work, while others feel more personally involved in the 
organisation they work for. The following items 
express what people might feel about themselves as 
members of their organisation._____________________
Please tick the appropriate box.
I am quite proud to be able to bl No, I disagree strongly D i
tell people who it is I work for. N0 /1 disagree quite a n
lot Dz
No, I disagree just a n
little U3
I am not sure Da
Yes, I agree just a little Ds
Yes, I agree quite a lot CU
Yes, I strongly agree Dz
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employer for good.
I am not willing to put myself 
out just to help the organisation.
too well financially, I would be 
reluctant to change to another 
employer.
organisation.
b2 No, I disagree strongly 
No, I disagree quite a
□ 7
lot
No, I disagree just a
□e
□slittle
I am not sure □4
Yes, I agree just a little □3
Yes, I agree quite a lot □2
Yes, I strongly agree □  1
b3 No, I disagree strongly □7
No, I disagree quite a 
lot
□e
No, I disagree just a 
little
□s
I am not sure □4
Yes, I agree just a little □3
Yes, I agree quite a lot □2
Yes, I strongly agree □1
b4 No, I disagree strongly □1
No, I disagree quite a 
lot
□2
No, I disagree just a 
little
□3
I am not sure □4
Yes, I agree just a little □s
Yes, I agree quite a lot □e
Yes, I strongly agree □7
b5 No, I disagree strongly □  1
No, I disagree quite a 
lot
□2
No, I disagree just a 
little
□3
I am not sure □4
Yes, I agree just a little □5
Yes, I agree quite a lot □e
Yes, I strongly agree □7
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In my work I like to feel I am 1)6 
making some effort, not just for 
myself but for the organisation 
as well.
The offer of a bit more money b7 
with another employer would 
not seriously make me think of 
changing my job.
I would not recommend a close 68 
friend to join our staff.
To know that my own work had M 
made a contribution to the good 
of the organisation would please 
me.
No, I disagree strongly □ i
No, I disagree quite a □ 2
lot
No, I disagree just a □3
little
I am not sure □4
Yes, I agree just a little □ 5
Yes, I agree quite a lot □e
Yes, I strongly agree □7
No, I disagree strongly □  1
No, I disagree quite a □2
lot
No, I disagree just a □3
little
I am not sure □4
Yes, I agree just a little □s
Yes, I agree quite a lot □s
Yes, I strongly agree □7
No, I disagree strongly □7
No, I disagree quite a □ 6
lot
No, I disagree just a □5
little
I am not sure □4
Yes, I agree just a little □3
Yes, I agree quite a lot □2
Yes, I strongly agree □  1
No, I disagree strongly □  1
No, I disagree quite a □2
lot
No, I disagree just a □3
little
I am not sure □4
Yes, I agree just a little □s
Yes, I agree quite a lot □s
Yes, I strongly agree □7
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Section C
This section asks about your Staff Performance Review. 
You should have been given a copy of your last Staff 
Performance Review form.
How many Staff Performance Review interviews have you had in the last 
twelve months?  □  CL
Please answer the following questions using information 
from the last Staff Performance Review you had, even if 
that Staff Performance Review took place more than 
twelve months ago.
How many Objectives were set for you at your last Staff Performance
Review?.........
Was it clear to you at the veiy clear............................  CL
Staff Performance Review quite clear...........................  CL
how you could achieve the not sure...................................  CL
Objectives which had been quite unclear...........................  CL
set? very unclear............................  CLcs
al Quantifiable Objectives:
How many of the Objectives which were set for you related to the achievement
of quantifiable targets?.....
How specific were the very specific......................  CL
quantifiable Objectives that quite specific...........................  CL
were set for you at your last not sure...................................  CL
Staff Performance Review? quite general...........................  CL
very general............................  Dies
Qualitative Objectives:
How many of the Objectives which were set for you relate to the achievement 
of targets of a qualitative nature, that is relate to how well work is
done?....................... .
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How specific were the very specific............................  CL
qualitative Objectives that quite specific...........................  CU
were set for you at your last not sure.................................... CL
Staff Performance Review? quite general...........................  EL
very general...............................CLcz
How long did your last Staff less than 30 minutes CL
Performance Review interview 30 - 59 minutes CL
last 1 -2  hours CL
over 2 hours CL <*
Did your last Staff Performance Review lead to any of the following outcomes 
or activities?
the offer of training/development.....................  Da
a dispute over the interview record........................... CL
further counselling regarding your performance  EL
none of the above  CL *
If you were offered further training or development as a result of the last Staff 
Performance Review has that training or development taken place?
Yes CL NoED lclO
Section D
You are now asked how you feel about the objectives that 
were set for you at the last Staff Performance Review.
Do you agree with the following statements? Please tick 
the appropriate box.
agree agree not sure disagree disagree
Your manager takes your dl 
Staff Performance Review 
very seriously.
strongly strongly
5 CD 4Q 3CD 2 CD 1CD
d2You had the right amount of 
influence over setting the 
Objectives that were set in
your Staff Performance 2
Review.
The Objectives which were ^ 
set for you at the Staff
Performance Review are SCD a\J aD zED iCD 
relevant to your job.
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agree agree not sure disagree disagree
strongly strongly
You have all the skills and M 
ability necessary to perform
the Objectives that have SG a\3 3Q 2Q iG
been set for you in the Staff 
Performance Review.
It will be necessary to d5 
increase your effort at work n  n
to achieve the Objectives 
that have been set for you.
»□ 2O iG
d6You are personally 
committed to achieving the
Objectives that were set for SQ 4G 3Q 2G iQ
you at the Staff Performance
Review.
It will be difficult to achieve 67
the Objectives set at the n  n
Staff Performance Review. iG 2G iG
It would improve your job d8
security if you achieved the SQ 40 3Q 2Q iG 
Objectives set for you.
d9It would improve the
prospect of future pay n
increases if you achieved the 5 
goals set for you.
»Q 3Q 2G iG
dlOIt would be advantageous 
for your promotion n
prospects if you achieved 
the goals set for you.
4O 3Q 2Q  i Q
d ll
Attaining the goals set for
you would increase your 5Q 4Q 3Q 2G iG
sense of self confidence at
work.
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Section E
These questions are concerned with feedback, that is 
what you have been told about how well or badly you are 
doing at work.____________________________________
Do you agree with the following statements? Please tick 
the appropriate box.
agree agree not sure disagree disagree
strongly strongly
Your manager is bad at el
giving you feedback on your iD 2D 3D sD
performance.
You receive frequent 62
informal feedback from your 
manager regarding your n
progress towards the 
Objectives set at the Staff 
Performance Review.
,□ 3n  2n  in
The feedback you have had 63 n  n  
has riot been encouraging. iD 4CH 5O
You feel a sense of 
achievement when you 
receive feedback to the 
effect that you are on target 
to attain the Objectives set 
for you.
>0 4Q 3n 2n iD
Feedback is important in 65
helping you to attain your SD aD 3D 2D iD 
job Objectives.
How many times have you received informal feedback on your performance 
during the last year?  Cl Cl *
Section F
The next set of questions are concerned with your 
feelings about the assessment of your performance for
the Performance Related Pay scheme._________________
How well do you understand your very well.......................  CL
employers performance related pay quite well.....................  CL
scheme? not sure.......................  IH3
only in part.................  CL
not at all.....................  Dm
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Do you agree with the following statements? Please tick 
the appropriate box.
12
agree agree not sure disagree disagree 
strongly strongly
. Performance related pay 
has eroded some of the trust
which existed between you iD 2D 3D aD sD 
and the manager responsible 
for assessing you.
Your manager knows enough R 
about you and your work to 
be able to assess your 
performance accurately.
>□ 2D iD
Your most recent w 
assessment was a fair
reflection of your
performance.
;□ 4D 3D 2D iD
You have to keep on the * 
'right side' of your manager 
to get a good assessment 
rating.
reIt is easier to get a higher 
performance assessment in 
other parts of the 
organisation.
iD
The performance criteria K
against which you were 5D  4D 3D  2O iD
assessed were fair.
Staff are often denied the n
assessment they deserve 
because there is a quota
system for assessments iD 2D 3D  4D sD
which predetermines the 
number of people in each 
assessment level.
The trouble with ra
performance pay is that a 
good assessment by the n  n
reporting officer is too often 
overruled by someone 
higher up.
*D 4D sD
iD 4D sD
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If you achieve the goals set fl° 
for you at the last Staff 
Performance Review it is 
likely that you will receive a 
better performance
assessment.
You do less well out of m 
performance pay than some 
of your colleagues.
You are poorly paid for the f12 
work that you do.
Section G
In this section you are asked about your last performance 
assessment for Performance Related Pay. You should 
have details of your last overall assessment and your 
resultant position in relation to Scale Salary.___________
What was your last overall Excellent.........................  HU
assessment? Very Good......................  ds
Fully Acceptable  □4
Needs Improvement  CL
Unacceptable................  CL
Not Known....................  C L gi
What percentage of Scale Salary have over 115%.................  CL
you been paid since the last 107.6%-115%................. CL
assessment? 101% -107.5%................CL
Scale Salary......................CL
92.6% - 99%.................. CL
85% - 92.5%....................CL
less than 85%...................Chg2
Section H
In this part of the questionnaire you are asked how you 
feel about Performance Related Pay in Thames Water.
Do you believe that by trying harder to
achieve the Objectives that are set for yes.... CL
you at the Staff Performance Review it no... CL
would be possible to increase the Do not know.CLhi
amount of pay that you earn?
agree
strongly
sd
id
id
agree
4d
2d
2d
not sure
3d
3d
3d
disagree
2d
<d
4d
disagree
strongly
id
sd
sd
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Do you believe that by trying harder to
improve your performance in relation yes... Db
to the Performance Criteria it would be no ... D2
possible to increase the amount of pay Do not know. CL h2
that you earn?
Do you agree with the following statements? Please tick 
the appropriate box.
h3
agree agree not sure disagree disagree 
strongly strongly
It is important for your 
sense of self confidence at 
work for you to get a sD 4D sD 2D iD 
performance payment.
Performance related pay has M
encouraged you to work
harder. sD 4D »□ 2D iD
h5Performance related pay has 
generally encouraged other n  n  
employees at your work to 
work harder.
,□ 2D iD
h6You personally have been 
paid more fairly as a result n
of the introduction of sU
performance related pay.
iD 2n  iD
Hard work is adequately h7 ^  ^  _
rewarded by your employer. sU 4U 3U zLJ lLJ
h8Performance related pay has 
had no effect on the quality 
your work because it was iD 2D 3D 4D SD
already at the appropriate 
standard.
The existence of h9 
performance related pay has
made you willing to improve sU 4 3U zU lU
the quality of your work.
hlOThe existence of
performance related pay has n  n
made you willing to improve 5 4
the quantity of your work.
iD 2D iD
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agree agree not sure disagree disagree
strongly strongly
Performance related pay has h11 
to be substantially Increased 
before it will improve 
performance.
Performance related pay has h12 
given you the incentive to 
work beyond the 
requirements of your job.
Performance related pay has h13 
encouraged you to give n  
sustained performance at 
work.
iD
>n iD
*□ 3D 2D iD
Performance related pay has h14 
given you a greater incentive
to get your work priorities sD 4D  3D 2D iD 
right.
Performance related pay has h15
caused jealousies between iD 2D 3D 4D sD 
staff.
Section I
This section asks about some of the other things that 
have been happening at work in the last two or three 
years.___________________________________________
Do you agree with the following statements? Please tick the
appropriate box.
agree agree not sure disagree disagree 
strongly strongly
The core values which are 1 
promoted by the
organisation are now n  n
supported by a larger 
proportion of the workforce 
than they used to be.
iD 2D iD
The pressure on employees 12
to work harder has increased SD  4D 3D 2D iD
substantially.
There are unlikely to be any 13
further significant reductions iD 2D 3D 4D  sD
in the size of the workforce.
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There is less of a feeling of 
'us' and 'them' between 
employees and management 
than there used to be.
Employees are more likely to 
be treated as individuals by 
the organisation than they 
were in the past.
Employees feel more
confident about being
flexible in their approach to 
changes in their work than in 
the past.
Communication between the 
management and employees 
is generally improving.
Management generally are 
more inclined to listen to the 
views of employees than 
they used to be.
Trade unions have less a 
important role to play in 
protecting employees than 
they used to have.
It seems inevitable that 
performance related pay will 
lead to an increasingly 
individualised approach to 
the employment relationship 
by your employer.
110
i l l
agree
strongly
n
n
n
n
agree not sure disagree disagree
strongly
n
*□
n
n
»□
«□
n i n
n
n
>□
n
n
iD
i □
n
iD
L □
Section J
This section asks for some information about 
you.
How long have you been working for the company and its predecessors? 
.........
[Please state the number of completed years.]
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Which of the following age categories under 25...Di
do you fall into: 25 to 34...□ 2
35 to 44...D3
45 to 55...CU
over 55...Dsj2
Are you? Male □  1 or Female □
Are you? full time Dz
part time.... CL *
What grade are you on? Band...................... Djs
Section K
Finally, this section gives you the opportunity 
to make any comment you want to about 
your experience of Performance Related Pay.
There are a lot of different claims made for performance related pay, for 
instance it is sometimes claimed that performance related pay motivates 
employees to work harder, but on the other hand it is also said that 
performance related pay may cause jealousies between staff and damages 
teamwork, could you summarise your own experience of performance related 
pay in Thames Water in your own words?
Thank you for your assistance in completing this 
questionnaire.
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APPENDIX B
Chapter 8
Outcome Frequencies
F AGREESTRONGLY
AGREE NOT SURE DISAGREE DISAGREE
STRONGLY
i "In general relating pay to 
performance Is a fair way of 
paying staff"
8.2% 58.4% 15% 13.3% 4.7%
ii "You personally have been paid 
more fairly as a result of the 
introduction of performance 
related pay"
0% 10.7% 16.3% 45.5% 26.6%
iii "Hard work is adequately 
rewarded by your employer." 0.9% 6.9% 10.7% 52.8% 27.9%
iv "Performance related pay has 
encouraged you to work 
harder."
3% 14.6% 12.4% 49.8% 20.2%
V "Performance related pay has 
given you the incentive to work 
beyond the requirements of 
your job."
1.3% 7.3% 9% 55.8% 25.8%
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Outcome Frequencies
F AGREESTRONGLY
AGREE NOT SURE DISAGREE DISAGREE
STRONGLY
vi "Performance related pay has 
encouraged you to give 
sustained performance at 
work."
0.4% 14.6% 9.4% 52.4% 22.3%
vii Performance related pay has 
generally encouraged other 
employees at your work to work 
harder.
0.9% 6.9% 27.5% 46.4% 18%
viii 'The existence of performance 
related pay has made you 
willina to improve the quality of 
your work."
0.9% 15% 12% 53.2% 18.5%
ix 'The existence of performance 
related pay has made you 
willina to improve the quantity 
of your work."
0.9% 17.6% 10.3% 52.4% 18.5%
X "Performance related pay has 
given you a greater incentive to 
get your work priorities right."
0.9% 16.7% 8.6% 51.1% 22.3%
APPENDIX B
Chapter 8
Outcome Frequencies
F AGREESTRONGLY
AGREE NOT SURE DISAGREE DISAGREE
STRONGLY
xi 'The pressure on employees to 
work harder has increased 
substantially."
42.5% 49.8% 3.9% 2.6% 0.9%
xii 'There are unlikley to be any 
further significant reductions in 
the size of the workforce."
0.9% 3.4% 19.3% 45.1% 30.9%
xiii "Communication between 
management and employees is 
generally improving."
0.9% 29.2% 13.7% 34.3% 21%
xiv "Management generally are 
more inclined to listen to the 
views of employees than they 
used to be."
1.3% 27.5% 16.7% 31.8% 22.3%
XV 'The core values which are 
promoted by the organisation 
are now supported by a larger 
proportion of the workforce 
than they used to be."
0.9% 25.3% 35.2% 28.8% 9%
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Outcome Frequencies
F AGREESTRONGLY
AGREE NOT SURE DISAGREE DISAGREE
STRONGLY
xvi 'There is less of a feeling of 'us' 
and 'them' between employees 
and management than there 
used to be."
0.9% 11.2% 9.9% 47.2% 30.5%
xvii "Employees are more likely to 
be treated as individuals by the 
organisation than they were in 
the past."
2.1% 11.6% 14.2% 39.9% 31.8%
xviii "It seems inevitable that 
performance related pay will 
lead to an increasingly 
individualised approach to the 
employment relationship by 
your employer."
9% 44.2% 30.9% 12% 3%
xix "Employees feel more confident 
about being flexible in their 
approach to changes in their 
work than in the past."
2.1% 37.8% 18.9% 27% 13.7%
XX 'Trade unions have a less 
important role to play in 
protecting employees than they 
used to have."
13.7% 36.5% 6.9% 25.8% 16.7%
APPENDIX B
Chapter 8
Outcome Frequencies
F AGREESTRONGLY
AGREE NOT SURE DISAGREE DISAGREE
STRONGLY
xxi "Employers run the risk that if 
they use performance related 
pay it will damage teamwork."
2.1% 23.6% 16.7% 41.2% 15.5%
xxii "Performance related pay has 
caused jealousies between 
staff."
2.1% 14.6% 23.2% 36.5% 23.2%
xxiii "Performance related pay has 
eroded some of the trust which 
existed between you and the 
manager responsible for 
assessing you."
15.9% 27.9% 18.9% 32.6% 3%
xxiv "You have to keep on the 'right 
side1 of your manager to get a 
good assessment rating."
17.6% 30.9% 21% 25.8% 3.9%
APPENDIX C
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Process Frequencies
F AGREE
STRONGLY
AGREE NOT SURE DISAGREE DISAGREE
STRONGLY
i 'Your manager takes your Staff 
Performance Review seriously/ 15% 39.1% 16.3% 15.5% 10.3%
ii 'You had the right amount of 
influence over setting the 
Objectives that were set in your 
Staff Performance Review/
7.3 43.3% 15% 22.3% 8.6%
iii 'The Objectives which were set 
for you at the Staff Performance 
Review are relevant to your 
job/
15.5% 67% 5.2% 6.9% 1.7%
iv 'You are personally committed 
to achieving the Objectives that 
were set for you at the Staff 
Performance Review/
21.5% 54.9% 8.6% 8.6% 2.6%
V 'It would improve the prospects 
of future pay increases if you 
achieved the goals set for you/
6.4% 21% 15.9% 30.5% 24.3%
APPENDIX C
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Process Frequencies
F AGREE
STRONGLY
AGREE NOT SURE DISAGREE DISAGREE
STRONGLY
vi 'You have all the skills and 
ability necessary to perform the 
objectives that have been set 
for you/
18.9% 58% 10.7% 7.3% 0.9%
vii 'It will be necessary to increase 
your effort at work to achieve 
the Objectives that have been 
set for you/
11.2% 37.3% 17.2% 26.2% 4.3%
viii 'It would be advantageous for 
your promotion prospects if you 
achieved the goals set for you/
4.3% 16.3% 24.5% 35.2% 15.5%
ix 'It would improve your job 
security if you achieved the 
Objectives set for you/
6.4% 21% 15.9% 30.5% 22.3%
X 'Attaining the goals set for you 
would increase your sense of 
self confidence at work/
14.2% 42.1% 9% 24% 6%
APPENDIX C
Chapter 9
Process Frequencies
F AGREE
STRONGLY
AGREE NOT SURE DISAGREE DISAGREE
STRONGLY
xi 'Your most recent assessment 
was a fair reflection of your 
performance/
6.9% 52.4% 14.2% 15.9% 9.4%
xii 'You have to keep on the 'right 
side' of your manager to get a 
good assessment rating/
17.6% 30.9% 21% 25.8% 3.9%
xiii 'The trouble with performance 
pay is that a good assessment 
by the reporting officer is too 
often overruled by someone 
higher up/
27.5% 27% 30.5% 13.7% 1.3%
xiv 'Staff are often denied the 
assessment they deserve 
because there is a quota system 
for assessments which 
predetermines the number of 
people in each assessment 
level/
42.9% 24% 21.9% 7.7% 3.4%
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Process Frequencies
F AGREE
STRONGLY
AGREE NOT SURE DISAGREE DISAGREE
STRONGLY
XV 'Hard work is adequately 
rewarded by your employer. 0.9% 6.9% 10.7% 52.8% 27.9%
xvi 'It is easier to get a higher 
performance assessment in 
other parts of the organisation/
18.9% 18% 54.9% 6.9% 0.9%
xvii 'You do less well out of 
performance pay than some of 
your colleagues/
13.7% 25.3% 34.8% 22.7% 3%
xviii 'You receive frequent informal 
feedback from your manager 
regarding your progress 
towards the Objectives set for 
you at your Staff Performance 
Review/
1.7% 23.2% 9.9% 42.5% 22.3%
xix 'You feel a sense of 
achievement when you receive 
feedback to the effect that you 
are on target to attain the 
objectives set for you/
11.2% 57.1% 12.4% 11.2% 3%
APPENDIX C
Chapter 9
Process Frequencies
F AGREE
STRONGLY
AGREE NOT SURE DISAGREE DISAGREE
STRONGLY
XX 'Feedback is important in 
helping you to attain your 
objectives/
31.3% 49.4% 7.7% 8 . 6 % 2.1%
APPENDIX C
Chapter 9
Process Frequencies
F AGREE
DONT
KNOW DISAGREE
xxi I am quite proud to be able to tell people who it is I work for. 
(b l) 67% 5% 29%
xxii I feel myself to be part of the organisation. (b5) 62% 4% 34%
xxiii I would not recommend a close friend to join our staff. (b8) 31% 14% 55%
xxiv I sometimes feel like leaving this employer for good. 55% 5% 40%
XXV Even if the firm were not doing too well financially. I would be 
reluctant to change to another employer. 47% 18% 36%
xxvi The offer of a bit more money with another employer would not 
seriously make me think of changing my job. 39% 15% 47%
xxvii I am not willing to put myself out just to help the organisation. 19% 4% 77%
xxviii In my work I like to feel I am making some effort, not just for 
myself but for the organisation as well. 90% 3% 7%
xxix bTo know that my own work had made a contribution to the 
organisation would please me. (b9) 94% 2% 4%
Appendix D
Variable Definitions
Label Definition Mean
MOTIVATION Measure of the motivational effectiveness of 2.2 
PRP comprising seven items, a = .99 
(hl3)'Performance related pay has 
encouraged you to give sustained 
Performance at work/
Factor Loading.86 (from factor analysis)
(hlO)'The existence of performance related 
pay has made you willing to improve the 
quantity of your work/
Factor Loading .82
(h9)'The existence of performance related 
pay has made you willing to improve the 
quality of your work/
Factor Loading .82
(hl4)'Performance related pay has given you 
a greater incentive to get your work priorities 
right/
Factor Loading .82
(hl2)'Performance related pay has given you 
the incentive to work beyond the 
requirements of your job/
Factor Loading .82
(h4)'Performance related pay has encouraged 
you to work harder/
Factor Loading .78
(h5)'Performance related pay has generally 
encouraged other employees at your work to 
work harder/
Factor Loading .64
Based on a five item scale where 5 =high level 
of motivation and 1 = low level of motivation 
(N = 482)
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Label Definition Mean
INSTRVAL The instrumentality and valence comprising 2.6 
three items, a =.8
(d9) 'It would improve the prospect of future 
pay increases if you achieved the goals set 
for you/
Factor Loading .84
(dlO) 'It would be advantageous for your 
promotion prospects if you achieved the goals 
set for you/
Factor Loading 80
(d8) 'It would improve your job security if you 
achieved the objectives set for you/
Factor Loading 78
Based on a five item scale where 5 =high 
level of instrumentality and valence and 1 = 
low level of instrumentality and valence 
(N=469)
EXPECTANCY The expectancy of a valent outcome 21 
comprising two items, a = .7 
(hl2)'Do you believe that by trying harder to 
improve your Performance in relation to the 
Performance Criteria it would be possible to 
increase the amount of pay that you earn?'
Factor Loading .83
(hi) 'Do you believe that by trying harder to 
achieve the Objectives that were set for you 
at the Staff Performance Review it would be 
possible to increase the amount of pay that 
you earn?'
Factor Loading .76
Based on a five item scale where 5 =high 
level of expectancy and 1 = low level of 
expectancy (N=488)
FAIRA The employee's feelings about the fairness of 3.23 
the assessment of the employee's 
performance by the manager comprising 
three items. a =  .66
(f4) 'Your most recent assessment was a fair
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Label Definition Mean
reflection of your performance/
Factor Loading .79
(f3) 'Your manager knows enough about you 
and your work to be able to assess your 
performance accurately/
Factor Loading .58
(f6) 'The criteria against which you were 
assessed were fair/
Factor Loading .53
Based on a five item scale where 5 =high 
level of feeling the assessment was fair and 1 
= low level of feeling the assessment was fair 
(N=476)
INTERFEREA Employee's feelings about interference in the 2.32 
manager's assessment of the employee's 
performance comprising three items, a = .68 
(f8) 'The trouble with performance pay is that 
a good assessment by the reporting officer is 
too often overruled by someone higher up.'
Factor Loading .72
(f7) 'Staff are often denied the assessment 
they deserve because there is a quota system 
for assessments which predetermines the 
number of people in each assessment level/
Factor Loading .70
(f9) It is easier to get a higher performance 
assessment in other parts of the organization 
Factor Loading .51
Based on a five item scale where 5 =high 
level of feeling the assessment was not 
interfered with and 1 = low level of 
confidence that the assessment was not 
interfered with (N=484)
GOODF The employee's feelings about feedback from 2.9 
their manager regarding the employee's 
performance comprising three items, a  = .6
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(el) -  reverse scored - 'Your manager is bad 
at giving you feedback on your performance.' 
Factor Loading .74
(e2) 'You receive frequent informal feedback 
from your manager regarding your progress 
towards the Objectives set at the Staff 
Performance Review.
Factor Loading .64
(e3) -  reverse scored - 'The feedback you 
have had has not been encouraging/
Factor Loading .51
Based on a five item scale where 5 = good 
feedback and 1 = poor feedback (N=455)
POSmVEF A measure of the employee's need for 3.23 
positive feedback comprising three items. a=
.65
(e5) 'Feedback is important in helping you to 
attain your Objectives/
Factor Loading .71
(e4) 'You feel a sense of achievement when 
you receive feedback to the effect that you 
are on target to attain the Objectives set for 
you/
Factor Loading .59
(d ll)  'Attaining the goals set for you would 
increase your sense of self confidence at 
work.'
Factor Loading .51
Based on a five item scale where 5 = most 
need for positive feedback and 1 = least 
(N=455)
DIFFICULTG The employee's perception of goal difficulty 3.03 
comprising two items, a = .58 
(d5) 'It will be necessary to increase your 
effort at work to achieve the objectives which
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have been set for you/
Factor Loading .76
(d7) 'It will be difficult to achieve the 
objectives set at the Staff Performance 
Review/
Factor Loading .64
Based on a five item scale where 5 = most 
difficult and 1 = least (N=463)
SPECIFICG Goal specificity comprising three items. a =  3.42 
.82
(c7) 'How specific were the qualitative 
Objectives that were set for you at your last 
Staff Performance Review?'
Factor Loading .84
(c5) 'How specific were the quantifiable 
Objectives that were set for you at your last 
Staff Performance Review?'
Factor Loading .80
(c3) 'Was it clear to you at the Staff 
Performance Review how you could achieve 
the Objectives which had been set?'
Factor Loading .67
Based on a five item scale where 5 = most 
specific and 1 = least (N=380)
RELEVANTG A measure of the employee's perception of 3.7 
goal appropriateness comprising three items, 
a  = .56
(d3) 'The Objectives which were set for you 
at the Staff Performance Review are relevant 
to your job/
Factor Loading .76
(d2) 'You had the right amount of 
influence over setting the Objectives 
that were set for you in your Staff
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Performance Review/
Factor Loading .68
(d4)'You have the skills and ability 
necessary to perform the objectives 
that have been set for you in the staff 
performance review/
Factor Loading .61
Based on a five item scale where 5 = most 
appropriate and 1 = least (N=464)
UNITARY A measure of the employee's perception 2.53 
about the changing nature of the 
employment relationship over the period that 
PRP had been in operation comprising six 
items. a= .84
(i9) 'Management generally are more inclined 
to listen to the views of employees than they 
used to be/
Factor Loading .83
(i8) 'Communication between management 
and employees is generally improving/
Factor Loading .81
(i5) 'Employees are more likely to be treated 
as individuals by the organisation than they 
were in the past/
Factor Loading .77
(i7) 'Employees feel more confident about 
being flexible in their approach to changes in 
their work than in the past/ 
eigwenvalue .72
(i4) 'There is less a feeling of 'us1 and 'them1 
between employees and management than 
there used to be/
Factor Loading .72
(il)  'The core values which are promoted by 
the organisation are now supported by a 
larger proportion of the workforce than they 
used to be/
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Factor Loading .57
Based on a five item scale where 5 = more 
unitarist over period since the introduction of 
PRP and 1 = least (N=483)
BELONG A measure of the employee's feelings of 3.25 
identification and loyalty -  based on Cook &
Wall's (1980) standard commitment questions 
- comprising six items. a= .82 
(b2) reverse scored - 'I sometimes feel like 
leaving this employer for good.'
Factor Loading .76
(b4) 'Even if the firm were not doing to well 
financially, I would be reluctant to change to 
another employer.'
Factor Loading .71
(b8) -  reverse scored - 'I would not 
recommend a close friend to join our staff/
Factor Loading .69
(b5) 'I feel myself to be part of the 
organisation/
Factor Loading .69
(bl) 'I am quite proud to be able to tell 
people who it is I work for/
Factor Loading .68
(b7) 'The offer of a bit more money with 
another employer would not seriously make 
me think of changing my job/
Factor Loading .63
Based on a seven item scale where 7 = 
greatest feelings of loyalty and identification 
and 1 = least (N=485)
INVOLVEMENT A measure of the employee's feelings of 4.41 
involvement -  based on Cook & Wall's (1980) 
standard commitment questions - comprising 
three items. a= .67
(b9) 'To know that my own work had made a
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contribution to the good of the organisation 
would please me'
Factor Loading .81
(b6) 'In my work I like to feel I am making 
some effort, not just for myself but for the 
organisation as well/
Factor Loading .79
(b3) -  reverse scored 'I am not willing to put 
myself out just to help the organisation/ 
Factor Loading .64
Based on a seven item scale where 7 = 
greatest feelings of involvement and 1 = least 
(N=485)
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Appendix E
Correlation Matrix -  Latent Variables -  Spearman's rho 2tailed sig. **>.01 *>.05
MOTIVATION
INSTVAL___
EXPECTANCY
FAIRA_____
INTERFEREA
GOODF 
POSITIVE F
DIFFICLTG
SPECIFICG
RELEVANTG
UNITARY
BELONG
INVOLVEMENT
Appendix F
Hypotheses
No. Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1. 'Thames Water introduced PRP in order to 
achieve a number of objectives, but 
principally in order to achieve a change in 
corporate culture following privatisation/
Hypothesis
2(a)(1)
HH 1
'Individual employee motivation will tend 
to increase as a result of PRP, where the 
employee has an expectancy that 
improved performance will be instrumental 
in leading to a valent outcome."
Hypothesis
2(a)(ii).
m  i
'The explanatory powers of expectancy 
theory in respect of the motivational 
effectiveness of PRP will be improved by 
factoring in Equity considerations'
Hvpothesis
2(a)(iii)
ESS
'The explanatory powers of expectancy 
theory in respect of the motivational 
effectiveness of PRP will be improved by 
factoring in feedback/
Outcome
The qualitative evidence from structured interviews 
with key players supports this hypothesis -  see 
Chapter 7.
Regression analysis confirms this association, R .36 
(Table 10.i). N.B. However, while motivation in 
Thames Water increases in response to these 
variables, it is still only the minority in Thames Water 
who report that they are motivated by PRP.
Equity variables increase the explanatory power of 
the expectancy model, so that R.39 (Table 10.ii). This 
is only a marginal improvement in the explanatory 
power of the model and it is suggested that is 
because instrumentality already comprises some 
equity considerations
Feedback further increases the explanatory power of 
the expectancy model so that R.43 (Table 10.iii). 
Manipulation of the model then suggests a more 
parsimonious expectancy model R.42 (Table 10.iv) 
where equity variables are removed but feedback 
variables are retained.
Hypothesis 2
(b)
Hypothesis 2 
(c)
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2
(dm
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Hypotheses
'In so far as goal setting theory explains 
the motivational effectiveness of a PRP 
scheme, individual employee motivation 
will be directly and positively related to 
goal difficulty for specific goals to which 
the employee is committed.'
'Goal setting and expectancy theory will 
not be cumulative in the extent to which 
they explain the motivational effectiveness 
of the Thames Water PRP scheme.'
'Where employees believe that other 
employees of the same firm are being paid 
comparatively more for their effort, they 
will be demotivated.'
'Where employees perceive that there is 
procedural inequity in the PRP scheme 
they will be less motivated.'
_____
Regression analysis suggests a relatively lower level 
of association between goal setting variables and 
motivation, R.23 (Table 10.v). There were problems in 
identifying a measure for commitment and goal 
relevance and difficulty both had poor scale reliability. 
The literature also suggests problems with 
operationalising this theory in a field setting. 
Consequently it is difficult to be confident about the 
results.
Goal setting and expectancy do not have a 
cumulative explanatory effect on the results of the 
Thames Water survey (Table 10.vi) and these results 
support this hypothesis.
Distributive equity was not identified as an underlying 
variable by factor analysis, consequently it was 
necessary to rely on a single item in the 
questionnaire. There turned out to be a relatively poor 
association between this item and motivation R.15 
(Table 10.vii).
Procedural equity was more highly associated with 
motivation, R.27 (Table 10.viii) than distributive 
equity. This suggests that hypothesis 2 (d)(ii) is a 
more robust explanation of motivation in Thames 
Water than hypothesis 2 (d)(i).
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Hypotheses
Hypothesis
3(a)
The Thames Water programme of cultural 
change will have brought about a change 
for some employees in their view of the 
relationship with their employer, and that 
will in turn have increased the commitment 
of those employees to the employer.
m
Hypothesis
3(b)
Employees who are more committed to 
their employer will be more highly 
motivated by PRP than employees who are 
less committed to their employer/
Hvpothesis
m
'PRP will be more effective in changing 
organisational culture where the PRP 
scheme is also successful in motivating 
employees/
The two commitment variables identified in this 
research are associated with measures of cultural 
change, R.50 (Table 10.x) and R.37 (Table 10.xi). 
These results support this hypothesis, however it is 
difficult to be confident about the flow of causation, 
and these results should be treated with caution.
There is a relatively weak association between 
commitment and motivation, R.26 (Table 10.xiii). This 
suggests either that PRP may not be a particularly 
effective mechanism for brining about cultural change 
or that the proposed model for explaining its 
effectiveness is not particularly robust.
There is an association between cultural change and 
motivation, R.44 (Table 10.xiii). These results support 
this hypothesis, however it is difficult to be confident 
about the flow of causation, and these results should 
be treated with caution. However the issues raised 
about the effectiveness of PRP as an agent of cultural 
change would provide an interesting avenue for 
further research.
